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I. ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
4. Expectation of Privacy
Fourth amendment protection attaches to a warrantless search or
seizure only if a person's legitimate expectation of privacy has been
violated.' A legitimate expectation of privacy arises when one pos-
sesses a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable.2
1. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). "[C]apacity to claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon
whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the invaded place." Id at 143 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967)).
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In his concurring opinion in Katz, Jus-
tice Harlan stated the now-famous two-prong test for determining whether a person is enti-
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1. Briefcases
In United States v. Allen,3 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents' warrantless search and seizure of
Allen's briefcase and ordered the drugs found inside suppressed.4 The
agents contended that they had probable cause to seize the briefcase
based on the following facts: Allen fit some of the characteristics of the
DEA's drug courier profile, he started to tremble and perspire when
informed that the agents believed he was carrying drugs, and a strip
search to which Allen had consented produced no contraband.5 The
Ninth Circuit, however, found these facts insufficent to "warrant a pru-
dent [person] in believing that. . . [Allen] had committed or was com-
mitting an offense."6
2. Paper bags
In United States v. Honigman,7 the Ninth Circuit held that evi-
dence found during a warrantless search was properly admitted be-
cause the container involved was a paper bag.8 DEA agents discovered
LSD during a warrantless search of a paper bag that Honigman was
carrying through a Safeway store parking lot.' On appeal, the court
first noted that the agents had probable cause to seize the paper bag.10
In considering that its earlier decision in United States v. Mackey' was
controlling, the court concluded that Honigman did not "'possess a
sufficient privacy interest in the paper bag to justify imposing the war-
rant requirement,' "12 and that because the bag had been lawfully
seized, it could also be searched.' 3 The distinguishing features of paper
bags that the Honigman court considered to justify a reduced privacy
interest were the ease with which they could be torn, their inability to
be latched, and the relatively greater extent to which their contents
tied to fourth amendment protection. The test requires "that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,. . . that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
3. 644 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1980).
4. Id at 751-52.
5. Id. at 751.
6. Id at 752 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
7. 633 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1980).
8. lid at 1338.
9. Id at 1337-38.
10. Id at 1337.
11. 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980).
12. 633 F.2d at 1338 (quoting United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir.
1980)).
13. 633 F.2d at 1338.
19821
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could be discerned by holding or feeling them. 14
3. Parent-child confidences
In United States v. Penn, 's the Ninth Circuit ruled that there is no
expectation of privacy in a mother's confidences with her minor child.
The police had searched defendant Penn's home and backyard under a
valid search warrant for a cache of heroin.' 6 Penn's children, ranging
in age from five to twenty-two, were present during the search. 7 The
children were very uncooperative, and in their taunting of the police
they demonstrated awareness of their mother's drug activities.i' At one
point during the search, an officer asked the youngest child if he knew
where the heroin was hidden. 9 The child answered yes but hesitated
when the officer asked him to point out its location.20 The officer then
offered the child five dollars to lead him to the heroin, and the child
agreed.
21
The Ninth Circuit found that the police conduct did not violate
Penn's fourth amendment rights because the child "was free to reveal
the information at will to anyone in the world."22 Penn did not, there-
fore, possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in any information she
had revealed to the child.
4. Abandoned property
The search of abandoned property and the subsequent discovery
of incriminating evidence is another circumstance in which a warrant-
less search or seizure is considered reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment.24 In United States v. Diggs,25 the Ninth Circuit stated that the
test of "abandonment" is whether the owner "has retained a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the articles alleged to have been aban-
14. Id (citing United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1980)).
15. 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (5-4 decision) (en banc).
16. Id at 878-79.
17. Id




22. Id at 883.
23. Id Accord Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). In Hoffa, the Supreme
Court decided that when a person misplaces his or her trust by voluntarily giving incrimi-
nating information to another, the information is not entitled to fourth amendment protec-
tion if later revealed to law enforcement officials. Id at 302-03.
24. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).
25. 649 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981).
Vol. 15
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doned."26 In Diggs, evidence was seized from the defendant's motel
room, which had been his residence while he had engaged in certain
illegal activity." The trial court denied his motion to suppress the evi-
dence, finding that the seized property had been abandoned. 8
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that there was sufficient evi-
dence demonstrating that Diggs no longer had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the articles.29 The court based its finding of abandonment
on the following facts: Diggs owed $1000 in back rent when he left the
motel room, the motel had terminated his tenancy after receiving the
key to his room in the mail, and Diggs never attempted to retrieve any
of the articles he left in the room.3"
A residence may be found to be abandoned even when a person
possesses a subjective or undisclosed intent to return. In United States v.
Sledge, 31 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of the de-
fendants' motion to suppress drug paraphernalia seized from their
apartment during a warrantless search.32 On March 1, 1979 the de-
fendants gave thirty days' notice to their landlord of their intent to va-
cate their apartment.33 The rent had been paid through March.34
Approximately March 15, the landlord went to the apartment to in-
quire when the defendants were planning to leave.35 Finding no one at
home, the landlord left a note requesting the defendants to telephone
him.36 They did not comply with his requests, nor did they answer his
subsequent phone calls.37 On March 29, the landlord again returned to
the apartment and found the front door open, but no one present in-
sideY.3 The next day, the landlord found the apartment completely
empty of the defendants' furnishings and food.39 Concluding that the
apartment had been vacated, the landlord recovered possession, began
to clean the apartment, and discovered various chemicals in a box.4"
26. Id at 735 (citing United States v. Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 975 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973)).
27. 649 F.2d at 734-35.
28. Id at 735.
29. Id
30. Id
31. 650 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1981).
32. Id at 1082.
33. Id at 1075.
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The landlord then called a DEA agent who searched the apartment and
seized the drug paraphernalia. 41 The Ninth Circuit upheld the war-
rantless search and seizure, ruling that although the defendants may
have possessed a subjective or undisclosed intent to return, the officer
had reasonable grounds to conclude that the apartment had been
abandoned.42
5. Prison searches
Prisoners' fourth amendment rights are extremely limited43 The
Ninth Circuit has ruled, however, that even a prisoner has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a sealed letter unless the warrantless seizure
of the letter "serves a justifiable purpose of imprisonment or prison
security."'
In United States v. Vallez 5 defendant Molina argued that a par-
tially sealed letter seized from his prison cell without a warrant should
have been suppressed at his murder trial.46 The letter was discovered
during a cell-by-cell search which was prompted by information that
an escape plan was underway.47 Prison regulations allowed such secur-
ity searches "'to detect contraband, prevent escapes, maintain sanitary
conditions and to eliminate fire and safety hazards.' "48 The Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the warrantless search because it was conducted under a
prison regulation "reasonably designed to promote prison security,"
4 9
and it went no further than necessary to effect this purpose.
50
B. State Action
Searches and seizures conducted by private parties do not nor-
mally implicate the fourth amendment.5 An exception arises, how-
41. Id
42. Id at 1081-82.
43. See United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 415
U.S. 932 (1974).
44. Id at 1373.
45. 653 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981).
46. Id at 406.
47. Id
48. Id
49. Id (citing United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 806 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 423
U.S. 855 (1975)).
50. 653 F.2d at 406.
51. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (wrongful search or seizure by
private party did not constitute fourth amendment violation) (citing Burdeau v. Mc Dowell,
256 U.S. 465,475 (1921)); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,488 (1971) ("some type




ever, when such a party has acted as an instrument or agent of the
state.52 The Ninth Circuit has identified two factors to be utilized in
assessing the applicability of the fourth amendment when a private
party is alleged to have committed a constitutional violation: "[1] the
government's knowledge and acquiescence [in the search] and [2] the
intent of the party performing the search."53
In United States v. Walther,54 the Ninth Circuit found state action
when Rivard, an airline employee, opened an overnight case and dis-
covered a white powder later confirmed to be cocaine. Rivard con-
tacted a DEA agent who arrested defendant Walther when she arrived
that evening to claim the package. Rivard had previously provided the
DEA with information in return for payment. At Walther's suppres-
sion hearing Rivard testifed that he had no reason not to expect pay-
ment for notifying the DEA about the contents of Walther's case.5
The Ninth Circuit found Rivard's past contacts with the DEA ex-
tensive enough to establish the DEA's acquiescence in the search.56 On
ten prior occasions, Rivard had opened packages in which he had dis-
covered drugs and reported this information to the DEA. 7 Moreover,
the DEA had established a confidential informant file on Rivard relat-
ing to his reports on individuals who fit the DEA's drug courier pro-
file.58 Based on these facts, the court concluded that although the DEA
did not have any knowledge regarding the search in question, that
agency had encouraged, as well as acquiesced in, Rivard's activity.59 In
addition, the circuit court noted that the intent factor was satisfied
based on the fact that suspicion of illegal activity was the "only" reason
for the private party search.60
In United States v. McGreevy, 6 the Ninth Circuit held that an off-
duty police officer employed as a security guard may conduct a war-
52. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) ("The test ... is whether,
m ..in light of all the circumstances of the case, [a private party] must be regarded as having
acted as an 'instrument' or agent of the state. .... ").
53. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). These
factors were derived from the court's examination of previous cases wherein the "instrument
or agent" test was applied to a wide variety of factual situations. Id
54. 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 790.
56. Id at 793.
57. Id at 790.
58. Id
59. Id at 793. "The DEA thus had knowledge of a particular pattern of search activity
dealing with a specific category of cargo, and had acquiesced in such activity."
60. Id at 792.
61. 652 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1981).
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rantless search without violating the fourth amendment if he is not act-
ing "under color of state law." In McGreevy, Petrie performed security
services for Federal Express while off-duty from his full-time employ-
ment as a police officer. In his capacity as a security officer, he made a
warrantless search of the defendant's package and seized drugs found
inside.
The defendant claimed that Petrie was acting as a government
agent while conducting the search and that the drugs should have been
suppressed because of the warrantless seizure.62 The Ninth Circuit
ruled, however, that because Petrie was not acting "under color of state,
law," the search was outside the scope of the fourth amendment.63 The
court rested its decision on three facts: Petrie did not hold his position
with Federal Express because he was a police officer; he had "carefully
separated the two jobs"; and he was unaware of any understanding
between Federal Express and the DEA for the disposal of
contraband.64
C Sufficiency of Search Warrants
The determination of whether probable cause exists to support a
search warrant requires a magistrate to draw inferences independently
from facts presented by an affiant officer.65 In United States v. Stean-
son, 66 the Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed Stefanson's contention
that an oral affidavit failed to allege facts sufficient to establish prob-
able cause to search his home for illegal firearms, ammunition, and
drugs.67 The affidavit stated that on the day the warrant was issued,
62. Id at 851.
63. Id
64. Id
65. See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (by implication).
66. 648 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981).
67. Id at 1236. Stefanson also challenged the warrant's validity for failure to comply
with several requirements of FED. R. CR.Im. P. 41(c)(2)(D):
When a caller informs the Federal magistrate that the purpose of the call is to
request a warrant, the Federal magistrate shall immediate l place under oath each
person whose testimony forms a basis of the application and each person applying
for that warrant. If a voice recording device is available, the Federal magistrate
shall record by means of such device all of the call after the caller informs the
Federal magistrate that the purpose of the call is to request a warrant. Otherwise a
stenographic or longhand verbatim record shall be made.
Id at 1234-35 (quoting FED. R. Caim. P. 41(c)(2)(D) (emphasis in case)).
Stefanson first argued that the magistrate's failure to place the afflant under oath before
accepting his testimony invalidated the warrant. The court held that the violation was only
"technical"; the accepted Ninth Circuit standard requires that the violation be either preju-
dicial or deliberate before evidence may be suppressed. Id at 1235. Because the magistrate
[Vol. 15
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Stefanson had been arrested one mile from his home for illegally pos-
sessing firearms, ammunition, and narcotics; that similar illegal drugs
and firearms had been found in Stefanson's home just over a year
before the current arrest; that Stefanson had been previously convicted
of possession of firearms and ammunition and of drug related offenses;
and that a shooting had occurred outside his home eight days before
the present arrest.68 The affiant further stated that sixteen years of ex-
perience led him to conclude that persons carrying illegal drugs and
firearms are likely to have a large "cache" at their residence.69
1. Timeliness
Probable cause to seize any items must exist at the time a warrant
is issued.70 The validity of such a warrant then continues only for such
time as a reasonable person would believe that the items to be seized
are still in the indicated place.71
In United States v. Reid72 the defendant argued that the facts in
the affidavit failed to establish probable cause to believe that the items
to be seized were in the place stated in the warrant.73 Although the
warrant was recent, the facts supporting it were over a year old. In
upholding the magistrate's finding of probable cause, the Ninth Circuit
stressed that factors other than the mere passage of time bear on
was unaware of the oath requirement, the violation was not deliberate. Moreover, because
the oath was given at the end of the call, the violation was not prejudicial. Id at 1234. But
see United States v. Shorter, 600 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1979) (suppression required because
oath given after oral information).
Stefanson also argued that the magistrate's failure to transcribe verbatim the telephonic
conversation rendered the warrant invalid. The magistrate testified that "he dictated the
probable cause statement from the tape of the original conversation supplemented by his
memory." 648 F.2d at 1235. He further testified that there was no conflict between the tape
and his memory of the conversation and that any unclear portions of the tape had been
deleted from the transcript. The magistrate certified the accuracy of the conversation, and
the defendant stipulated to the transcription's substantial accuracy. Id Because the magis-
trate had acted in good faith, and no prejudice had been demonstrated, this violation was
also considered merely technical. Id at 1236.
Stefanson finally charged that the magistrate was not acting impartially when he au-
thorized night-time execution of the warrant. Id The court found, however, that the risk
that the contraband might be destroyed justified a night-time search. Id
68. Id at 1233.
69. Id at 1233-34.
70. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 211 (1932); United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d
33, 37 (8th Cir. 1975).
71. United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir. 1977). "Probable cause
ceases to exist when it is no longer reasonable to presume that items once located on the
premises are still there." Id
72. 634 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980).
73. Id at 472.
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whether particular items to be seized would likely remain at the stated
place. The nature of the criminal activity involved, as well as the prop-
erty to be seized, may offset a rather lengthy passage of time.74
On May 10, 1978, Postal Inspector Hall applied for and obtained a
warrant to search the Eden Press offices. The affidavit stated that dur-
ing February and March 1977, Detective Corbin made several mail or-
der purchases from Eden Press of birth certificates, books, catalogues,
and identification cards listing fictitious names, addresses, and birth
dates next to photographs of police personnel. In August 1977, Hall
ordered and received an identification card and three birth certificates
in the name of Thomas C. Rossi. On May 2, 1978, Hall interviewed
two Eden Press employees, who described the processing of mail orders
and provided a detailed description of the layout and contents of the
Eden Press offices. Hall visited the offices on May 5, 1978 and observed
a camera and twenty-five to fifty identification cards with photographs
attached and personal data typed in, as well as several boxes and files.75
The court held that these facts established probable cause to be-
lieve that business records, a camera, and laminating machine, "mock-
ups" of identification cards, stocks of blank identification cards, and
birth certificates could be found on May 10, 1978, at the Eden Press
offices. 76 The court explained that the magistrate could reasonably
have expected that business records would be found at the offices, be-
cause such records are generated and maintained in the ordinary
course of business at such a location." The court also found probable
cause with respect to the camera, laminating machine, and mock-ups
because the affiant had personally observed these items.78 Finally, the
court found that the lapse of time between the ordering date of the
blank identification cards and birth certificates, and the execution date
of the search warrant had not destroyed probable cause with respect to
these items because it was reasonable to believe that absent depletion
they would have been stored at the company offices.79
74. Id at 473 (citing United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1975) (time lapse
between robbery and date warrant issued not destructive of probable cause where stolen
revolver, ski mask, and clothing could reasonably be found at defendant's home); United
States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970) (probable cause found where the stolen
materials were the sort "one would expect to be hidden" at defendant's home and where
defendant had ample opportunity to return home to hide them)).
75. 634 F.2d at 471-72.
76. Id at 472-73.
77. Id; accord Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 478 n.9 (1976).
78. 634 F.2d at 473.
79. Id; see United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1975).
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2. Particularity
The particularity requirement prohibits general searches and
seizures of items that are not described in the warrant.80 Even when
the warrant is supported by probable cause and specifies the alleged
offense, the executing officer has no discretion concerning what may be
seized.81 Moreover, when items such as books are sought and "the ba-
sis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain,"82 the particularity
requirement must be accorded "scrupulous exactitude."
8 3
A gt neral warrant may, however, meet the particularity require-
ment if it incorporates a specific, accompanying affidavit.84 In In re
Property Belonging to Talk of the Town Bookstore, Inc.,85 the district
court granted a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to two
search warrants because the warrants were unconstitutionally gen-
eral.86 The warrants directed the executing officers to seize only the
property specified in the attached affidavits, and "to seize only those
books, magazines, and films which depict the specific sex acts described
in the Affidavits."8
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the generality of the warrant
was cured by the attached and incorporated affidavits.88 The court ex-
plained that an attached and incorporated affidavit limits the generality
of the warrant by circumscribing the executing officers' discretion, and
by notifying the person being searched of the specific items that the
officer is entitled to seize.8 9 Because the warrant expressly limited the
seizure to those items spec/cally described in the incorporated affida-
vits, the warrant met the standard of "the most scrupulous exactitude,"
applicable when first amendment rights are involved. 9
80. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (seizure of ledgers and bills not
described in warrant violated fourth amendment).
81. Id
82. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (footnote omitted).
83. Id (warrant authorizing seizure of books, records, pamphlets, memoranda, pictures,
and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party held unconstitutionally
general).
84. United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); see
United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1977); accord United States v. Marti,
421 F.2d 1263, 1269 (2d Cir. 1970).
85. 644 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1981).
86. Id at 1318.
87. Id at 1319.
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id (citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
1982]
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3. Affidavits based on hearsay
In Aguilar v. Texas,9' the Supreme Court set forth a two part test
for determining probable cause when an affidavit supporting a warrant
is based on hearsay information. First, the magistrate must be in-
formed of the underlying circumstances that the informant relied on in
reaching his or her conclusion. Second, the magistrate must be in-
formed of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant con-
cluded that the informant was credible or that the information was
reliable.92 If the informant's tip fails to satisfy the Aguilar standard, the
magistrate may still find probable cause if the tip is sufficiently corrob-
orated by independent evidence,93 or if the tip is sufficiently detailed as
to indicate the reliability of the information. 94 When there is a sub-
stantial basis for believing the hearsay, courts should interpret the affi-
davit in a sensible and realistic manner.95
In United States v. Ellsworth, 96 members of the public were eyewit-
nesses to Ellsworth's assault on a federal officer. 97 In their affidavits,
these witnesses identified Ellsworth and described him as having worn
dark gloves and a T-shirt bearing the words "Satisfaction Guaran-
teed." 98 From this information, the Ninth Circuit summarily con-
cluded that there was a sufficient factual basis for the magistrate to
conclude that Ellsworth's house was the probable location of critical
evidence.99 The decision rested primarily on the fact that the informa-
tion was provided by witnesses from the general public.c° Ellsworth's
indictment for the assault also supported the finding of probable
cause.10
91. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
92. Id at 114.
93. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969).
94. Id at 416-17 (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959)).
95. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965). Affidavits are usually
drafted by nonlawyers in the "midst and haste" of a criminal investigation. A hypertechni-
cal interpretation will discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a magis-
trate before acting. d at 108.
96. 647 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1981).
97. Id at 963.
98. Id at 959.
99. Id at 963. It is unclear how this information alone would suggest Ellsworth's house
as a probable location. The court did not indicate the manner in which this information
would satisfy the first prong of the Agullar test relating to the probable location of incrimi-
nating evidence. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114.
100. 647 F.2d at 963.
101. Id (citing United States v. Sevier, 539 F.2d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 1976)). The magis-
trate, as well as the court, can take judicial notice of an indictment. However, a magistrate
may not rest a finding of probable cause on the mere fact that an individual was previously
Vol. 15
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In United States v. Davis, ' 2 an investigation into the murder of
Davis' "disaffected associate" resulted in the issuance of warrants to
search Davis' business and residence. 0 3 The affidavits contained infor-
mation supplied by three informants. The first informant provided
personal observations regarding the murder plan, details of persons in-
volved in conversations, and the times and locations of the conversa-
tions. The second informant disclosed conversations with Davis
concerning a drug conspiracy, and the third informant supplied infor-
mation corroborating the first informant's disclosures. Significantly,
the first and third informants provided information against their inter-
ests. 04 The court found that all three were credible and that their in-
formation was sufficiently detailed to support the magistrate's finding
of probable cause. 0 5
4. Misstatements and omissions
When the validity of the affidavit is challenged because it contains
misstatements or omissions by the informant or affiant, the defendant
must show that any false statements were intentionally or recklessly
made, and that the affidavit, purged of its misstatements, would not
support a finding of probable cause. 10 6 Three recent Ninth Circuit
cases, United States v. Davis, 0 7 United States v. Willis, ' 8 and United
States v. Maher, 'o involved omissions and misstatements of fact that
allegedly rendered the affidavits constitutionally deficient.
The defendant in Davis argued that the warrant to search his busi-
ness offices contained misstatements by the affiant, Epstein, to the effect
that the first and third informants had no known pending cases against
them. In reality, Davis contended, the affiant was present when the
informants had been advised that they were suspects in a murder con-
spiracy.1 0 The court dismissed Davis' contention, noting the difference
indicted. The obvious rationale behind such a rule is that a grand jury determines only
whether there is sufficient evidence to cause an accused to stand trial, not whether probable
cause exists to search. 647 F.2d at 964 (citing United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971, 980
(6th Cir. 1968)).
102. 663 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1981).
103. Id at 827.
104. Id at 829.
105. Id
106. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); United States v. Lefkowitz, 618
F.2d 1313, 1317 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980).
107. 663 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1981).
108. 647 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1981).
109. 645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
110. 663 F.2d at 829.
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.between one who is a suspect and one who has a case pending against
him or her."'
Davis also attacked the warrant to search his residence on the ba-
sis that the affiant, Thompson, did not have personal knowledge of the
facts recited in the affidavit.' 12 Although Epstein had executed the affi-
davit for the office warrant, Thompson signed the same affidavit for the
warrant to search Davis' residence, without changing the wording of
the affidavit from the first person singular. 13 The court reluctantly
concluded that even though there was no offer of proof that the infor-
mation given by the two affiants differed, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Franks v. Delawarel l4 mandated an evidentiary hearing in the Davis
case. I
5
In Willis, much of the information recited in the affidavit had been
provided by Willis' former live-in girlfriend. The affiant remained un-
aware, however, that she had also been having sexual relations with the
state narcotics officer who arrested Willis.1 6 Based on the affiant's lack
of knowledge, the court found that the omission of this fact from the
affidavit had not been reckless or intentional." 7 The court relied on an
earlier decision, United States v. Lefkowitz, I 8 in which it held that un-
intentional or nonreckless omissions will not vitiate an affidavit that
would have provided probable cause if the omitted information had
been included." 9 The court found that disclosure of the informant's
possible bias was not essential to the establishment of probable cause
because her information was detailed and first-hand, because she was
in a position to know the facts she had asserted, and because her state-
ments had subjected her to penal and personal risk. 20
The defendant in Maher challenged the affidavit because the affi-




114. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
115. 663 F.2d at 830.
116. 647 F.2d at 55.
117. Id at 58.
118. 618 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980).
119. Id at 1317. In Lekowitz, the affiant neither intentionally nor recklessly omitted the
fact that one of the informants was the defendant's estranged wife. Even if her identity had
been revealed, the affidavit indicated that she had personally heard and observed the infor-
mation she asserted, that her information was highly detailed and independently corrobo-
rated by information known to the IRS, and that her information had subjected her to penal
consequences. Id at 1316-17.
120. 647 F.2d at 58-59.
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vehicle to be searched, incorrectly named a motel. 21 The court found
this contention meritless, noting that even deliberate falsehoods must
be material to vitiate a warrant.1 22 Because the agents easily located
the vehicle by following other directions supplied by the informant, the
omission was considered immaterial.
123
D. Warrantless Searches
The chief evil at which the fourth amendment is directed is physi-
cal entry of the home.' 24 Therefore, warrantless searches and seizures
of a residence have been held to be per se unreasonable in the absence
of consent or exigent circumstances.
25
In Steagald v. United States, 126 the Supreme Court held that ab-
sent exigent circumstances or consent, police officers may not effect a
warrantless search for the subject of an arrest warrant in a third party's
home.' 27 DEA agents entered Steagald's home seeking Ricky Lyons,
the subject of an arrest warrant. Lyons was not found, but an agent
observed cocaine. This discovery prompted an application for a war-
rant to search Steagald's house. Before the warrant was obtained, a
second search uncovered additional incriminating evidence. A third
search, conducted pursuant to a warrant, uncovered forty-three pounds
of cocaine. Steagald moved to suppress the evidence obtained during
the warrantless search.'
28
121. 645 F.2d at 782.
122. Id See United States v. Young Buffalo, 591 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir.) (affidavit
purged of immaterial, unintentional, and nonreckless omissions and misstatements still had
to establish probable cause), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 950 (1979).
123. 645 F.2d at 781-82.
124. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (citing United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
125. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971). See, e.g., United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (upholding warrantless entry into suspect's home to prevent
destruction of evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (upholding warrantless
search by officers in hot pursuit of suspected armed felon who had entered house only a few
minutes before officers' arrival).
126. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
127. Id at 211. An arrest warrant carries with it the limited authority to enter a suspect's
home when there is reason to believe that the suspect is within. Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. at 603.
The Court refused to consider the Government's argument that Steagald lacked a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in his house. The Government lost the right to argue this point
by making contrary assertions in the lower courts and by acquiescing to contrary findings by
those courts. 451 U.S. at 208-09.
128. Id at 206-07. The district court denied the motion, finding the arrest warrant suffi-
cient to justify the entry and search. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979), relying on United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.
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The Court explained that the purpose of the warrant requirement
is to interpose a neutral judicial officer between zealous police and the
citizen. 29 While protecting distinct interests, both an arrest warrant
and a search warrant interpose neutral review. An arrest warrant pro-
tects against unreasonable seizures, while a search warrant protects
against unreasonable intrusions into an individual's privacy in his
home and possessions.'30
The Court thus reasoned that although the arrest warrant pro-
tected Lyons from an unreasonable seizure, Steagald's privacy interest
merited only the protection of an agent's determination of probable
cause. From Steagald's perspective, the search pursuant to the arrest
was no more reasonable than the warrantless search.' 3' Moreover, be-
cause there was sufficient time to obtain a warrant and because of the
absence of consent or exigent circumstances, there was no justification
for the warrantless search. The search, therefore, unquestionably vio-
lated Steagald's fourth amendment rights.'
32
Citing Semaynes' Case, 33 the dissent contended that at common
law an officer could enter the home of a third party to apprehend the
subject of an arrest warrant.'34 The emphasis in Semayne's Case, how-
ever, was on preventing the subject of an arrest warrant from obtaining
sanctuary from arrest in a third party's home. 35 The dissent's reliance
on this authority, therefore, seems misplaced, given the fact that the
issue before the Court was whether a thirdparty could complain of the
search.
36
The dissent also contended that because fugitives are inherently
mobile, officers will be forced to return to the magistrate several times
before effecting an arrest. 37 The Court adequately responded to this
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977), wherein it was held that a valid arrest warrant, when
coupled with the officer's reasonable belief that the subject is within a third party's premises,
is sufficient to justify a search of those premises. 545 F.2d at 421.
129. 451 U.S. at 212 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
130. 451 U.S. at 213.
131. Id at 213-16.
132. Id at 216. A contrary conclusion would create a significant potential for abuse: the
police could search the homes of the individual's friends, see, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966), or the arrest warrant could serve as the pretext for entering a home
when there is no probable cause to believe that criminal activity is afoot. See Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969).
133. 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198 (K.B. 1603).
134. 451 U.S. at 227-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id (citing 1 J. CHiTrY, CRIMINAL LAW 57 (1816); M. FOSTER, CROWN CASES 320
(1762); 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 117 (1736)).
136. 451 U.S. at 212.
137. Id at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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argument, noting that situations such as that in the case at bar arise
infrequently because (1) a warrant is not required to arrest a suspected
felon in a public place; (2) only an arrest warrant is required when
police arrest a suspect in his own home; and (3) the exigent circum-
stances doctrine permits warrantless entry in hot pursuit. 138 Further-
more, any remaining practical problems did not, in the opinion of the
Court, outweigh the constitutional interests at stake.
1 39
The dissent was scathing in its criticism of the majority's posi-
tion, 140 contending that Steagald would result in the apprehension of
fewer criminals. 4 ' Although it was primarily concerned that fugitives
would exploit the additional time required to obtain search and arrest
warrants, 42 the dissent did acknowledge that the impact of the Court's
ruling on law enforcement would be slight. 43
In short, Steagald prohibits the use of evidence against a third
party obtained by law enforcement officers as the collateral benefit of a
search for a fugitive in the third party's home. Only evidence against
the thirdparty may be suppressed under Steagald, not evidence against
the subject of the arrest warrant. Whatever impact the Court's holding
will have on the execution of an arrest warrant depends upon whether
the exigent circumstances doctrine applies,' 44 permitting warrantless
entry in hot pursuit.
138. Id at 226. The "hot pursuit" doctrine may, in fact, lessen the impact of Steagald
139. Id at 224.
140. Justice Rehnquist characterized the majority opinion as proceeding in a "pristinely
simple manner," 451 U.S. at 223, as employing a "simple Aristotelian syllogism," id at 224,
as giving "beguilingly simple answers" to the law enforcement problem which it would cre-
ate, id at 225, and as having an "ivory tower misconception" of the true realities of the case.
Id at 226.
141. Id Rehnquist argued: "[i]ncidental infringements of distinct Fourth Amendment
interests may, however, be reasonable when they occur in the course of executing a valid
warrant addressed to other interests." Id at 224. Rehnquist relied on Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979), in which a covert entry to install electronic surveillance equip-
ment was held not to violate fourth amendment interests even though the court authorizing
the surveillance did not explicitly authorize the entry. In bugging authorizations, however,
entry is clearly implicit. 451 U.S. at 226.
142. Id "IT]he object of arrest may flee at anytime - including the 'short time' during
which the police are endeavoring to obtain a search warrant.' Id
143. Id at 231. "The genuinely unfortunate aspect of today's ruling is not that fewer
fugitives will be brought to book, or fewer criminals apprehended, though both of these
consequences will undoubtedly occur. . . ." Id
144. The "exigent circumstances" doctrine recognizes the reasonableness of a warrantless
entry where there is a "compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant."
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)).
"The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investi-
gation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others." 387 U.S. at 298-
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1. Consent searches
Searches conducted pursuant to consent are one of the few well-
settled exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.14s
Such searches are valid, however, only when consent is given volunta-
rily and free of duress or coercion. 146 The "voluntariness" of consent is
determined from the totality of the circumstances. 14 7 This, in turn, ne-
cessitates an inquiry into the characteristics of the individual defend-
ant, as well as the circumstances of the particular interrogation.148 In
three recent decisions, the Ninth Circuit addressed the subject of con-
sent searches and their voluntariness.
In United States v. Tavelman, ' 49 defendant Tavelman allowed five
DEA agents into his hotel room. He balked, however, at letting them
search the bathroom where he had set up a cocaine laboratory. He was
then arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. After trying unsuc-
cessfully to contact his attorney, Tavelman allowed the arresting agent
to search the bathroom. The trial court found the consent voluntary,
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed under the "clearly erroneous" stan-
99. Thus, when speed is essential "to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large in the
house may resist or escape," the warrant requirement may be circumvented. Id at 299.
But see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless entry into private resi-
dence to effect arrest unreasonable when there is ample time to obtain a warrant); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (warrantless search of automobile unreasonable
,when defendant had opportunity to destroy incriminating evidence and police had long
known of probable role of car).
145. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
146. Id at 222.
147. Id at 227.
148. Id at 226-27. When an accused is actually in police custody, courts are particularly
sensitive to the heightened possibility that consent was obtained as a result of coercion. Id
at 240-41 n.29. Seealso Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962) (quoting
United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1962): "'Coercion is implicit in situations
where consent is obtained under color of the badge .... "'); Judd v. United States, 190
F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (consent obtained after arrest or display of official authority
deemed a product of intimidation or duress). Even a written and signed consent to search
will be invalidated in these circumstances if the search was not sufficiently attenuated from
unconstitutional conduct by authorities. See United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.
1981), wherein the Ninth Circuit excluded evidence obtained pursuant to a written and
signed consent to search. According to the court, neither defendant's receipt of Miranda
warnings prior to giving consent, nor the consent itself was sufficient to purge the taint of his
illegal arrest. Id at 601.
But see United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981), in which the Ninth
Circuit found the requisite attenuation based on the following: (I) defendant's receipt of
Miranda rights; (2) defendant's receipt of advice from his attorney to remain silent; and (3)
defendant's relaxed and calm demeanor. Id at 555-57.
149. 650 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
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dard. 5 ° The court noted (1) that Tavelman gave indicia of consent
when the agents came to his hotel room door and (2) that his election to
contact his attorney at a time when he may have reasonably suspected
that the investigation was focusing on him demonstrated that he under-
stood his Miranda rights.15" '
In United States v. Perez, 152 customs officers separated and interro-
gated defendants at gunpoint, without advising them of their Miranda
rights. The officers asked if they might search the defendants' truck,
and one of the men agreed. The officers returned to the truck with the
defendants and again asked and received consent to search it. Four
pounds of heroin were discovered in the vehicle.1
53
The court concluded that the Government had failed to prove that
the consent was voluntary, 54 reasoning that the burden of proving vol-
untariness of consent given at gunpoint was insurmountable.155
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Bramble,5 6
found voluntary consent present under circumstances ostensibly more
coercive than those present in Perez. Bramble was arrested, hand-
cuffed, and forced to lie face down on the ground. Two officers sur-
rounded him with their weapons pointed towards him. A DEA agent
then placed Bramble in a chair and obtained his consent to search the
vehicle he had been driving. 157 The court conceded that the circum-
stances were coercive.1ss However, because Bramble had stated that he
wished to be present during the search to protect his dog, the court
150. Id at 1136, 1138-39. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evi-
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 85
(9th Cir. 1962) (citing United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Applying
this standard in United States v. Wasserteil, 641 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit
held that the trial court's finding of voluntary consent to search was not "clearly erroneous"
where evidence showed that the defendant was a sophisticated businessman who was sub-
jected to neither prolonged interrogation nor physical punishment, and where he had been
informed of his right to refuse consent. Id at 707. Similarly, in United States v. 'Looney,
544 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976), the Ninth Circuit concluded
under essentially the same circumstances that the trial court's finding of voluntariness was
not "clearly erroneous." In O'Looney, the defendant was also a sophisticated businessman
who often sought legal advice, and, like Wasserteil, was not subjected to a lengthy detention,
to prolonged interrogation, or to physical punishment. Id at 388.
151. 650 F.2d at 1138.
152. 644 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1981).
153. Id at 1301.
154. Id at 1302.
155. Id at 1303.
156. 641 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1981).
157. Id at 683.
158. I1d
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concluded that the defendant had given his consent to prevent harm to
the animal; Bramble could not, therefore, later complain that the con-
sent had been involuntary.'59
2. Border searches
Border officials may conduct a warrantless interrogation of any
alien, or person believed to be an alien, regarding his or her right to be
present in the United States. 6 Such officials may also conduct war-
rantless searches for aliens in any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or
vehicle.6 The authority to conduct border searches subject to relaxed
fourth amendment standards stems from a congressional determination
that some measure of an individual's right to privacy must yield to a
superior national right of security. 162 This broad discretion to conduct
warrantless searches has been limited, however, to the border or its
functional equivalent, 63 and is subject to the test of "reasonable
suspicion." 114
In United States v. Cortez, 165 the Supreme Court recently ex-
panded the "reasonable suspicion" test to "reasonable surmise."'' 66 In
Cortez, border patrol officers spotted a distinctive "chevron" shoeprint
leading from the Mexican border to an isolated point on a United
States highway. 67 Relying upon information that the area was heavily
travelled by aliens entering the United States illegally, and upon the
fact that the path led over obstacles that would have been avoided in
daylight, the officers deduced that someone was leading a group of ille-
gal aliens into the United States.' 68 Officers then established a surveil-
159. Id
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1970).
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970). Automobile searches qualify as "border searches" in
two instances: (1) when a border crossing has been established and the car is kept under
surveillance; and (2) when a border crossing has not been established, but it appears with
"reasonable certainty" that the vehicle is carrying suspect goods or persons. See United
States v. Kessler, 497 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1974).
162. Note, From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law of Border Search, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
53, 53-54 (1974).
163. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
164. Id at 884. The suspicion must be founded on "specific articulable facts, together
with rational inferences from those facts." Id The standard represents a consideration of
the "importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop,
and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border." Id at 881.
165. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
166. Id at 421. ("Rather the question is whether, based upon the whole picture, they...
could reasonably surmise that the particular vehicle they stopped was engaged in criminal
activity." Id).
167. Id at 413.
168. Id
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In United States v. Urias, 78 a border patrol officer, stationed at a
checkpoint forty miles north of the Mexican border, observed a pickup-
camper turn onto a dirt road leading to a state fish hatchery. From past
experience, the officer knew that approximately seventy-five percent of
the vehicles turning onto the dirt road carried illegal aliens. Moreover,
he was familiar with the employees at the hatchery and would have
recognized their vehicles.' 79
The officer drove to the hatchery and stopped beside the camper.
Urias was in the driver's seat, and seated next to him were two passen-
gers of Latin appearance. Urias told the officer that he was looking for
Holtville. When asked why he did not ask his passengers for direc-
tions, Urias responded that he did not know them but had "just picked
them up down the road." The passengers did not respond when ques-
tioned in English. They did, however, comply with the officer's request
in Spanish to leave the car.'80 The passengers told the officer that they
had illegally entered the country from Mexico.'
8'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the warrantless search on the
ground that the officer's assessment of the facts, based on his prior ex-
perience and knowledge of the area, had led him to conclude properly
that illegal activity was taking place.'
82
In United States v. Perez, 183 a computer scan of Perez's identifica-
tion at a border checkpoint revealed that Perez and defendant de la
Garza were suspected of smuggling contraband. Although a customs
search of Perez yielded nothing, he was placed under continuous sur-
veillance. Perez joined defendant Sanchez and drove 160 miles north
of the border. They were followed by defendants Marquez and de la
Garza. Two days later, the truck they had been driving was left unat-
tended in a parking lot while the four men drove another car into the
desert. There, customs officers approached them with drawn weapons
and asked Sanchez if they could search the truck. Sanchez consented.
The search revealed four pounds of heroin taped on the inside of the
gas tank.
184
the vehicle." His fenced compound was not only a residence, but was also a place of business
to which the public had been routinely admitted; furthermore, the cages were located a
considerable distance away from the residence itself. Id at 994.
178. 648 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1981).
179. Id at 622.
180. Id at 623.
181. Id
182. Id
183. 644 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1981).
184. Id at 1301.
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lance point and subsequently stopped the only vehicle large enough to
carry a group of people which passed that point twice within an hour
and a half. Defendant Hernandez-Lorea, riding in the passenger seat,
was wearing shoes with a chevron sole. The driver, defendant Cortez,
consented to a search of the vehicle, and six aliens were arrested.
169
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the defendants' convic-
tions.17 0 The court reasoned that there was no basis for stopping the
Cortez vehicle because "the circumstances admitted 'far too many in-
nocent inferences to make the officers' suspicions reasonably
warranted.' "171
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the
stop was justified as an investigative border stop. 172 The Court rea-
soned that "based upon the whole picture," the officers could "reason-
ably surmise" that the particular vehicle was being used to smuggle
illegal aliens.
173
In United States v. Jacobson, 17 customs agents investigated large
scale parrot smuggling from Mexico into the United States. The inves-
tigation focused on Jacobson, a pet store owner. On April 20, an in-
formant advised the agents of a sizeable shipment to the United States,
and on April 28, the informant advised the agents that he would trans-
port the parrots in his van to Tucson, where he would exchange vehi-
cles with two women. These women were then to make the delivery to
Jacobson. 175
Agents observed the van enter Jacobson's premises and saw
flashlights in the area where they had been informed that the birds
were kept. Two agents entered and discovered 154 parrots in the cages
in which they had presumably been transported.
17 6
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the search as an extended
border search because the totality of the surrounding circumstances
was sufficient to indicate that the parrots had been smuggled into the
United States. 1
77
169. Id at 416.
170. Id
171. Id at 416-17 (citing United States v. Cortez, 595 F.2d 505, 508 (1979)). Only the
stop was at issue, since the subsequent search was conducted pursuant to Cortez's consent.
449 U.S. at 421.
172. 449 U.S. at 421.
173. Id at 421-22.
174. 647 F.2d 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
175. Id at 991.
176. Id at 992.
177. Id at 994. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that Jacobson did not possess
a sufficiently "reasonable expectation of privacy as to preclude an extended border search of
19821
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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling upholding the
search, reasoning that the search was justified neither as an extended
border search nor as a consent search. 1 5 The court stated that a border
search conducted away from the border required "reasonable cer-
tainty" that the contraband sought had crossed the border.1 86 A ninety-
minute gap in the officer's surveillance, however, precluded a determi-
nation with "reasonable certainty" that either the truck or the heroin
had recently crossed the border.'87
3. Vehicle searches
In Robbins v. California, 188 the Supreme Court considered whether
the fourth amendment prohibited the warrantless search of two
wrapped, opaque packages located in the. luggage compartment of the
defendant's automobile.8 9 Robbins was observed by California High-
way Patrol officers driving his station wagon in an erratic manner. 90
The officers subsequently stopped Robbins' vehicle and asked him to
produce his driver's license and vehicle registration.19' When Robbins
opened his car door to retrieve the requested items, the officers smelled
marijuana smoke.' 92 Based on this evidence and a vial of liquid found
in Robbins' possession, the officers searched the passenger compart-
ment of his vehicle.'93 The search yielded a quantity of marijuana and
related paraphernalia.1 94 The officers then opened a recessed luggage
compartment and discovered two packages wrapped in green opaque
plastic.' 95 Each package was sealed with opaque tape and "roughly
resemble[d] an oversized, extra-long cigar box with slightly rounded
185. Id at 1302.
186. Id
187. Id
188. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
189. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Brennan, White,
and Marshall joined. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment. Justice Powell filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens each
ified a dissenting opinion.
190. Id at 422.
191. Id
192. Id Robbins had exited the vehicle after the initial stop. Id It was, therefore, neces-
sary for him to re-enter it in order to procure registration. Id
193. Id
194. Id Robbins was arrested by officers at this time and secured in the patrol car. Id
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that before the arrest, but after the officers
had found the marijuana and related paraphernalia, Robbins stated, "'What you are look-
ing for is in the back."' Id at 442. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This was not mentioned in
the plurality opinion.
195. Id at 422.
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comers and edges." 196 The officers opened the packages and found
fifteen pounds of marijuana.
19 7
Following the trial court's denial of Robbins' suppression motion,
he was convicted of various drug related offenses.' 98 The California
Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction on the ground that the con-
tents of the packages could have been inferred from their outward ap-
pearance. According to the court, this inference conclusively
established that Robbins had no reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to the contents of the packages. 99
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the
fourth amendment prohibits the opening of a closed container without
a warrant even when it is found during the lawful search of an automo-
bile.2 °° In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected three arguments
raised by the Government.20'
The Government first contended that the disputed search was jus-
tifiable under the automobile exception to the fourth amendment war-
rant requirement.20 2 The Court found this argument inconsistent with
its holdings in United States v. Chadwick20 3 andArkansas v. Sanders, 
2 4
and reaffirmed that "a closed piece of luggage found in a lawfully
searched car is constitutionally protected to the same extent as are
closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else."20
The Government next contended that the packages in question
were not commonly used to transport "personal effects," and, therefore,
they were unprotected by the fourth amendment.2 0 6 In rejecting this
196. California v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 44, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 785 (Ist Dist.
1980) (Rattigan, J., dissenting), quoted in Robbins, 453 U.S. at 422 n. 1.
197. 453 U.S. at 422.
198. Id at 422-23. Robbins' suppression motion concerned only the contraband discov-
ered inside the packages. Id at 423. He made no attempt to suppress the evidence located
by officers in the passenger compartment of his vehicle. Id
199. Id at 423. This marked the second time the California Court of Appeal had af-
firmed the trial court's judgment. The initial affirmance was vacated by the Supreme Court,
443 U.S. 903 (1979), and the case was remanded for further consideration in light of Arkan-
sas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
200. 453 U.S. at 428.
201. The Government did not argue that the search was conducted incident to a lawful
arrest. Id at 429 n.3. Cf. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S 454 (1981) (permissible scope of
search incident to arrest includes entire passenger compartment and all contents therein).
202. 453 U.S. at 425.
203. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
204. 442 U.S. 752 (1979).
205. 453 U.S. at 424-25.
206. Id at 425. The Government argued that the term "personal effects" meant "prop-
erty worn on or carried about the person or having some intimate relation to the person."
Id
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contention, the Court reasoned that fourth amendment protections ex-
tend to all of the belongings of an individual, whether personal or im-
personal.2 °v Therefore, once a person's belongings are placed inside a
closed container, the owner has manifested a reasonable expectation of
privacy in that container.208 The Court further noted the virtual im-
possibility of formulating objective standards to determine whether a
container is normally used to transport "personal effects. 20 9
Relying on dicta in Sanders, the Government finally argued that
because the contents of the packages could be inferred from their out-
ward appearance, Robbins had no reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to those contents.210 The Court, however, characterized
the exception noted in Sanders as an extension of the plain view excep-
tion.21 1 The Court specified that the plain view exception would be
operative only where "a container. . . so clearly announce[s] its con-
tents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
otherwise, that [they] are obvious to an observer."2 12 Because the rec-
ord did not adequately establish that the packages in Robbins' car
could only have contained marijuana, the Court concluded that the ex-
207. Id at 426.
208. Id In the words of the Court, "[o]nce placed within such a container a diary and a
dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id
209. Id at 427. Although Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the automobile
exception should be extended to all containers found in the subject car, he agreed that draw-
ing distinctions between containers was unwise. Id at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
442 U.S. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (fourth amendment does not distinguish between
"an orange crate, a lunch bucket, an attache case, a duffle bag, a cardboard box, a backpack,
a totebag, and a paperbag.').
210. 453 U.S. at 427 (citing Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13 ("Not all containers and pack-
ages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the
Fourth Amendment.")).
211. 453 U.S. at 427 (citing Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13 ("[S]ome containers (for
example, a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their verynature cannot support any reason-
able expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward
appearance.")).
212. 453 U.S. at 428. In his dissenting opinion Justice Blackmun persuasively alleged
that "only time will tell whether the [plurality's] 'test'. . . for determining whether a pack-
age's exterior 'announces its contents' will lead to a new stream of litigation." Id at 436
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Under the plurality's test, it was still possible to conclude that
Robbins' packages announced the presence of marijuana inside. The test significantly weak-
ens an otherwise strong mandate by the Court. The better course would have been to limit
the Sanders exception to open and/or transparent containers from which the contents are
plainly and clearly visible. The Court's assumption that certain containers necessarily an-
nounce their contents is a faulty one. Just as a violin case may house any number or type of
items, a burglar tool kit does not necessarily mandate the presence of burglar tools. Thus,
the Sanders exception should not be extended to any items other than those actually in plain
view.
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ception was not applicable.21 3
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, expressed the view that
container cases should be decided individually, based on the owner's
expectation of privacy.21 4 Justice Powell reasoned that Robbins had
manifested such an expectation by the manner in which he had
wrapped the packages.215 Justice Powell suggested that:
[w]hen confronted with the claim that police should have ob-
tained a warrant before searching an ambiguous container, a
court should conduct a hearing to determine whether the de-
fendant had manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of the container.21 6
Such a hearing would occur after the alleged police violation and
would include an examination of the type of container and whether it
appeared from the character of the container that its owner intended to
keep its contents private.2 17 Furthermore, Justice Powell noted that
"[a] prudent officer will err on the side of respecting ambiguous asser-
tions of privacy. . . and a realistic court seldom should second-guess
the good-faith judgment of the officer in the field when the public con-
sequently must suffer from the suppression of probative evidence.
'218
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated that Robbins
should have been decided within the ambit of the automobile excep-
tion.2 19 He noted that Chadwick and Sanders "attempted to limit" the
213. Id The record contained a single statement made by one of the arresting officers to
the effect that he had heard that contraband was packaged in a manner similar to that used
to package the items found in Robbins' automobile. Id
214. Id at 429 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell felt that the plurality opinion would effec-
tively "extend the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment to every 'closed, opaque
container,' without regard to size, shape, or whether common experience would suggest that
the owner was asserting a privacy interest in the contents." Id at 429 n. I (emphasis added).
He expressed the concern that such a mechanical requirement "would impose. . . a sub-
stantial new burden on law enforcement." Id at 443.
Justice Powell failed to recognize that the goal of the fourth amendment is not effi-
ciency. Its purpose is to protect citizens from unrestricted and arbitrary government behav-
ior. Thus, the fourth amendment has always imposed a substantial burden on law
enforcement. Powell's argument, therefore, takes issue not only with the plurality's rule but
with the amendment itself.
215. Id at 429.
216. Id -at 434 n.3. Powell, therefore, apparently advocates removing the burden from
the police and placing it on an already over-burdened court system.
217. Id
218. Id (citations omitted). This hearing then, would not only be costly but would be
substantially meaningless as it would favor the unrestricted discretion of the police.
219. Id at 439 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also advocated abolishment
of the exclusionary rule and asserted that the fourth amendment does not require searches to
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scope of that exception 22° but asserted that if an automobile is subject
to a warantless search, any personal property found within the automo-
bile may also be searched.22'
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens similarly advocated applica-
tion of the automobile exception.222 He specified, however, that the
exception would only be applicable when probable cause or some other
exigency justified a search of the entire automobile.223 Justice Stevens
noted that in Sanders, probable cause to search was focused on the
luggage in question rather than on the automobile itself; consequently,
those items were accorded constitutional protection.224 Conversely, be-
cause the officers in Robbins had probable cause to search the entire
automobile, Justice Stevens reasoned that the permissible scope of the
search included all containers found therein.
221
New York v. Belton226 involved a factual situation substantially
similar to that presented in Robbins. In Belton, however, the Court
chose to uphold the challenged search as "incident to a lawful custodial
arrest. 227
In Belton, a New York state police officer stopped a speeding vehi-
cle occupied by defendant Belton and three other individuals. As he
approached the vehicle, the officer smelled marijuana and observed an
envelope with the inscription "Supergold" on the floor.228 He immedi-
ately ordered the occupants out of the vehicle and arrested them for
possession of marijuana. After determining that the envelope did, in
fact, contain marijuana, the officer searched the entire passenger com-
be conducted pursuant to warrants. His view is that it merely mandates that they be reason-
able. Id at 437-39.
220. Id at 442-43.
221. Id. at 443. Justice Rehnquist argued in the alternative that the packages discovered
in Robbins' vehicle clearly fell within the exception noted in Sanders. Id at 441-42. See
supra notes 210-11.
222. 453 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Id at 449 n.9.
224. Id
225. Id at 444. Justice Stevens' argument ignores the plurality's postulate that contain-
ers may easily be brought under the control of the police and held until a warrant is ob-
tained. See id at 424.
226. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
227. Id at 462-63. Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C.J.,
Blackmun, J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a concurring state-
ment; Stevens, J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment; Brennan, J., and White, J.,
filed dissenting opinions, in which Marshall, J., joined. Id at 454-55.
Although the search took place within an automobile, the Court specifically declined to
consider the applicability of the automobile exception. See id at 462 n.6.
228. Id at 456-57. The officer associated the inscription with marijuana and apparently
believed that the envelope contained that substance. Id at 457.
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partment of the vehicle. During this search, he picked up Belton'sjack-
et, unzipped one of the pockets, and discovered cocaine.229
The trial court denied Belton's motion to suppress the cocaine, and
he pled guilty to a lesser offense. °30 The Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court upheld the search, stating that after Belton's ar-
rest the officer justifiably examined the immediate area for more con-
traband.231 The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
search incident to arrest exception was inapplicable because Belton
could not have gained access to the areas searched.3 2
The search incident to arrest exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement was most recently considered by the Supreme
Court in Chime? v. Calfornia. 3 3 In that case, officers arrested the de-
fendant in his home and then conducted a warrantless search of his
house, attic, and garage. The Chimel Court held the search invalid on
229. Id at 456.
230. Id Belton, however, preserved his claim that the cocaine had been seized in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. Id
231. 1d
232. Id Two dissenting judges of the New York Court of Appeals observed that because
there were four arrestees and only one police officer, the passenger compartment of the car
was dangerously within reach of the suspects. Id at 456-57.
233. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The scope of the search incident to arrest doctrine has periodi-
cally fluctuated. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court recognized "the
right on the part of the Government... to search theperson of the accused when legally
arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." Id at 392 (emphasis added).
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court expanded the exception to in-
clude evidence found on the arrestee or in his control Id at 158. Citing Weeks and Carroll,
the Court in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), noted in dictum that searches
incident to arrest could be made of the arrestee and theplace where the arrest was made. Id
at 30. This dictum later formed the basis for the Court's decision in Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), that the seizure of a ledger was lawful because the arrest gave
agents the right to "contemporaneously... search theplace in order to find and seize the
things used to carry on the criminal enterprise." Id at 199 (emphasis added). See also
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947) (search incident to arrest may also include
premises under arrestee's immediate control).
In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), the Court, stating tnat a warrantless
search incident to arrest constituted a "limited right," held the seizure of an illegal still
unlawful. Id at 708. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). In United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), however, the Court rejected the reasoning in Trupl-
ano, and held that an area in the possession or under the control of the arrestee may be
searched without a warrant after a lawful arrest. Id at 66. Until the Chimel decision, Rabi-
nowitz was considered to be controlling where the search incident to arrest exception was
concerned. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41 (1963) (search of house incident to a
lawful arrest upheld); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960) (search of a defend-
ants room pursuant to lawful administrative arrest upheld); Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 311 (1959); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958); Kremen v. United
States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
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the ground that it was too extensive.234 The Court emphasized that a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest is permissible, but its
scope may not exceed the area within the arrestee's immediate control,
and it may only be undertaken to prevent the arrestee from procuring a
weapon or his destruction or concealment of evidence. 3 5
The Belton Court restated and reviewed these principles, 236 but
noted that lower courts had had difficulty applying them.237 The Court
specifically observed that no workable definition of the term "area
within the immediate control of the arrestee" had been formulated
when that area "arguably includes the interior of an automobile and
the arrestee is its recent occupant. 238 Such a definition was necessary,
according to the Court, because law enforcement demands quick deci-
sions and therefore requires a "bright line" rule which is easily applica-
ble in the field.239
In an effort to formulate a workable definition, the Belton Court
then held that once the occupant of an automobile has been lawfully
arrested, it is permissible for police officers to search the passenger
compartment as well as any open or closed containers240 located
therein.241 These areas, the Court reasoned, were "generally, even if
234. 395 U.S. at 762-63.
235. Id at 763.
236. 453 U.S. at 457-58.
237. Id at 458.
238. Id at 460. See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Frick, 490
F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973).
239. 453 U.S. at 458. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police con-
duct. If an ambiguous legal standard results in police uncertainty regarding the permissibil-
ity of police conduct, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is obfuscated. It does not
necessarily follow, however, as the Court concluded in Beltan, that enlargement of such a
standard is the most effective means of resolving its ambiguities. Neither is such an enlarge-
ment justified merely because a "bright line" rule would be more convenient. See Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (mere fact that enforcement may be more efficient can
never, by itself, justify disregard of the fourth amendment warrant requirement).
240. 453 U.S. at 460. Containers were defined as "any object[s] capable of holding...
other object[s]." Id at 460 n.4. This includes "closed or open glove compartments, consoles,
or other receptacles. . . as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like." Id Not
included, however, were the trunk and items located within it. d
241. Subsequent application of this standard to the facts presented resulted in an affirm-
ance of defendant's conviction and a reversal of the New York Court of Appeals' ruling.
453 U.S. at 463. In the final portion of its opinion, the Court criticized the state court for
relying on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979). The Court noted that Chadwick and the principles enunciated therein were in-
applicable because the search incident to arrest exception was not at issue. 453 U.S. at 461-
62.
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not inevitably" within reach of an arrestee.242 Relying on United States
v. Robinson,243 the Court also specified that a lawful arrest in and of
itself justified a broad scope of search. It is thus not necessary to
demonstrate that evidence may be destroyed or concealed, or that the
safety of an arresting officer is endangered.244
Justice Stevens concurred in the upholding of Belton's conviction,
but would have done so on the basis of the automobile exception.245
The Court's expansion of the search incident to arrest exception was, in
his opinion, both unnecessary and dangerous. Such an expansion
would enable police officers to arrest individuals for minor traffic viola-
tions, and on that basis alone permit them, unreasonably, to search the
interior of their automobile and any containers in the automobile. 46
According to Stevens, this created a situation where an officer's deci-
sion would "provide the constitutional predicate for broader vehicle
searches than any neutral magistrate could authorize by issuing a
warrant."5
247
Justice Brennan, in dissent, stressed that the Chime? Court had
placed both "temporal and. . . spatial limitations" on the search inci-
dent to arrest exception.248 Specifically, he noted that Chimel was
"narrowly tailored" to situations where, immediately following a custo-
dial arrest, a threat to the officer's safety or the destruction of evidence
242. 453 U.S. at 460. The fact that the individuals were separated on the highway after
being arrested amply demonstrates that this is not true.
243. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In Robinson, the Court upheld the warrantless search of a
crumpled cigarette package as incident to a lawful arrest. According to the Court:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based
upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court
may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest
of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification.
Id at 235.
244. 453 U.S. at 459. The position taken by the Belton Court is plainly inconsistent with
the holding in Chimel See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). If a search
incident to a lawful arrest is always reasonable, regardless of the presence of the justifica-
tions supporting the exception, the exception has no purpose other than to allow police of-
ficers to avoid the warrant requirement. Although the Belton Court did not directly reject
the justifications for the exception, see 453 U.S. at 460 n.3, they have been, for all practical
purposes, rendered meaningless.
245. See 453 U.S. at 463 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 444 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
246. Id at 452.
247. Id
248. 453 U.S. at 465 (Brennan, L, dissenting).
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was imminent.2 49 Brennan concluded that the majority had abandoned
the Chimel principles in favor of an arbitrary "bright line" rule.250
Such a rule, in Brennan's view, could "provide a workable guide in
certain routine cases," but would ultimately "create more problems
than it solved."2'
E. Warrantless Arrests
An investigatory stop is considered constitutionally permissible if
articulable facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion of the presence of
criminal activity. However, the more severe intrusion of an arrest is
considered legal only if based on probable cause.252 As a general rule,
arrest warrants are not constitutionally required for an arrest, even
when the police have sufficient time to procure a warrant without jeop-
ardizing the arrest.253 Such a warrant is, however, constitutionally re-
quired to effect an arrest in a private home, absent exigent
circumstances.254
In Michigan v Summers,2 55 the United States Supreme Court re-
cently decided that a warrant to search for contraband "implicitly car-
ries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises
while a proper search is conducted." '256 In Summers, the police were
about to search a house for drugs pursuant to a warrant when they met
the defendant descending the front steps. The police asked Summers to
let them into the house. They detained Summers while conducting the
search, and ultimately, the police found drugs in the house. After
learning that Summers was the owner of the house, the police arrested
him, searched him, and discovered heroin in his coat pocket.257
Summers argued that the heroin should have been suppressed be-
cause it had been obtained during an illegal detention. The Court,
249. Id
250. Id at 463.
251. Id at 469. Justice Brennan noted, for example, that the majority's "bright line" rule
left the following questions unanswered: How long after the suspect has been arrested may
the search be conducted? How close to the car must the arrestee be in order to render the
search permissible? May probable cause to search the car be found after the arrest? Finally,
does the "interior" of the car include door panels or floorboards? Id at 470.
252. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979) (careful analysis of the distinc-
tions between those circumstances which constitute an arrest requiring probable cause and
those which constitute an investigatory stop requiring mere reasonable suspicion).
253. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).
254. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
255. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
256. Id at 705.
257. Id at 693.
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however, held that the search was legal because the police had author-
ity to detain Summers until evidence establishing probable cause to ar-
rest him was found. Once this occurred, Summers' arrest and search
incident to the arrest were constitutional.258
Several factors supported the Court's finding that the initial deten-
tion was legal. First, the police had obtained a warrant to search Sum-
mers' house for drugs." 9 Because a neutral magistrate had decided
that there was probable cause to believe contraband was in the house
and had authorized a substantial intrusion into the privacy of the per-
sons living there, the detention of the owner was "surely less intrusive
than the search itself.' 260 Moreover, the Court decided that the type of
detention imposed was unlikely to be exploited to gain more informa-
tion, since the information sought would normally be obtained through
searching the house rather than through the detention.261 The Court
also reasoned that the search warrant provided an objective justifica-
tion for the detention. Because a judicial officer had determined that
there was probable cause to believe that someone in the house was com-
mitting a crime, an occupant's connection with that house gave the po-
lice an identifiable and articulable basis for believing that the
"suspicion of criminal activity justified a detention of that
occupant.5
262
The dissenting opinion pointed out that this holding turned the
requirement of probable cause for arrest "upside down. '263 The dis-
sent argued that the majority used exceptions to the general rule of a
warrant requirement based on special circumstances to create a new,
expanded rule applicable to the unrelated situation of normalpolice ac-
tivities. The legitimate law enforcement purposes which underlie the
need for those exceptions to the warrant requirement are not present
when ordinary police activities are conducted.2 4 Moreover, the dissent
contended that the exceptions to the warrant requirement allow limited
intrusions into personal privacy, whereas here the intrusion of an arrest
was far from a limited one.265 The dissent also criticized the majority's
rule as lacking inherent limitations. Because a proper search under the
258. Id at 705.
259. Id at 701.
260. Id
261. Id
262. Id at 703-04.
263. Id at 709 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
264. Id
265. Id at 710.
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majority rule "can mean a detention of several hours, 26 6 the police can
make a person "a prisoner in his own home for a potentially very long
period of time. 2 67
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the question of when an in-
vestigatory stop escalates into an arrest in United States v. Harring-
ton. 2 Defendant Harrington had been under surveillance by border
patrol agents for several days during his stay in Douglas, Arizona, an
area known for the smuggling of illegal aliens. Harrington was regis-
tered at a motel under an assumed name, and agents had observed a
Mexican male visiting his room three times for brief periods. After the
last visit, Harrington took a circuitous route to two known alien pick-
up areas. After his stops at these areas, Harrington's van appeared to
be riding low, swaying on curves, bouncing at dips, and struggling to
climb hills.269 Harrington was stopped by a police officer ostensibly for
a traffic violation. A border patrol agent approached the suspect, iden-
tified himself, and stated: "[d]epending on what I find [when checking
the van] I need to come back and talk to you about an immigration
violation." Seventeen illegal aliens were found in the van.270
On appeal, Harrington alleged that he had been arrested, rather
than merely stopped, when the border patrol agent informed him that
he was going to be questioned about an immigration violation. The
court stated that whether an investigatory stop escalates into an arrest
"depends on all of the surrounding circumstances including the extent
that freedom of movement is curtailed and the degree and type of force
or authority used to effectuate the stop."'27 The court concluded that in
this instance nothing would lead a reasonable person to believe that
Harrington had been arrested.272 The court also found that the facts of
the case gave rise to reasonable suspicion justifying the investigatory
stop. 3 The court's conclusion is well within the factual parameters of
other cases where police actions have been found to constitute investi-
gatory stops. 274
266. Id at 711.
267. Id
268. 636 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980).
269. Id at 1184.
270. Id at 1186.
271. Id (citing United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497, 500-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (arrest rather
than investigatory stop occurred when nine armed officers in four vehicles surrounded de-
fendants' taxi and two agents took each defendant by the arms to different locations around
the car)).
272. 636 F.2d at 1186.
273. Id
274. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
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In United States v. Patterson, 275 the Ninth Circuit again held that a
defendant had not been arrested. Defendant Oglesby had parked in
front of a residence being searched by DEA agents and had remained
in his car with the motor running while his passenger went inside.
DEA agents then blocked the car and ordered Oglesby out of the car.
As he emerged, Oglesby told the agents that there was a gun under the
front seat. The agents asked whether there was anything else in the car,
and Oglesby responded that there was marijuana and cocaine. 6
On appeal, Oglesby contended that he had been arrested rather
than stopped when the agents had blocked his car and ordered him out,
and that the arrest was made without probable cause.277 He also con-
tended that even if he had not been arrested, the agents lacked reason-
able suspicion for an investigatory stop.
278
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Harrington test and found that the
stop was not an arrest. The court stated that a valid stop is not trans-
formed into an arrest because agents momentarily restrict a person's
-freedom, provided that excessive force is not used. The court con-
cluded that a different rule would prevent agents from performing their
investigative functions without a suspect's cooperation.279 In this case,
the court decided that blocking the defendant's car "was a reasonable
precaution" to ensure that he would not drive away before the agents
could question him. Ordering him from his car was also regarded as a
reasonable precaution.2 8 0 Thus, the court found that the force used by
the agents was not excessive and that an "innocent person could not
reasonably have assumed he was being taken into custody
indefinitely."
281
In United States v. Patino,282 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
DEA agents had arrested Patino when they stopped and questioned her
(1968). In Terry, an officer approached suspects who appeared to be casing a store, identi-
fied himself as a policeman, and asked them to identify themselves. When the suspects only
mumbled something in return, the officer grabbed Terry and patted him down. This was
held to be an investigatory stop. 392 U.S. at 19.
In Mimms, officers stopped a vehicle to issue a traffic citation, ordering the driver out of
the car. When the officer noticed a bulge in the defendant's pocket, he frisked the defend-
ant. This was held to be an investigatory stop. 434 U.S. at 109.
275. 648 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1981).
276. Id at 628.
277. Id at 631.
278. Id
279. Id at 633.
280. Id
281. Id at 634.
282. 649 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981).
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at the Miami Airport. Patino was stopped and required to produce her
airline ticket and identification. The agents informed her early in the
conversation that she fit the DEA's profile of a female drug courier.
She was not, however, told that she could refuse to stop as well as re-
fuse to answer the agents' questions. 3
Patino argued that she was stopped without reasonable suspicion
that she had engaged in unlawful activity. She contended that because
the stop was illegal, the drugs found in her suitcase as a result of infor-
mation derived from the stop should have been suppressed.
28 4
The Ninth Circuit found that Patino's encounter with the agents
had constituted an arrest within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
The court's decision rested on the following facts: (1) Patino was an
alien with a language problem;285  (2) when the agents stopped her,
Patino was not told that she could refuse to stop and answer questions;
and (3) Patino was an alien and therefore she may have felt a greater
compulsion to comply with the agents' requests and "would not reason-
ably have believed she was free to walk away" when they stopped
her.286 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's or-
der suppressing evidence obtained after the stop.
2 8 7
F. Joint Ventures
The fourth amendment does not generally apply to searches or
seizures made by foreign officials while enforcing foreign law, even if
the evidence is seized from American citizens.28 8 Under the doctrine of
joint venture, however, the fourth amendment is deemed applicable
when American officials so actively participate in the search or seizure
that the foreign officials, in fact, become their agents.2 8 9 The practical
283. Id at 726.
284. Id at 725.
285. Patino had requested that a Spanish-speaking officer be present during interroga-
tion. Id at 726.
286. Id at 727. The court stated that whether a seizure comes within the protection of the
fourth amendment depends on "whether the person stopped reasonably believed that he or
she was not free to leave." Id at 726-27 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1960)).
287. 649 F.2d at 729.
288. United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1978) (joint venture doctrine
inapplicable to search of suitcase by Canadian customs officer because American customs
officials neither ordered, directed, nor participated in search).
289. Id at 1362 (citing Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968) (joint
venture doctrine applicable only if federal agents "so substantially participated in the raids
so as to convert them into joint ventures between the United States and the foreign offi-
cias"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969)).
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difficulty of establishing the existence of a joint venture290 is illustrated
by two recent Ninth Circuit opinions.
In United States v. Maher,291 the defendant was convicted of con-
spiracy and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute the
drug. On appeal, Maher claimed that an unlawful wiretap was used by
Canadian police to acquire information which was later given to DEA
agents.2 92 This information was incorporated into an affidavit used by
the DEA to obtain a search warrant. Maher claimed that the joint ven-
ture doctrine applied and tainted the fruits of the DEA search. The
court held, however, that the absence of any use by the DEA of Cana-
dian police as "agents" was a sufficient ground for rejection of the joint
venture claim.293
The Ninth Circuit also rejected a joint venture claim in United
States v. Benedict, 294 where a Bangkok customs official discovered her-
oin concealed in radio sets that Benedict was shipping to America.
Both the Thai police and the Bangkok office of the DEA were notified.
A subsequent search of Benedict's apartment by Thai police, in which
American officials were invited to join, yielded more heroin and led to
Benedict's arrest.
The court rejected the joint venture theory because the Thai police
initiated their own search after discovering the heroin at the customs
station. Furthermore, the search warrant had been issued by the Bang-
kok police and DEA agents were invited to participate in the search
only because the heroin had been marked for shipment to the United
States.295
Both the above decisions appear consistent with other opinions in
the joint venture area. The key factors are whether foreign or United
States officials initiated the allegedly unconstitutional actions involved
and the degree of American participation in these actions.296
Although the present judicial trend appears to favor rejection of
290. See United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956
(1977). "[A]s a statistical matter [the courts have] been virtually unanimous in rejecting
claims of undue participation." Id at 140.
291. 645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
292. Id at 781-82.
293. Id at 783.
294. 647 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087 (1981).
295. Id at 930-3 1.
296. See, eg., Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Johnson, 451
F.2d 1321, 1322 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1018 (1971); United States v. Tierney, 448
F.2d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Shea, 436 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1970), appeal
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joint venture claims, 2 9 7 the doctrine may still apply if American offi-
cials either actively participate in the search or arrest or initiate the
action on their own accord and then participate in its execution.298
G. The Retroactivity of Chadwick
The constitutional doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Chadwick299 has generated several cases raising the
issue of whether Chadwick should be applied retroactively. Chadwick
held that, absent exigent circumstances, police must obtain a warrant
before searching luggage lawfully seized from an automobile. 3°° The
Court reasoned that luggage is a common receptacle for personal ef-
fects, and, therefore, is inevitably associated with a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy.30'
The Ninth Circuit's position that Chadwick should not be applied
retroactively was reaffirmed in United States v. Stewart. 3 02 In Stewart,
the police conducted a warrantless search of an attache case found on
the rear seat of Stewart's vehicle and discovered that it contained
methamphetamine. Stewart argued that under the Supreme Court's
decision in Arkansas v. Sanders, 03 the Chadwick doctrine should be
applied retroactively, and, therefore, the methamphetamine should
have been suppressed.3 4 The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that
after remand, 445 F.2d 856 (1971); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743, 746 (9th
Cir. 1968).
297. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 1978) (joint venture
established when DEA agents alerted Mexican police to possible drug transaction in
Guaymas area, coordinated surveillance of suspects at Guaymas airport, supplied DEA un-
dercover agent to act as pilot in drug transaction, and gave signal instigating defendant's
arrest); United States v. Pechac, 54 F.R.D. 187, 189 (D. Ariz. 1972) (joint venture established
when federal investigator actively participated in searching defendant's home with local
Phoenix police, checked discovered weapons against defendant's registration papers, and
took custody of weapons after listing them on local authorities' inventory of seized
property).
299. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
300. Id at 15-16.
301. Id at 13.
302. 650 F.2d 178, 179 (9th Cir. 1981). See United States v. Cornejo, 598 F.2d 554, 556
(9th Cir. 1979) (Chadwick only to be applied prospectively).
303. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). In Sanders, police had probable cause to believe that the de-
fendant's suitcase contained marijuana. They followed the defendant's taxi, stopped the
vehicle, and, without consent or a warrant, searched the suitcase, in which the contraband
was discovered. The Court applied Chadwick and held that the evidence should have been
suppressed at trial because the police did not obtain a warrant before instituting the search.
Id at 757-66.
304. 650 F.2d at 179.
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although the Sanders Court applied Chadwick to a pre-Chadwick
search and held that the evidence seized during the warrantless search
was inadmissible, it did not specifically address the issue of Chadwick-'
retroactivity.3 0 It was therefore improper to infer that the Court in-
tended to apply Chadwick retroactively. 6
The court also applied the retroactivity guidelines established by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Peltier.30 In Peltier, the Court
"expressed a strong preference" for applying new decisions prospec-
tively when the exclusionary rule is involved.0 8 Its rationale for this
preference was that the policies of deterrence and judicial integrity un-
derlying the exclusionary rule were not served when the police believed
in good faith that their actions were lawful under current constitutional
standards. °9
The Stewart court ruled that Chadwick indeed changed contempo-
rary constitutional standards. 10 Sanders neither contradicted this rul-
ing nor overruled or distinguished Peltier.31 1 Thus, because the police
in Stewart searched the attache case in a good faith belief that their
actions were lawful under contemporary constitutional standards, prec-
edential authority clearly favored prospective application of
Chadwick. 
312
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Stewart is consistent with the law in
several other circuits. Because the Supreme Court has not explicitly
decided the question of Chadwick's retroactivity, other circuits faced
with this question have also looked to Peltier for guidance. Most have
interpreted Peltier as indicating that Chadwick should be applied pro-
spectively.313 The Eighth Circuit, however, has taken a different ap-
proach to this issue, holding that because Chadwick announced no new
constitutional standard, it may be applied retroactively.314 The ap-
305. The Court explicitly stated that it granted certiorari in Sanders "to resolve some
apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our decision in United States V. Chad-
wick " 442 U.S. at 754 (citation and footnotes omitted).
306. 650 F.2d at 179-80.
307. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
308. Id at 535.
309. 650 F.2d at 180 (citing United States v. Peltier, 442 U.S. at 538).
310. 650 F.2d at 180-81.
311. Id at 180.
312. Id
313. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 571 F.2d 2, 3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840
(1978); United States v. Reda, 563 F.2d 510, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 973 (1978); United States v. Montgomery, 558 F.2d 311, 312 (5th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1174 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Unlike
Peltier, this case does not present a question of retroactivity and, thus, we need not reach the
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proach of those circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, that have held
that Chadwick is to be applied prospectively, however, appears to be
more consistent with the Supreme Court's general approach to the ret-
roactivity of decisions involving the exclusionary rule.
II. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
Since 1791, the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
has guaranteed to United States citizens the right against self-incrimi-
nation in a criminal proceeding. 315 One hundred and seventy-three
years later in Malloy v. Hogan3"6 this fundamental protection was
made applicable to the states. Recently, issues involving the right
against self-incrimination have been raised before both the Supreme
Court and the Ninth Circuit.
1. Miranda challenges
a. Miranda rights at psychiatric evaluations
In Estelle v. Smith, 317 the Supreme Court addressed whether an
accused must be advised of his or her right against self-incrimination
before submitting to a court-ordered psychiatric examination, when the
examination's conclusions may be used to determine the defendant's
sentence. 318 Defendant Smith was indicted for murder.319 In response
to the state's announcement that it would seek the death penalty for
Smith, the trial judge ordered a psychiatric examination to determine
Smith's competence to stand trial.320 After a ninety-minute examina-
tion, Dr. Grigson, the court-appointed psychiatrist, concluded that al-
though the defendant was "a severe sociopath," he was competent to
question of whether or not to apply the exclusionary rule .... Chadwick announces no new
constitutional doctrine, nor does it broaden any existing exclusionary rule. All the Court did
in Chadwick was to hold that warrantless searches of luggage absent an exigency are an
invasion of a 'legitimate privacy interest' and cannot be justified under any of the long estab-
lished exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirement.") (citation omitted).
315. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
316. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) ("The Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-in-
crimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the
States.").
317. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
318. Id at 456.
319. Id The defendant's accomplice in a robbery shot and killed a grocery store clerk.
Id
320. Id at 456-57.
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stand trial.321
After a guilty verdict was rendered, a sentencing hearing was held
before the same jury to determine whether the defendant should re-
ceive the death penalty.322 At this hearing, one of the critical issues was
whether it was probable that the defendant would commit violent crim-
inal acts again; if so, he would be deemed a continuing threat to
society.
323
In a surprise move, the State called Dr. Grigson to testify, and the
trial court denied the defense motion to exclude Dr. Grigson's testi-
mony.324 Dr. Grigson testified that the defendant was "a very severe
sociopath" who "is going to. . .commit other similar or same criminal
acts if given the opportunity to do so.''s25 Dr. Grigson's testimony was
the State's only evidence at the sentencing hearing. 326 The jury sen-
tenced the defendant to death.
3 27
Before the Supreme Court, the State maintained that the fifth
amendment did not apply because the issue of Dr. Grigson's testimony
arose during the penalty phase of the trial, after the defendant had
321. Id at 457-59.
322. Id at 457. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(a) (Vernon 1981) provides in
pertinent part: "Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment."
323. 451 U.S. at 458. To aid a jury's determination, TEXAS CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art.
37.071(b) (Vernon 1981) provides three questions which, if answered affirmatively, mandate
a sentence of death:
(I) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the de-
fendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the
defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation,
if any, by the deceased.
324. 451 U.S. at 459. The defense objection was based on the fact that Dr. Grigson's
name failed to appear on the list of witnesses for the state. Id Therefore, the defense ar-
gued, admission of Dr. Grigson's testimony at the penalty stage violated a pretrial order
barring testimony of any witness not named in the list of state witnesses. Id Because the
Court reversed the defendant's sentence on other constitutional grounds, it did not find it
necessary to "reach the question of whether the failure to give advance notice of Dr. Grig-
son's appearance as a witness for the state deprived [the defendant] of due process." Id at
473 n.17.
325. Id at 459-60. A more detailed record of Dr. Grigson's testimony was set forth by
the Court. Dr. Grigson testified that Smith was a severe sociopath who would continue his
previous behavior, and that his condition would get only worse because there was no treat-
ment available to modify or change his behavior. Id (citing Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694,
697-98 (5th Cir. 1979)).




been found guilty.328 The Court rejected this construction of the fifth
amendment, holding that the fifth amendment is equally applicable to
the penalty phase of a trial.3 29 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
emphasized "the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty
phase. 33 o
The Court further rejected the State's argument that because the
defendant's response to the psychiatric evaluation was nontestimonial,
the fifth amendment was inapplicable.33 The Court distinguished ad-
mitting into evidence conclusions drawn from communications with
the defendant from nontestimonial evidence such as handwriting,
332
blood samples, 333 and lineup identifications.3 34 Accordingly, the Court
held that because Dr. Grigson's conclusions were based largely on the
defendant's verbal account of the crime, the fifth amendment was
applicable. 35
The key factor in the Court's decision was that neither the defend-
ant nor his counsel had any reason to believe that the defendant's state-
ments during the psychiatric examination could be used for any
purpose other than to determine his competency to stand trial.336 Nev-
ertheless, Smith's unguarded statements during the psychiatric exami-
nation led to Dr. Grigson's conclusions which in turn became the basis
for the death sentence.337
By reaffirming the proposition that "[t]he Fifth Amendment privi-
328. Id at 462.
329. Id at 462-63.
330. Id at 463 (citing Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (constitutional guarantee
to fair trial equally applicable to penalty phase of trial); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16
(1978) ("[F]undamental principles of procedural fairness apply with no less force at the pen-
alty phases of a trial in a capital case than they do in the guilt-determining phase of any
criminal trial."); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (because "the sentencing is a
critical stage of the criminal proceeding" the requirements of due process must be satisfied)).
The Court also relied upon language in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967), which extended
the scope of the fifth amendment to juvenile proceedings: "'the availability of the [fifth
amendment] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is
invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it in-
vites.'" 451 U.S. at 462.
331. 451 U.S. at 463-65.
332. Id See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
333. 451 U.S. at 463-65. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (fifth
amendment protects defendant only from compelled testimony or from otherwise providing
State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature).
334. 451 U.S. at 463-65. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967).
335. 451 U.S. at 464-65.
336. Id at 466.
337. Id
1982]
LOYO_,L OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
lege is 'as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard,' ",338 the
Court supported its finding that "[tihe considerations calling for the
accused to be warned prior to custodial interrogation apply with no less
force to the pretrial psychiatric examination at issue. ' 339 The Court
further reasoned that if Dr. Grigson's conclusions had been confined to
their original purpose, there would have been no fifth amendment vio-
lation. 340 The Court explained:
When Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting to the court
on the issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at
the penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent's future
dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like
that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements
made in a post-arrest custodial setting.
341
The Court also found it significant that the. defendant neither initi-
ated the psychiatric evaluation nor attempted to introduce psychiatric
evidence.342 Thus, the Court distinguished the psychiatric evaluation
in Smith from "a sanity examination occasioned by a defendant's plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity.' 3 43 The Court explained that the
privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to examinations ne-
cessitated by an insanity plea: once a defendant puts his mental health
into issue, "his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means
it has of controverting [the defendant's] proof on an issue that he inter-
jected into the case., 34
338. Id at 467-68 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)).
339. 451 U.S. at 467.
340. Id at 465.
341. Id at 467.
342. Id at 465-66.
343. Id at 465.
344. Id (emphasis added). Five circuit courts of appeal have held that if a defendant
pleads insanity, he must submit to a state sanity examination. United States v. Cohen, 530
F.2d 43, 47 (5th Cir.) (upholding "compelled psychiatric examinations when a defendant has
raised the insanity defense"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Karstettler v. Cardwell, 526
F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[O]nce a defendant indicates his intention to invoke the
insanity defense and present expert testimony on the issue, he may be ordered to submit to a
psychiatric examination by psychiatrists available to testify for the government . . .");
United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1969) ("[T]he fifth amendment is not
violated by allowing a psychiatrist to testify on the basis of an examination of defendant to
which the latter was ordered to submit."), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971); United States v.
Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724-25 (4th Cir. 1968) (Government's burden of proof regarding
defendant's sanity requires access to defendant for sanity evaluation); Pope v. United States,
372 F.2d 710, 720-21 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (defense right to refuse Government psychiat-
ric examination waived by presenting psychiatric testimony on insanity issue), vacated on
other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
Moreover, the Smith Court noted that a similar issue was "carefully left open" by the
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While Smith appears at first glance to be an uncharacteristically
broad extension of the fifth amendment by the Burger Court, the Court
actually narrowed its decision by specifying similar circumstances in
which the privilege would not apply.345 Moreover, the Court was re-
luctant to extend the privilege against self-incrimination beyond state-
ments made to a police officer or government agent, as was evident in
its conclusion that Dr. Grigson, by testifying against the defendant, be-
came, in effect, "an agent of the State. 34
6
In addition to the fifth amendment violation, the Smith Court held
that the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had been
abridged.347 Smith had been indicted and counsel appointed before the
psychiatric examination. Because counsel was not present during the
examination, the Court concluded that Smith was denied the assistance
of counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings. 348
Justice Powell joined in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, sup-
porting the decision's sixth amendment ground.349 They considered
this a sufficient basis to affirm the court of appeals without reaching the
fifth amendment issue.350 Justice Rehnquist concurred separately on
the sixth amendment ground, but vigorously opposed the decision's
fifth amendment groundY.3 5 He did not consider Smith's fifth amend-
ment rights implicated because Dr. Grigson's examination did not con-
stitute "the inherently coercive situation considered in Miranda. 3 5
2
Justice Rehnquist further argued that even if Smith's fifth amendment
rights were implicated, he had waived them by failing to invoke them
when questioned by Dr. Grigson.353 Although acknowledging that the
court of appeals: "'the possibility that a defendant who wishes to use psychiatric evidence in
his own behalf [on the issue of future dangerousness] can be precluded from using it unless
he is [also] willing to be examined by a psychiatrist nominated by the state."' 451 U.S. at
466 n.10 (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 705 (5th Cir. 1979)).
345. Sanity examinations necessitated by defendants' putting their mental health in issue
was an example cited by the Smith Court. 451 U.S. at 465.
346. Id at 467. It is interesting to note, as did the court of appeals, that Dr. Grigson was
often an expert witness for the State, but never a witness for the defense. Also, when ap-
pointed in other cases to determine only a defendant's competency to stand trial, Dr. Grig-
son often drew the conclusion that the defendant was a "sociopath" and/or was likely to
commit crimes in the future. The court of appeals cited fifteen Texas cases as authority for
these statements. Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d at 700-01 n.7.
347. 451 U.S. at 469.
348. Id
349. Id at 474 (Stewart, J., concurring).
350. Id
351. Id (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
352. Id at 475.
353. Id
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right against self-incrimination is not self-executing, Justice Rehnquist
considered the requirement of giving Miranda warnings inapplicable
"'outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations
for which [they were] designed.' "-4
In contrast, the majority's decision to base its opinion on the fifth,
as well as the sixth, amendment indicates the strong weight it accorded
to the fifth amendment issues involved. Thus, Estelle v. Smith may be
viewed as a firm, albeit narrow, extension of Miranda.
b. interrogation following requestfor counsel
In Edwards v. Arizona, 355 the Supreme Court re-examined the re-
quirements for establishing a valid waiver of the right to counsel. De-
fendant Edwards was arrested for murder and was informed of his
Miranda rights.356 Thereafter, he submitted to police questioning
which ceased when Edwards refused to answer further questions until
he could consult an attorney.357
The following day, interrogation resumed, although Edwards had
not been provided with counsel.358 When Edwards objected, a guard
told him that "'he had' to talk. ' 359 After receiving additional Miranda
warnings, Edwards listened to a tape recording in which an accomplice
incriminated him in the murder.3uo Minutes later, he confessed.36'
Before trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession on the
ground that it had been obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.
362
The trial court denied his motion.363 The Arizona Supreme Court up-
held Edwards' conviction, finding that he had confessed voluntarily,
after waiving his right to counsel.
36 4
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the Arizona
Supreme Court determined Edwards' admission to be voluntary under
the totality of circumstances standard as announced in Schneckloth v.
354. Id (quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560 (1980)).
355. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
356. Id at 478. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).






362. Id "If the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent, 'the interrogation must
cease.' If he requests counsel, 'the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.'"
Id at 482 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
363. 451 U.S. at 479-80.
364. Id at 480.
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Bustamonte.365 The Edwards Court reasoned that because BustamonWe
involved consent to search and waiver of fourth amendment rights
while Edwards involved waiver of the right to counsel, Bustamonte was
not controlling.366 The Court relied instead on Johnson v. Zerbst 367 for
the rule that although waiver of counsel must be voluntary it "must
also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment . . . of a
known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case.' "368
The Edwards Court reaffirmed that additional protection is re-
quired when a defendant has invoked the right to the presence of coun-
sel during custodial interrogation.369 Under such circumstances,
waiver cannot be established by proving only that the accused has re-
sponded to police-initiated reinterrogation even if the defendant has
been given Miranda warnings. 370 The Court characterized communi-
cation initiated by the accused as a necessary fact among the totality of
circumstances considered in determining the validity of the waiver,
371
and concluded that unless a defendant initiates further communication
with the police, he or she "is not subject to further interrogation...
until counsel has been made available."
372
The practical application of the Court's "initiation by the accused"
requirement appears to modify the waiver standard of Zerbst in that
the totality of the circumstances surrounding a given case need not be
considered when police initiate a conversation that results in interroga-
tion.373 Under these circumstances it appears that there can be no
365. Id at 483 (citing 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
366. 451 U.S. at 483.
367. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
368. 451 U.S. at 482 (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464). The Edwards Court noted that
Bustamonte itself emphasized that questions of voluntariness and knowing and intelligent
waiver are discrete inquiries. 451 U.S. at 484.
369. 451 U.S. at 484; see id at 483 (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 241 (right to counsel a
prime example of rights requiring special protection of Zerbst standard)).
370. 451 U.S. at 484 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 386 (1977)).
371. 451 U.S. at 486 n.9. The Court's placement of "initiation by the accused" within the
context of the totality of the circumstances indicates that the Court did not consider proof of
such initiation sufficient in itself to establish waiver.
372. Id at 484-85 (construing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)).
373. Justice Powell found the majority opinion unclear but noted that it could be read to
establish a new per se rule that requires a threshold inquiry as to who initiated any exchange
between an accused and the police. 451 U.S. at 489-90 (Powell, J., concurring). He criti-
cized this interpretation as superimposing a new element of proof on the doctrine of waiver
established in Zerbst. Id at 490. Justice Powell reasoned that unless the traditional stan-
dard were shown to be ineffective, this imposition would be unjustified and noted that there
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waiver and the fifth amendment would require the suppression of post-
arrest statements at defendant's trial.374 While the full impact of Ed-
wards awaits future articulation, the Court's emphasis on "initiation by
the accused" seems to reflect an attempt to create a practical procedural
safeguard of a defendant's fifth amendment rights in keeping with the
tradition of Miranda and its progeny.
c. use of defendantv' tape-recorded statements
In United States v. Kenny,3 " a tape recording of an incriminating
telephone call between the defendant and his co-conspira-
tor/government informer was played before the jury, ostensibly to im-
peach Kenny's testimony.376 Kenny asserted that the tape had been
obtained in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination and
should have been suppressed.377 The Ninth Circuit held that because
the tape had not been obtained during custodial interrogation, there
was no fifth amendment violation.378
d statements made during customs searches
In United States v. Estrada-Lucas,379 the Ninth Circuit addressed
the admissibility of statements made to customs agents before receipt of
Miranda warnings. A customs search of defendant's luggage at the
California-Mexico border revealed ten tablecloths and three bags of
gold jewelry worth approximately $19,000.380 After the customs agent
had discovered the first bag of jewelry, he asked the defendant what
was in the bag, and she replied, "It's jewelry." '' While the agent was
removing the other two bags, Estrada-Lucas volunteered that she was
merely delivering the jewelry to its owner, but after further questioning
has been "no indication. . . that Zerbst and its progeny have failed to protect constitutional
rights." Id at 492 n.2.
374. See id at 480.
375. 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981).
376. Id at 1337.
377. Id at 1338.
378. Id In reaching its decision, the court cited Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495
(1977) (per curiam) (upholding burglary conviction where suspect voluntarily went to police
station and confessed during interview: "Miranda warnings are required only when there
has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' "); and
United States v. Beckwith, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976) (no fifth amendment violation from
failure to give Miranda warnings before interrogating defendant in his home because setting
not coercive or custodial).
379. 651 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1980).




by another agent, the defendant admitted that the jewelry was hers.382
On appeal, Estrada-Lucas argued that her statements to the cus-
toms agents should have been suppressed because they had been elic-
ited without prior Miranda warnings. She contended that the
Miranda warnings should have been given when the agent had prob-
able cause to arrest: when he discovered the tablecloths and the first
bag of jewelry.384 The Ninth Circuit applied the test it established in
Chavez-Martinez v. United States385 for determining when customs
agents are required to administer Miranda warnings.
386
The court first questioned when the agents had probable cause to
arrest, and then whether Estrada-Lucas had been in custody.3 87 It held
that probable cause had been established upon discovery of the first
bag of jewelry, because "it was reasonable to believe that. . the jew-
elry. . . was not part of [Estrada-Lucas's] personal wardrobe." 388 The
court then applied the test it established in United States v. Luther
389
for determining when custody occurs during a customs search.39 ° It
found that Estrada-Lucas had been in custody because: (1) both cus-
toms agents considered that defendant had not been free to leave dur-
ing the search; (2) Estrada-Lucas had been confronted with evidence of
her guilt; and (3) the discovery of the jewelry and tablecloths had been
treated as more than a mere administrative matter.39' The court con-
cluded that the defendant's statements to the customs agent prior to
Miranda warnings should have been excluded, and the conviction was
reversed.392
382. Id
383. Id at 1265.
384. Id
385. 407 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.) ("IThe warning required in Miranda need not be given
to one who is entering the United States unless and until the questioning agents have prob-
able cause to believe that the person questioned has committed an offense, or the person
questioned has been arrested, whether with or without probable cause."), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 858 (1969).
386. 651 F.2d at 1265 (citing Chavez-Martinez, 407 F.2d at 539).
387. 651 F.2d at 1265-66. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Chavez-Martinez test contains
a "probable cause" element, and, implicitly, a "custody" element. Id at 1265.
388. Id at 1265-66.
389. 521 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (when circumstances indicated seizure
merely administrative matter, defendant found not in custody). The Luther test addresses:
(1) the language used to summon the defendant; (2) the physical surroundings of the interro-
gation; (3) the extent to which the defendant had been confronted with evidence of his or her
guilt; and (4) the pressure exerted to detain the defendant. Id at 410-11.
390. 651 F.2d at 1266 (citing Luther, 521 F.2d at 410-11).
391. 651 F.2d at 1266.
392. Id
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2. "No adverse inference" jury instruction
In Carter v. Kentucky,393 the Court addressed an issue specifically
reserved in Griffn v. California.394 whether under the fifth amendment
a defendant has the right to an instruction that the jury may not infer
guilt from the defendant's failure to testify.
395
Fearing that evidence of his prior felony convictions would be too
prejudicial, Carter chose not to testify at his trial for burglary.396 The
trial judge refused to give the following requested jury instruction:
"'The [defendant] is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does
not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice
him in any way.' ,,397 The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the de-
fendant's conviction,398 relying on Kentucky statutory399 and case
law'  that prohibited commentary on a defendant's failure to testify.
The court concluded that the instruction would have constituted an im-
permissible commentary.
40 1
Although the United States Supreme Court had decided a similar
issue over forty years earlier in Bruno v. United States402 Bruno in-
volved the construction of a federal statute 3 rather than the applica-
bility of the fifth amendment. The Court therefore relied upon two
more recent decisions, Gri~n v. California4I and Lakeside v. Oregon,405
to hold that a state trial court is constitutionally obligated to give a "no-
inference" jury instruction when so requested.40 6
In Griffn, the Court set forth the "no comment" rule, holding that
no adverse commentary on the defendant's failure to testify could be
393. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
394. 380 U.S. 609, 615 n.6 (1965).
395. 450 U.S. at 289-90.
396. Id at 292-93. Defense counsel described the defendant's position as caught "'be-
tween a rock and a hard place."' Id at 293 n.4.
397. Id at 294 (brackets in original).
398. Id at 295.
399. Ky. REv. STAT. § 421.225 (Supp. 1980): "In any criminal or penal prosecution the
defendant, on his own request, shall be allowed to testify in his own behalf, but his failure to
do so shall not be commented upon or create any presumption against him."
400. Green v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 339, 341-42 (1972).
401. 450 U.S. at 295.
402. 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939) (federal statute prohibiting presumption of guilt arising
from defendant's failure to testify interpreted to require a "no-inference" jury instruction if
defendant so requests).
403. Act of March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976), prohibits
creating any presumption from a defendant's failure to testify.
404. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
405. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
406. 450 U.S. at 305.
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made in the presence of the jury.40 7 The Court in Lakeside went fur-
ther and upheld the constitutionality of a "no-inference" instruction
that was given over the defendant's objection.40 8 The Lakeside Court
reasoned that Griffin prohibited only adverse comment on a defendant's
refusal to testify.
40 9
Noting the importance of a "no-inference" instruction, the Carter
Court explained that "'[t]oo many, even those who should be better
advised, view this [fifth amendment] privilege as a shelter for wrongdo-
ers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are. . . guilty of
crime .... "1,410 Furthermore, the juror may not realize the many
valid reasons a defendant may have for choosing not to testify.411 This
concern was voiced by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Grffi, 4 12 and
again in his majority opinion in Carter. He explained that unjust pen-
alties may result "when the jury is left to roam at large with only its
untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defendant's silence
broad inferences of guilt. '41 3 The Court concluded that a state trial
judge must, upon proper request, "minimize the danger that the jury
will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify" in his
own behalf.
41 4
Justice Powell, who concurred in the result, and Justice Rehnquist,
who dissented, questioned whether the fifth amendment requires a "no-
inference" jury instruction when requested by the defendant.41 5 Al-
though Justice Powell disagreed with Griffin, he concurred in Carter in
order to follow precedent.41 6 Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, at-
407. 380 U.S. at 614-15. The Griffin Court reasoned that commenting on the defendant's
exercise of his fifth amendment right not to testify "cuts down on the privilege by making its
assertion costly." Id at 614.
408. 435 U.S. at 340-41.
409. Id at 338-39. "It would be strange indeed to conclude that this cautionary instruc-
tion violates the very constitutional provision it is intended to protect." Id at 339.
410. 450 U.S. at 302 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956)).
411. These reasons include, as in Carter, fear of impeachment by prior convictions. In
addition, "'[e]xcessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain
transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against him, will often confuse
and embarrass [a defendant] to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices
against him."' 450 U.S. at 300 n.15 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66
(1893)).
412. 380 U.S. at 621 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
413. 450 U.S. at 301. The Court reinforced this statement with a public opinion survey's
finding "that 37% of those interviewed believed that it is the responsibility of the accused to
prove his innocence." Id at 303 n.21 (citing 64 A.B.A.J. 653 (1978)).
414. 450 U.S. at 305.
415. Id at 305-07 (Powell, J., concurring); id at 307-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
416. Id at 305-07 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell argued that the Constitution
does not require jurors to set aside "logical inferences" when a defendant chooses not to
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tacked the majority's decision as veering impermissibly from constitu-
tional paths.41 7
Justice Powell's and Justice Rehnquist's reservations in the Carter
decision reflect their policy of strictly construing the Constitution. One
of the Constitution's inherent qualities is its flexibility to reach and pre-
vent practices that may undercut its specific provisions. The Carter
majority relied on this quality in reasoning that to protect the meaning-
ful exercise of the right to remain silent, the Constitution guarantees
that "no adverse inferences ...be drawn from the exercise of that
privilege." 418 The jury instruction required under Carter merely func-
tions to "limit the jurors' speculation on the meaning of [the defend-
ant's] silence" in order to avoid exacting "an impermissible toll on the
full and free exercise of the privilege."
419
3. Production of business records
In two recent cases, United States v. Alderson42 ° and United States
v. MacKey,42' the Ninth Circuit considered the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination as it relates to the production of business
records. In Alderson, the Internal Revenue Service issued a summons
for production of records of Perfection Produce-Alderson Brothers, a
farming partnership maintained by defendant and his brother.422 The
defendant refused to comply with the summons, asserting his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.423 In determining
whether the Alderson partnership had "an institutional identity in-
dependent of its members,"'424 the Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court holding in Bellis v. United States42 that "the privilege against
self-incrimination is personal, [and]. . .may not be invoked to avoid
producing records of an artificial organization which are held in a rep-
explain incriminating circumstances, id at 306, but he concluded that under Griffn the de-
fendant was entitled to the instruction. Id at 307.
417. Id at 310 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist characterized the majority
opinion as allowing a criminal defendant "to take from the trial judge any control over"jury
instructions. Id He argued that neither Grffin nor the Constitution entitled the defendant
to such a result. Id at 308-10.
418. Id at 305 (citing Gr&%Fn, 380 U.S. at 609).
419. 450 U.S. at 305.
420. 646 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1981).
421. 647 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1981).
422. 646 F.2d at 422.
423. Id
424. Id at 422.
425. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
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resentative capacity." 426
The Alderson court found striking similarities between the facts in
Bellis and those in the case at bar.427 In Bellis, the Supreme Court held
that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination cannot be
asserted by individual partners as a defense to noncompliance with a
subpeona for partnership records.428 The court further held that
neither the size of the business entity nor insubstantial differences in
the form of the business warranted a different holding.429 Despite the
similarities between Bellis and Alderson, however, Alderson asserted
that dictum in Bellis430 made the family nature of the Alderson part-
nership a distinguishing factor.43'
The court of appeals rejected this argument and adopted the ap-
proach of the other circuits that have addressed the issue, ie., that a
family relationship is just one factor bearing on the issue of the organi-
zation's separate identity from its individual members.432 The court
stated that when "the facts overwhelmingly point to the existence of a
separate entity with an institutional identity, the existence of a family
relationship . . . will not overcome this conclusion. 433 Alderson,
though perhaps contrary to unexplained dictum in Bellis, comports
with the Supreme Court interpretation of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination" 'as personal in the sense that it applies only
426. 646 F.2d at 422 (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. at 89-90). The Bellis Court
stated that the organization must be:
recognized as an independent entity apart from individual members. The group
must be relatively well organized and structured, and not merely a loose, informal
association of individuals. It must maintain a distinct set of organizational records,
and recognize rights in its members of control and access to them. And the records
subpoenaed must in fact be organizational records held in a representative capac-
ity. In other words, it must be fair to say that the records demanded are the records
of the organization rather than those of the individual ....
Id at 92-93.
427. 646 F.2d at 423. Perfection Produce-Alderson Bros. had existed for 20 years, had six
permanent employees, 75 seasonal farm workers, a separate business bank account, and had
filed separate partnership tax returns in 1976 and 1977. Id Bells involved a three-man law
firm with an established name, six full-time employees, a separate business bank account,
and it had filed separate partnership tax returns. See 417 U.S. at 95-97.
428. 417 U.S. at 100-01.
429. Id
430. "This might be a different case if it involved a small family partnership." Id at 101.
431. 646 F.2d at 423.
432. Id See, eg., United States v. Hankins, 565 F.2d 1344, 1349 (5th Cir. 1978) (a part-
nership between two brothers), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Mahady &
Mahady, 512 F.2d 521, 523-24 (3d Cir. 1975) (family law partnership).
433. 646 F.2d at 423.
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to an individual's words or personal papers.' ""
In United States v. MacKey,4 35 the Ninth Circuit addressed the
characterization of records having both business and personal func-
tions. MacKey had been charged with price-fixing.436 The Govern-
ment sought to discover diaries, calendars, and appointment books
used by MacKey as vice-president and general manager of a roofing
construction corporation.437 Although these records had been used in
the corporation's daily business, MacKey argued that they were, never-
theless, personal notations and were used only by himself.438 There-
fore, he argued, they were protected against compulsory production
under the privilege against self-incrimination.439
The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of a line of district court
cases which held that "mixed documents are corporate and outside the
privilege."" 0 The court concluded that although some facts might in-
dicate that the documents were MacKey's personal papers, the docu-
ments were in fact "mixed," and therefore were outside the scope of
fifth amendment protection.44 '
4. Compulsory testimony
Recently, the Ninth Circuit considered two cases involving a de-
fendant's objection to the court's failure to compel testimony from a
witness. In United States v. Tsui442 the court upheld the defendant's
434. 417 U.S. at 87 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation (Bellis), 483 F.2d 961, 962 (3d
Cir. 1973)).
435. 647 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1981).
436. MacKey was charged "with conspiring to rig bids and prices in the panelized roofing
construction industry" in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 647 F.2d at 899.
437. 647 F.2d at 899.
438. Id at 900-01. In drawing this distinction between personal and corporate records,
MacKey also noted that the records "were not documents required by law to be kept for
regulatory or tax purposes." Id at 900. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (McCoy and
Sussman), 601 F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1979) (records of sole proprietor kept pursuant to
United States Customs regulations not protected by fifth amendment).
439. 647 F.2d at 900.
440. Id at 900. See United States v. Waltman, 394 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (diary
used to substantiate corporate entertainment expenses held to be corporate record unpro-
tected by fifth amendment), vacated on other grounds, 525 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1975); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 1379, 1380 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (desk calendar used for
business and personal purposes by defendant as corporate board chairman held to be corpo-
rate because of corporation's "constructive possession" of the calendar); United States v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 278 F. Supp. 608, 616 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (fifth
amendment privilege inapplicable to corporate documents despite personal notations
therein).
441. 647 F.2d at 901.
442. 646 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1981).
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conviction for income tax evasion over his claim that the trial court had
abused its discretion in limiting his examination of two defense wit-
nesses. The first witness, who was the subject of the same investigation
that led to Tsui's indictment, asserted a blanket claim of fifth amend-
ment privilege, refusing to answer any substantive questions.443 The
court noted that ordinarily a claim of privilege must be made in re-
sponse to specific questions to allow the reviewing court to decide
whether substantive responses could lead to injurious disclosures.4
An exception to the general rule arises, however, if the trial court can
conclude on the basis of its knowledge of the case and the anticipated
testimony that the witness could legitimately assert the privilege in re-
sponse to all relevant questions." 5 The Ninth Circuit ruled the excep-
tion applicable,446 rejecting Tsui's contention that potential prosecution
of the witness was time barred. 47
Tsui also challenged the district court's refusal to permit the de-
fense to ask leading questions on direct examination of an IRS investi-
gating officer,44 who Tsui claimed was an adverse witness. The Ninth
Circuit found some merit in Tsui's argument 449 but agreed with the
443. Id at 365-66.
444. Id at 367. But see United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978). The standard for sustaining a claim of privilege was set out in
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). In Hoffman, a witness in an exten-
sive grand jury racketeering investigation refused to answer questions pertaining to his own
activities during the time in question and whereabouts of another witness for whom a bench
warrant had been issued. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction for criminal con-
tempt, holding that "[t]o sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications
of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclo-
sure could result." Id at 486-87.
445. 646 F.2d at 367-68.
446. Id The witness in Tsui was "up to his neck" in criminal investigations and it was
highly likely that any evidence at all would tend to incriminate him. Id See Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ("The privilege afforded not only extends to answers
that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise
embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
claimant for a federal crime." (citation omitted)). The fact that the Hoffman defendant was
a known racketeer with a twenty-year police record was sufficient proof that the questions
posed "could easily have required answers that would forge links in a chain of facts imperil-
ing petitioner with conviction of a federal crime." Id at 488. Cf. United States v. Neff, 615
F.2d 1235, 1239-41 (9th Cir.) (defendant in tax fraud case could not rely upon privilege as
complete defense to failure to fie tax return when questions on return did not suggest that
response would be incriminating and it was apparent that his failure was motivated by de-
sire to protest taxes rather than by fear of self-incrimination), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925
(1980).
447. 646 F.2d at 368.
448. Id
449. Id; see United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 917-18 (6th Cir. 1972), in which the
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
trial court that his offer of proof as to the relevance of the anticipated
testimony was deficient,450 Accordingly, the court held that any error
by the district court in limiting the questioning was not so prejudicial as
to warrant reversal. 5 '
In United States v. Valencia,452 the Ninth Circuit upheld a pro-
spective defense witness' refusal to testify on fifth amendment
grounds.453 Three defendants, Del Real, Duarte, and Valencia had
been indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine and for
the substantive offense of distribution. 54 Del Real pled guilty to the
distribution charge, and the Government moved to dismiss the conspir-
acy charge.455 Before the court had accepted Del Real's guilty plea,
however, and while the Government's motion to dismiss the conspiracy
charge was pending, Duarte and Valencia called upon Del Real to tes-
tify at their trial.456 Del Real refused, asserting his privilege against
self-incrimination.4 7
On appeal from their convictions, Valencia and Duarte argued
that Del Real could not have validly invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination because he was no longer exposed to criminal prosecu-
tion.458 The Government contended that Del Real was still subject to
court stated that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b), which allows leading questions of
adverse witnesses, should apply even more strongly in criminal cases where the defendant is
entitled to every available means of ascertaining the truth, but the hostility of the witness
must be shown before any such questioning takes place. In Bryant, however, there was no
showing that the witness, an informant, was hostile-defense counsel had spoken with him
before trial and had received a copy of the statement given to the Government. Further, he
was not an experienced informant, and both his reliability and allegiance were uncertain.
Id at 919. See also United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347, 350-51 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 958 (1963). In Freeman, the court noted that while Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 43(b) allows leading questions of adverse witnesses, there is no similar provision
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court reasoned, however, that "there is
even more reason for permitting such practice in criminal cases where every proper means of
ascertaining the truth should be placed at the defendant's disposal." Id at 351.
450. 646 F.2d 368-69. The court did not explain why the proffered evidence would not be
relevant.
451. Id (citing Nutter v. United States, 412 F.2d 178, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1969) (refusal to
declare informant hostile witness and allow leading questions as to informant's prior crimi-
nal record was not abuse of discretion because there was no showing that such evidence was
material to defense or that it would demonstrate prejudice or bias), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 927
(1970)).
452. 656 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1981).
453. Id at 416.
454. Id at 413.





possible state prosecution, and that because the trial judge had neither
accepted his guilty plea, nor ruled on the motion to dismiss, Del Real's
refusal to testify was based on a valid fear of self-incrimination.459 The
Ninth Circuit upheld Del Rears assertion of the privilege, reasoning




In United States v. Mayo,46 1 the Ninth Circuit rejected the defend-
ant Mayo's assertion that he had been compelled to incriminate himself
in the jury's presence by answering the court's question regarding his
knowledge of his co-defendant's whereabouts. 462 Mayo contended that
by answering the question he was compelled to incriminate himself by
revealing to the jury his association with his co-defendant, who had just
been identified as a resident of a half-way house for alcohol and drug
abusers, addicts, and federal prisoners.
463
The Ninth Circuit considered the danger of incrimination too "re-
mote" and "speculative" to deserve fifth amendment protection, be-
cause "overwhelming evidence" had already linked the two
defendants.4 " Further, the court concluded that Mayo waived any
fifth amendment privilege when he answered the court's question vol-
untarily and without objection from defense counsel.465
In United States v. Dufur,46 6 the defendant asserted that the "mo-
bile booking van" in which he had been transported was so coercive a
setting that his confession to murdering a customs inspector had been
459. Id
460. Id The Ninth Circuit rested its decision on a comparison of the Valencia facts with
those of United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.) (valid assertion of
privilege while witness was awaiting sentencing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978) and
United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1974) (valid assertion of privilege while
five of six counts were pending), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975).
461. 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1981).
462. Id at 376. Before the jury had been excused for the evening, the judge asked Mayo
to confirm that his co-defendant was en route to the courtroom from Reality House. Id at
375-76. Reality House is a "half-way house" residence for alcohol and drug abusers, ad-
dicts, and federal prisoners. Id at 376 n.2.
463. Id at 376.
464. Id In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit cited Zicarelli v. New Jersey
Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972) (invalid assertion of fifth amendment
privilege after defendant had been granted immunity: "the privilege protects against real
dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities.").
465. 646 F.2d at 376.
466. 648 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981).
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necessarily involuntary.467 Applying the "clearly erroneous" standard
enunciated in United States v. Parker,468 the Ninth Circuit held that the
record amply supported the district court's finding that Dufur had un-
derstood and waived his right against self-incrimination; thus, he had
confessed voluntarily.4' 9
B. The Right to Counsel
1. Attachment of the right
The sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel470 is made ap-
plicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.47' Kirby v. Illinois47 2 established that the right of an accused to
assistance of counsel attaches only upon the initiation of adversary ju-
dicial proceedings, whether by way of indictment, information, ar-
raignment, or preliminary hearing.473
The Supreme Court recently held, in Estelle v. Smith,474 that a de-
fendant has a right to assistance of counsel before submitting to a
court-ordered pretrial psychiatric interview.475 Smith had been in-
dicted and an attorney was appointed to represent him prior to the psy-
chiatric interview.476 Following Smith's conviction for murder, a
separate sentencing proceeding was held pursuant to Texas law to de-
termine whether the death sentence could be imposed.477 The psychia-
trist who had performed the pretrial competency examination was
allowed to testify over defense counsel's objection.478
467. Id at 513.
468. 549 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1977) (trial court's determination of voluntariness of
confession disturbed only if "plainly untenable").
469. 648 F.2d at 514. See also United States v. Benedict, 647 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir.
1981) (confession to heroin smuggling conspiracy voluntary; not coerced or enticed by al-
leged prospective use of foreign statute permitting sentence reduction).
470. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
471. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
472. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
473. Id at 688-89.
474. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
475. Id at 470-71.
476. Id at 469. Because Smith had been charged with murder, a capital offense, the trial
judge ordered Smith to submit to a pretrial psychiatric examination to determine his compe-
tency to stand trial. Smith was determined to be competent to stand trial.
477. Id at 456-58. TEx. CUM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(a) (Vernon 1981) provides
in pertinent part: "Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment."
478. Id at 459. The defense objected to the testimony because the psychiatrist's name did
not appear on the list of witnesses the State planned to use at either the guilt or penalty
stages of the proceedings as was required by a court order issued during the trial.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to vacate
the death sentence based on the sixth amendment violation.479 Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, indicated that the defendant's
right to counsel had attached at the time of indictment, prior to the
pretrial psychiatric examination.4 80 A denial of assistance of counsel
occurred when the defendant's attorneys were not notified in advance
that the psychiatric examination would encompass the issue of their
client's future danger to society.48 I The Court concluded that the right
to counsel is abridged when a defendant is not given an opportunity to
consult with counsel before submitting to a psychiatric examination.482
The Court's opinion in Estelle placed particular emphasis on the
role skilled legal advice plays in allowing a defendant to make a deci-
sion which may have subtle implications.483 Accordingly, the Court
observed that a denial of counsel may effectively deny fifth amendment
privileges to a defendant who is unaware of his or her right against self-
incrimination.484
The Ninth Circuit recently reiterated the Kirby rule in United
479. Id at 473. The decision to vacate the death sentence was also based on the fifth
amendment because the defendant was not informed of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion during the pre-trial competency examination. Id at 469.
480. Id at 469-70.
481. Id at 470-71. The Court limited its decision to the right of a defendant to consult
with counsel prior to a psychiatric interview; it did not declare the right of a defendant to
have counsel present during the examination. Id at 470 n.14.
482. Id at 470-71. In support of its conclusion, the Court quoted United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967):
It is central to [the sixth amendment] principle that in addition to counsel's pres-
ence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the
State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.
Id at 226-27 (footnote omitted).
483. 451 U.S. at 471. The lower court noted that the decision whether to submit to psy-
chiatric evaluation is "'literally a life or death matter' and is 'difficult ... even for an
attorney' because it requires 'a knowledge of what other evidence is available, of the particu-
lar psychiatrist's biases and predilections, [and] of possible alternative strategies at the sen-
tencing hearing."' Id (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (5th Cir. 1979)).
484. Id (citing Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975)). Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall joined in the Court's fifth and sixth amendment analysis while adhering to their view
that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. 451 U.S. at 474 (Brennan, J., concurring); id (Marshall, J., concurring).
The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, in which Justice Powell joined, stated that Mas-
siah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), bar
the introduction of the psychiatrist's testimony at any stage of the defendant's trial. Id
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist also joined in the Court's sixth amendment
analysis, although he found the Court's fifth amendment argument to be inapplicable to the
facts of the case. 451 U.S. at 475-76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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States v. Kenny.485 Kenny argued that the Government should have
notified defense counsel prior to the initiation of questioning.486 A tele-
phone conversation between the defendant and a Government agent,
containing several damaging admissions by Kenny, had been recorded
by the Government. 4 7 Kenny, however, had not been charged, ar-
rested, or indicted at the time of the recording. 88
Relying upon Kirby, the Ninth Circuit held that Kenny had no
right to counsel because adversary proceedings had not yet com-
menced.4 9 The court reasoned that a contrary holding would severely
cripple undercover techniques used in criminal investigations.490
The Ninth Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion in United States
v. Mills, 491 in which the sixth amendment rights of prison inmates were
called into question. The two inmates in Mills were segregated from
the rest of the prison population following their implication in the stab-
bing death of a fellow inmate.492 Until indictment for murder seven
months later, the inmates remained in segregated confinement, they
were subjected to curtailed prisoner privileges, and they were unable to
obtain legal advice regarding the potential criminal case the Govern-
ment might pursue.493
The trial court dismissed the indictments based both on the Gov-
ernment's failure to justify its delay in bringing the indictments and on
the prejudice the defendants may have suffered while confined in isola-
tion for eight months without the assistance of counsel.494 The trial
court concluded that the defendants had been irreparably prejudiced as
a result of "the dimming of memories of exonerating witnesses, the loss
of witnesses and the deterioration of physical evidence. '495
485. 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981).
486. Id at 1338.
487. Id at 1337-38.
488. Id
489. Id at 1338.
490. Id The court indicated that criminals might be encouraged to obtain "house coun-
sel" who would have to be informed of the Government's intention to use informants in the
investigation of their clients. Id
491. 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981).
492. Id at 786.
493. Id at 786-87. The inmates were kept in segregated confinement for a total of eight
months. During the course of the disciplinary proceedings, which occurred in the first few
weeks of this confinement, the inmates' request to consult with an attorney was denied. Id
at 787. The inmates were not permitted to communicate with prisoners outside the segrega-
tion area, to discuss their case with anyone except prison officials, or to be examined by their
own experts. Id at 786-87.
494. Id (citing Mills, 641 F.2d at 787).
495. Id
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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing the
indictments,496 ruling that the defendants had not been deprived of
their sixth amendment right to counsel during the pre-indictment pe-
riod.497 The court determined that the defendants had not been subject
to adversary proceedings until they were indicted; therefore, they were
not entitled to the right to counsel until that time.498
The concurring opinion noted the "unquestionably troubling"
facts of this case and stressed that the constitutional rights of inmates
are not to be ignored.49 9 Specifically, it stated that "[t]he government
cannot brazenly disregard prisoners' constitutional rights when prepar-
ing a criminal case against an inmate."' "°° The concurring opinion em-
phasized, however, that the decision to reverse was based only upon the
lower court's dismissal of the indictment and did not prevent the de-
fendants from raising any constitutional claims at trial.50 1
2. The right to appointed counsel
The Supreme Court first recognized an indigent defendant's con-
stitutional right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel in Powell v.
Alabama.50 2 In Johnson v. Zerbst,50 3 the Court held that the sixth
amendment requires the appointment of counsel for all indigent de-
fendants in federal felony trials."° In Betts v. Brady, 505 however, the
Court declared that the appointment of counsel was not required in
every state proceeding because assistance of counsel was not deemed a
fundamental right.5 06
496. Id at 786.
497. Id at 788.
498. Id The court apparently took the position that while the defendants were being
disciplined for the role they played in the victim's murder, they were not as yet "accused."
See id (citing Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689; United States v. Zazzara, 626 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir.
1980)).
499. Id at 790 (Nelson, J., concurring).
500. Id
501. Id The concurring opinion noted that the defendants' claim "goes to the heart of a
defendant's constitutionally protected right to defend himself at trial." Id
502. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). Powell involved indigent defendants who were accused of a
capital crime. The Court carefully limited the decision to capital cases in which the defend-
ant was incapable of adequately making his own defense "because of ignorance, feeble
mindedness, illiteracy or the like." Id The Court concluded that the appointment of coun-
sel to assist the indigent was a logical corollary of the right to a fair hearing. Id at 72.
503. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
504. Id at 467.
505. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
506. Id at 471. The Betts Court advocated a case-by-case analysis to determine whether
a particular court's refusal to appoint counsel amounted to a denial of fundamental fairness.
Id at 462.
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The analysis of the Betts Court was overruled in Gideon v.
Wainright, 5o7 where the Court determined that in felony cases, the
fourteenth amendment fully incorporates the sixth amendment right re-
quiring that indigent defendants be provided with appointed coun-
sel °8 Finally, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,50 9 the Court extended the
right to court-appointed counsel beyond felony cases, stating that "ab-
sent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned
for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." 510
Judicial interpretations of constitutional requirements have also
been supplemented by various federal statutes which require the ap-
pointment of counsel for an indigent defendant. l1 Recently, the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the provisions of one such statute which required
the appointment of two attorneys in capital cases. In United States v.
Dufur, 5-1 2 the court addressed the issue of whether the invalidation of
the death penalty provision in a federal murder statute5 13 invalidated
the defendant's right to two attorneys in a prosecution for a capital
crime.514 The case involved the fatal shooting of a customs inspector
who had attempted to search the defendant at the Canadian border.
Dufur contended on appeal that the district court erred in refusing to
appoint a second attorney as required by 18 U.S.C. section 3005.515
The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's determination that the
invalidation of the death penalty eliminated the statutory right to a sec-
ond court-appointed attorney. 16 After citing other circuit court deci-
sions on the issue, 1 ' the court directed its inquiry to the legislative
507. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
508. Id at 342-45.
509. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
510. Id at 37. InArgersinger, the defendant had been sentenced to a prison term. The
Court reserved judgment, however, on whether the right to appointment of counsel attaches
when no loss of liberty is involved. Id
511. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976).
512. 648 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1980).
513. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976) (providing death penalty in federal prosecutions).
514. 648 F.2d at 514 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (death pen-
alty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 held unconstitutional)).
515. 648 F.2d at 514. 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1976) grants defendants accused of capital crimes
the right to two appointed attorneys.
516. 648 F.2d at 515.
517. Id at 514 (citing United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 729 (7th Cir.) (two-coun-
sel provision inapplicable when there was no possibility that the death penalty could be
imposed), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978); United States v. Weddell, 567 F.2d 767, 770-71
(8th Cir.) (defendant not entitled to two attorneys), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1977); United
States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125, 1130 (4th Cir. 1973) (defendant entitled to two attorneys
despite invalidity of death penalty)).
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purpose underlying the dual attorney requirement. The requirement
was an attempt to "'reduce the chance that an innocent defendant
would be put to death because of inadvertence or errors in judgment of
his counsel.' 1,518 The court reasoned that because Congress was con-
cerned with the severity of the punishment rather than the nature of the
offense, 1 9 the elimination of a severe and irreversible punishment cor-
respondingly eliminated the necessity of an additional court-appointed
counsel.52 o
3. Effective assistance of counsel
The constitutional right to counsel is founded upon the assump-
tion that counsel will effectively assist the accused.5 2' Counsel's devia-
tion from this expectation results in a denial of the defendant's
constitutionally protected rights and warrants reversal of a convic-
tion.522 The Supreme Court, however, has expressly delegated determi-
nations of attorney competence to the trial courts.523
The Ninth Circuit standard for attorney competency was estab-
lished in Cooper v. Fitzharris. 524 This standard requires that an accused
be afforded a "reasonably competent and effective representation" pur-
suant to the sixth amendment guarantee.5 25 In cases where a denial of
effective assistance of counsel is found, the Cooper standard requires
that specific prejudice be shown before relief will be granted. 2 6
During the 1981 term, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
effective assistance of counsel in Satchell v. Cardwel. 27 Satchell had
been convicted in an Arizona state court of kidnapping, rape, aggra-
vated assault, and assault with a deadly weapon .52  The victim, a fifty-
year-old woman, had been abducted and held captive, and was repeat-
518. 648 F.2d at 515 (quoting United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 729 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978)).
519. 648 F.2d at 515.
520. Id
521. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56 (1932).
522. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
523. Id
524. 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
525. Id at 1328.
526. Id at 1331. "When the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rests upon specific
acts or omissions of counsel at trial, . . . relief will be granted only if it appears that the
defendant was prejudiced by counsel's conduct." Id at 1331. See also Ewing v. Williams,
596 F.2d 391, 394 (9th Cir. 1979) (requiring that lower court make specific findings of
prejudice on record). The prior Ninth Circuit standard of attorney incompetence required
conduct that resulted in a trial deemed a farce or a mockery of justice. 586 F.2d at 1328.
527. 653 F.2d 408 (1981).
528. Id at 408.
1982]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4WEVIEW
edly raped, stabbed, and beaten for a period of three days. 529 Acting
on a tip that the victim was confined in the defendant's trailer and that
her life was in danger, a police officer made a limited warrantless entry
into the trailer.
5 30
The defendant contended that his sixth amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel was violated when his attorney failed to make
a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless
search.53' The court, however, found the defendant's argument to be
without merit, and it affirmed the district court's denial of his habeas
corpus petition.532
The court determined that the proper test for Satchell's claim was
two-fold: the defendant must first prove that his counsel did not act in
a reasonably competent and effective manner; second, that the incom-
petence was prejudicial to the defense.533
The court found that Satchell had failed to show initially that his
attorney had not acted as a reasonably competent criminal defense at-
torney.534 The court made a thorough inquiry into the defendant's
fourth amendment claim, 535 and decided that even if the close question
of the existence of probable cause could not be answered affirma-
tively,536 the exigent circumstances involving the victim's safety justi-
fied the limited entry.537 Thus, the court found it unnecessary to apply
529. Id
530. Id at 408-09. The evidence indicated that the officer, hearing voices inside the
trailer, knocked on the door. Although the defendant opened the door only a few inches, the
officer opened the door the rest of the way in order to see the victim, who was clearly in-
jured. The officer then entered the trailer and questioned the victim prior to conducting a
more thorough search and arresting the defendant. Id at 409.
531. Id at 408.
532. Id at 414.
533. Id at 409 (citing Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1327; Ewing v. Williams, 596
F.2d at 394).
534. 653 F.2d at 409-10. The court noted that "[a]Ithough a suppression motion might
have been successful, the issue was so close that it cannot be said that a reasonably compe-
tent attorney could not have failed to make such a motion. That failure in the context of his
attorney's other aggressive actions on Satchell's behalf, did not deprive Satchell of compe-
tent representation." Id at 410 (footnote omitted).
535. Id at 410-13. The court found that the facts of the case made it unnecessary to
inquire whether its examination of a sixth amendment claim grounded upon a fourth
amendment violation was barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 653 F.2d at 409
n.6. In Stone, the Court concluded that federal habeas corpus relief should not be granted to
a prisoner when the state has provided an opportunity for the full litigation of a fourth
amendment claim. 428 U.S. at 494.
536. 653 F.2d at 411.
537. Id at 411-13. The court reasoned that a combination of factors may have justified
the warrantless search. These factors included corroboration of the tip, suspicious actions of
the defendant, and the clear potential for a life threatening situation. Id at 411.
[Vol. 15
CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
the second part of the test, ie., whether under Cooper, the defendant
had been prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of counsel.5 38
The Satchell court stressed that the decision to uphold the state
court's findings of fact as to the attorney's competence was required by
the habeas corpus statute, 39 unless the state court's findings were un-
supported by the record . 45 The court's deference to the state court's
findings in this case was supported by the transcripts of both the trial
and the post-conviction hearing.54" ' The judge who presided over both
of these proceedings made special inquiries into the attorney's failure
to make a motion to suppress. 42 The judge's findings indicated that
the representation of the defendant was commendable under the cir-
cumstances and that the defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney's
failure to make a motion to suppress.5 43 The district court gave these
findings a presumption of correctness after the Arizona Supreme Court
denied review of the case.5 "
The analysis in Satchell was based primarily on a review of the
defendant's fourth amendment claim. While this approach may appear
necessary to determine counsers effective defense of a defendant's
fourth amendment rights, it effectively transposed a sixth amendment
claim into a fourth amendment case. The concurring opinion observed
that this approach should be used with caution and only when abso-
lutely necessary.5 45 Both opinions emphasized that a reviewing court
considering sixth amendment claims should concentrate upon the at-
torney's ability to make competent defense decisions, and not upon
whether those decisions represent flawless legal conclusions.
5 46
538. Id at 409-10. If the defendant had shown ineffectiveness on the part of his attorney,
the burden to show prejudice resulting from his counsel's poor defense would have re-
mained. Id at 409 n.7. In dicta, the court noted that Satchell would not have been able to
make such a showing, as sufficient testimonial evidence was presented to uphold Satchell's
conviction even if the nontestimonial evidence had been suppressed as the result of an illegal
entry. Id
539. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1981).
540. 653 F.2d at 414 (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551 (1981) (indicating that a
court granting a writ of habeas corpus should include in its opinion the reasoning which led
it to conclude that any of the first seven factors enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) were
present, or the reasoning which led the court to conclude that the state court's finding was
not fairly supported by the record)).
541. 653 F.2d at 413-14.
542. Id
543. Id at 414.
544. Id
545. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring). The concurring opinion also warned that this ap-
proach may be precluded by a future decision on the applicability of Stone v. Powell. See
id at 409 n.6.
546. Id at 410, 414.
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The standard announced in Cooper was also applied by the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Casanova. 547 Casanova had been convicted
of aiding and abetting the robbery of a savings and loan association.
548
On appeal, the defendant asserted that he was denied effective assist-
ance of counsel because his attorney had announced prior to trial that
the attorney-client relationship had completely broken down; he failed,
however, to make a record of the factual basis for this assertion.5 49 The
defendant also claimed that his attorney's decision to challenge the ad-
equacy of the Government's evidence identifying the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime, rather than present an affirmative defense
based on involuntariness, was indicative of incompetent assistance of
counsel. °
The court, however, found nothing in the record to establish inef-
fective assistance of counsel under the Cooper standards. 5' It empha-
sized the trial counsel's apparent familiarity with the facts of the case
and the applicable law, and specifically noted that the record did not
support the suggestion that the attorney could have made a factual
showing of the basis for the communications breakdown.5 The court
also stated that counsel's decision not to present an affirmative defense
based on involuntariness was a "reasonable choice among available
trial strategies. ' 53
A strong dissenting opinion in Casanova argued that the defend-
ant's right to effective counsel was violated as a result of the trial court's
denial of his motion for substitution of attorney.55 4 The dissent pointed
out that the record was silent on the subject of a breakdown in the
attorney-client relationship only because the trial court refused to grant
the defendant's application for a factual hearing on his motion for
substitution.
555
The dissent noted that the denial of a motion to dismiss counsel is
a "'matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial judge.' ,,5"1
The dissent argued, however, that a defendant's constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel may be violated if the court refuses to
547. 642 F.2d 300 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cer. denied, 454 U.S. 899 (1981).
548. Id at 300.





554. Id at 301-04 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
555. Id at 302. The district court denied the appellant's application for a factual hearing
on his motion for substitution, concluding that the request was untimely. Id
556. Id (quoting United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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allow a substitution when an irreconcilable conflict exists between the
defendant and his attorney.-
57
The dissent relied on the test established in United States v.
Mills558 for determining whether a trial court has violated a defend-
ant's right to competent counsel.559 The Mills court announced three
factors to be considered in reviewing a lower court's denial of a request
to dismiss counsel: (1) the timeliness of the motion for substitution of
attorney; (2) the adequacy of the inquiry into the defendant's basis for
the motion; and (3) whether the conflict has resulted in a total lack of
communication between the defendant and his attorney. 6°
The dissent's application of these factors to the facts in Casa-
nova 56 1 presented a persuasive argument for granting a hearing to de-
termine whether a breakdown had, in fact, occurred in the attorney-
client relationship. The opinion noted that the motion for substitution
was made in the session of court following counsels discovery of the
breakdown 562 and that the trial court foreclosed any inquiry into the
attorney-client relationship by denying defendant's application for a
factual hearing on his motion for substitution of counsel. 63 The dis-
sent also observed that information given the lower court by the de-
fendant prior to trial resulted in that court's refusal to accept the
defendant's offer to plead guilty.56 The dissent argued that when it
subsequently became apparent that no defense was to be presented, the
trial court should have granted a hearing on the breakdown issue. 65
The majority refused to consider the dissent's analysis, noting that
the trial court's compliance with Mills was not properly raised on ap-
peal, and the record failed to disclose plain error.566 The dissent, how-
ever, urged that "an appellate court has an affirmative duty to reach an
issue not properly raised below, in order to preserve the integrity of the
557. Id
558. 597 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1979).
559. 642 F.2d at 301-02 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
560. Id at 302-03 (citing United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979)).
561. Id at 302-04.
562. Id at 302.
563. Id
564. Id at 303. The defendant claimed that he was under the influence of a memory
suppressant drug and could not recall the events leading to the commission of the robbery
and furthermore, that he was unaware that a bank was going to be robbed. Id
565. Id
566. Id at 301 n.I. In response, the dissent argued that on appeal the defendant's open-
ing brief alerted the Ninth Circuit to the fact that prior to trial, counsel had informed the
lower court of a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Id at 303 (Alar-
con, J., dissenting).
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judicial process, even though the facts may not disclose a miscarriage of
justice."
567
The necessity for a factual hearing, as advocated by the dissent, is
especially compelling in cases where the defendant has been potentially
deprived of the ability to present an effective defense. As the dissent
noted, in such cases the defendant is denied the ability even to establish
a sufficient record which might indicate tie existence of a breakdown
in the attorney-client relationship. 68 It is quite possible that the break-
down itself may prevent a reviewing court from being presented with a
clear issue. Therefore, it becomes incumbent upon reviewing courts to
analyze carefully a defendant's claim, and to order factual hearings in
cases where judicial integrity requires further investigation into a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The element of prejudice required by Cooper was not demon-
strated in United States v. Mayo. 569 The defendants in that case had
been convicted of mail and securities fraud. One of the defendants
claimed that a prison transfer he underwent during his incarceration
denied him his sixth amendment right to counsel.571 The defendant
asserted that he had lost some papers in the course of the transfer and
that the location of the second prison made conferences with his coun-
sel more difficult.572 The defendant, however, failed to show how he
had been prejudiced by these events, as required by Cooper. 573
Another defendant in Mayo argued that the trial court had erred
in not giving him an evidentiary hearing regarding the competence of
his counsel.574 The Ninth Circuit observed that this contention might
have been found meritorious had the defendant been able to show in
the record that choices made by his counsel were the product of inade-
567. Id at 303-04 (citing United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir. 1979), cerl.
denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980)).
568. 642 F.2d at 302 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
569. 646 F.2d 369 (1981) (per curiam).
570. Id at 371.
571. Id at 373.
572. Id
573. Id
574. Id at 374-75. The defendant based his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on
charges that his attorney
was rarely available to confer with him prior to trial; was seldom available during
the lengthy trial; refused to subpoena defense witnesses; was absent during the
trial; failed to arrange a meeting with other defense counsel; failed to give Mayo a
copy of the indictment; failed to discuss his closing argument with Mayo before
delivering it; and finally told Mayo that he "just [couldn't] handle [the trial]."
Id (brackets in original).
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quate preparation, or had he raised questions of fact in that regard.575
However, this defendant also was unable to show any prejudice result-
ing from counsel's conduct.576 The Mayo court concluded that the de-
fendant's allegations amounted to nothing more than a simple
difference of opinion with respect to trial tactics, which, standing alone,
does not constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel.
4. Conflict of interest
The sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel may
be jeopardized when an attorney represents conflicting interests.
Courts have been particularly sensitive when the interests of a client
have not been pursued single-mindedly. In Glasser v. United States,577
the Supreme Court found that the district court had denied Glasser his
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by requiring an
attorney to represent both Glasser and his co-defendant after the court
had been advised of the possibility that conflicting interests might
arise.578 In reversing Glasser's conviction, the Court did not inquire
whether the prejudice resulting from the conflict was harmless.57 9 The
Supreme Court refined the issue further in Holloway v. Arkansas, 580 by
establishing that the lower court will be automatically reversed when a
trial judge either fails to appoint separate counsel after the defense
counsel has raised the conflict issue, or refuses to conduct an adequate
hearing concerning a potential conflict. 81
In 1980, the Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan582 narrowed the
impact of its prior decisions. The Sullivan Court held that in order to
establish a violation of the sixth amendment a defendant must prove
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his/her lawyers'
performance.583 The narrow view presented in Sullivan was recently
modified in Wood v. Georgia.584 The Wood Court imposed an affirma-
575. Id. at 375 (citing United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
In Decoster, the court held that "a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assist-
ance ofan attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate. " 487 F.2d at 1202 (emphasis
in original). If a defendant shows that he has been denied effective representation, the bur-
den of proof to establish lack of prejudice shifts to the Government. Id at 1204.
576. Id at 375.
577. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
578. Id at 76.
579. Id at 75-76.
580. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
581. Id at 484, 488.
582. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
583. Id at 348.
584. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
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tive duty upon courts to inquire into a possible conflict of interest when
it becomes apparent that a conflict might exist.5"5
In Wood, former employees of an "adult" movie theater and book
store had been convicted of distributing obscene materials.58 6 The de-
fendants received probation on the condition that they make monthly
payments towards the satisfaction of their fines.' I When the defend-
ants failed to make the payments, a probation revocation hearing was
held, and the defendants were sentenced to serve the remaining por-
tions of their sentences. 588 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the equal protection clause allowed the imposition
of imprisonment for failure to make installment payments on fines.589
However, the Court declined to address the equal protection question
and instead analyzed the case in terms of due process.5 90 From the
facts, the Court found a clear possibility of a conflict of interest.5 9'
The defendants in Wood had been represented by an attorney who
was compensated by the defendants' former employer.592 The defend-
ants' employment contract provided for such representation and also
stated that the employer would pay any fines and post necessary
bonds.593 The employer, however, failed to pay the fines, which re-
sulted in the defendants' confinement. 94
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, surmised that the em-
ployer may have declined to pay the fines in an attempt to litigate the
equal protection issue concerning confinement for failure to pay
fines.5 95 The Court further noted that although it was uncertain that
the employer was motivated by a desire for a test case, there were suffi-
cient indications from the record to suggest that a conflict of interest
may have existed.596 The Court concluded that the potential for injus-
tice was sufficient to require a determination of whether the defendants
585. Id at 272.
586. Id at 263.
587. Id
588. Id at 264.
589. Id
590. Id at 264-65.
591. Id at 267.
592. Id at 266.
593. Id
594. Id at 267.
595. Id The Court found that the defendants' employer was substantially involved in the
litigation. Id at 266 n.9.
596. Id at 267. The Court noted that due process protections apply to probation revoca-
tions. Id at 271 (citing Gagnoin v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 480-82 (1972)).
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had been deprived of their rights under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 97
The Wood Court recognized that reversal is required when the
trial court has failed to inquire into a possible conflict of interest even
though it "'knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict
exists.' ,598 The majority noted that the defense counsel had sought to
present a constitutional argument rather than advocate leniency. 99
The Court observed that the leniency argument might have resulted in
substantial reductions in, or deferrals of, the fines, thereby preventing
the defendants' eventual imprisonment.c ° Accordingly, the Court va-
cated and remanded for a hearing to determine whether a conflict of
interest existed at the time of the probation revocation.601
In dissent, Justice White asserted that the Court lacked jurisdiction
to review the due process question, because it was never raised in state
court.6 0 2 Therefore, Justice White found the equal protection question
to be the only issue properly before the Court.60 3 Justice White criti-
cized the majority's assumption that a conflict of interest existed, and
he suggested possible alternative explanations for the employer's fail-
ure to pay the fines.604
597. 450 U.S. at 271.
598. Id at 272 n.18 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)).
599. 450 U.S. at 272.
600. Id The majority opinion in Wood was joined by Justice Stevens who found it un-
necessary to hypothesize on the possibility that the employer was interested in setting up a
test case. Id at 274 (Stevens, J., concurring). Rather, Justice Stevens found that independ-
ent counsel would have made arguments to prevent the imposition of the high fines which
the defendants were clearly unable to pay in the absence of an enforceable commitment
from the employer. Id He concluded that the judgment should be vacated because of "the
likelihood that the state trial court would have imposed a significantly different sentence if it
had not been led to believe that the employer would pay the fines." Id
In separate opinions, Justices Brennan and Stewart also concurred in the Court's deci-
sion with regard to the clear possibility of a conflict of interest. Id at 274-75 (Brennan, J.,
and Stewart, J., concurring in part). However, both Justices felt that the conviction should
have been reversed on the ground that the state obscenity statute was facially unconstitu-
tional. Id at 275 (Brennan, J., and Stewart, J., dissenting in part).
601. Id at 273.
602. Id at 277 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 799 (1972);
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438-39
(1969)).
603. 450 U.S. at 279 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White believed that the equal protec-
tion issue should have been decided in favor of the defendants. Id at 287. He noted that
"the 'Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automati-
cally converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent."' Id (quoting
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971)).
604. 450 U.S. at 282 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White pointed out that despite an
appeal the employer would have been liable for any fines if the obligations contained in the
employment contract had been enforceable. Id He also suggested that the employer may
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The dissenting opinion, however, failed to acknowledge the
unique nature of issues involving conflicts of interest. Often the very
existence of the conflict itself prevents the issue from being raised in
court proceedings.60 5 Thus, the courts must remain sensitive to situa-
tions which may indicate the possibility of a conflict. The majority
opinion in Wood properly characterized this judicial responsibility as
necessarj to protect the interests of the accused and to insure the fun-
damental fairness of the judicial system.60 6
In Bryan v. United States,6 °7 the Ninth Circuit considered the type
of conflict required for reversal. The defendant alleged that his coun-
sel's prior representation of a Government witness established a con-
flict of interest. 608 The defendant's attorney was a member of a law
firm which had represented the witness in another matter.0 9 At the
defendant's suppression hearing, the witness failed to disclose the con-
tent of a conversation with the defendant's attorney regarding a motion
for suppression of the evidence, and the attorney took the stand to tes-
tify to the substance of the conversation.10
The court relied on Sullivan6 11 in ruling that "'a defendant who
raise[s] no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' ,612 The record
indicated that the defendant's attorney had made vigorous efforts to
cross-examine the witness and then subsequently took the stand to tes-
have reneged on his promise to pay the fines because the defendants were no longer working
for the employer. Id Justice White concluded that if the employer had merely been unwill-
ing to pay the fines, then the equal protection argument advanced by the defendants' attor-
ney may have been the best argument available. Id at 283.
605. See id at 265 n.5. The majority opinion discussed the propriety of its consideration
of the conflict of interest issue in a direct response to the assertions made by Justice White.
The Court indicated that the appeal and the petition for certiorari had been prepared by the
attorney involved in the alleged conflict. Id The State's attorney could only be expected to
call the matter to the court's attention, and it is doubtful that the defendants were capable of
raising the conflicts issue on their own. Id Under such circumstances, the Court concluded
that the interests of justice required consideration of the issue, regardless of whether the
question was technically raised in the lower courts. Id
606. Id at 270-71.
607. 645 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981).
608. Id at 842-43.
609. Id
610. Id at 843. The defendant contended that counsel may have been in possession of
privileged information regarding the witness and that the witness still owed legal fees. This
state of affairs, argued defendant, adversely affected counsel's ability to cross-examine the
witness. Id
611. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
612. 645 F.2d at 843 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)).
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tify in direct opposition to the witness' testimony.613 The court con-
cluded that the attorney's efforts during cross-examination of the
witness conclusively established the absence of any conflict of
interest.614
The Bryan court factually distinguished Wood The court stated
that in Wood "the record strongly suggested that actual conflict existed
at the time of trial."615 In Bryan, however, the defendant had neglected
to show how the attorney's cross-examination might have been im-
proved.1 6 The court concluded that the defendant's allegation of con-
flict was "wholly without merit."
617
The dissent in Bryan determined that the case should have been
reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the merit of the
defendant's allegations.6 I Such a result would require a hearing
whenever the possibility of a conflict is found. Although recent deci-
sions establish heightened judicial awareness of conflicts of interest, a
general automatic reversal rule has yet to be accepted.61 9
While the dissenting opinion's sensitivity to the defendant's con-
flict of interest claim is commendable, the need for an evidentiary hear-
ing in Bryan was completely unsupported by the record.620 Moreover,
the interest in judicial economy would seem to justifiably override any
competing interest in investigating unsubstantiated claims of prejudice.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Wood strikes a reasonable balance be-
613. 645 F.2d at 843.
614. Id
615. Id (citing United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980)). In Hearst, the
defendant claimed that a book contract with her attorney concerning the subject matter of
her defense created a conflict of interest which denied her the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Id at 1193. The Hearst court ruled that the standard is whether the claimant has
"'stated a claim on which relief could be granted."' Id at 1194 (quoting Moore v. United
States, 571 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1978)). The court found that Hearst had sufficiently al-
leged an actual conflict and had effectively shown an adverse effect. 638 F.2d at 1195.
616. 645 F.2d at 843.
617. Id
618. Id at 843-44 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
619. The Wood decision requires that the record reveal some possibility of a conflict of
interest. 450 U.S. at 272.
620. See 645 F.2d at 843. The dissent conceded that the defendant's allegations were
unspecified and general; nevertheless, it advocated allowing the defendant an opportunity to
establish more specific grounds on the basis of facts presented at the requested evidentiary
hearing. Id at 844 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). The defendant's allegations regarding coun-
sel's inability to cross-examine the witness were, however, specifically refuted by the record's
documentation of counsel's extraordinary efforts to elicit testimony on behalf of the defend-
ant. Id at 843. Thus, the defendant's conflict of interest claim lacked even potential
grounds on which an evidentiary hearing might have been based.
1982]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
tween the protection of a defendant's sixth amendment rights and the
needs of judicial economy.
In United States v. Halbert,62' the Ninth Circuit again denied the
defendant relief because the record did not reveal a conflict of inter-
est.622 Halbert had been convicted of mail fraud stemming from a
scheme to market items commemorating the nation's bicentennial cele-
bration.623 He contended that his attorney's representation of a co-de-
fendant at the arraignment resulted in prejudicial error.6 24
Rejecting Halbert's argument, the court stated that "[r]eversal is
required only when the defendant meets the burden of showing specific
prejudice to his rights by the multiple representation. 625 The court
emphasized the Ninth Circuit's rejection of "aper se rule requiring re-
versal of a criminal conviction because of a potential conflict of interest
deriving from multiple representation of co-defendants in criminal
trials.
626
Halbert, however, contended that the implication of a potential
conflict requires reversal of a conviction under Holloway v. Arkan-
sas. 627 The Ninth Circuit found Halbert's contention without merit.
The court distinguished Holloway because in that case the multiple rep-
resentation had been forced on the defendants over the objections of
counsel;6 28 whereas in Halbert, the defendant's attorney had agreed to
the representation of the co-defendant, and the co-defendant had also
approved the arrangement.629
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Halbert underscores the trend to-
wards requiring that a defendant demonstrate "actual and substantial
621. 640 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1981).
622. d at 1010.
623. Id at 1003-04.
624. Id at 1010.
625. Id (citing Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d 1200, 1202-04 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); United
States v. Nystrom, 447 F.2d 1350, 1351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971); Davidson
v. Cupp, 446 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1971)).
626. 640 F.2d at 1010 (citing Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906
(1978); Watkins v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 351, 352 (9th Cir. 1969); Glavin v. United States, 396
F.2d 725, 727 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 926 (1968).
627. 640 F.2d at 1010 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)). See supra text
accompanying notes 580 & 581.
628. 640 F.2d at 1010.
629. Id The court's reasoning implies that the Ninth Circuit requires that multiple repre-
sentation be forced on unwilling defendants in order to invoke a per se rule requiring
reversal.
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prejudice" as a result of violations of his right to counsel.63 ° A defend-
ant, therefore, is required to show through objective evidence that an
actual conflict of interest exists. This rule ignores the sweeping lan-
guage of the Supreme Court in Holloway, which seems directed to-
wards potential conflicts of interest and the automatic reversal of cases
in which effective assistance of counsel has been denied.631
While the Ninth Circuit's requirement of a showing of prejudice
may impact potential cases of conflict which lack supporting evidence,
it seems unlikely that Halbert's conviction would have been reversed
even in the absence of a prejudice requirement. Halbert's claim was
based on multiple representation which occurred only during the de-
fendant's arraignment; any potential for conflict was thus effectively
eliminated as the representation was limited solely to the taking of a
plea.632 Because Halbert failed to demonstrate any potential conflict of
interest, further investigation which might have been warranted under
different circumstances was properly denied.
5. Interference with the attorney-client relationship
Once adversary judicial proceedings have commenced against an
accused and the corresponding constitutional right to counsel has at-
tached, any government interference with the attorney-client relation-
ship may be deemed a violation of the sixth amendment.633 In Massiah
v. United States,634 the Supreme Court found that the defendant had
been denied the basic protections of the sixth amendment guarantee
when, after he had been indicted, the government deliberately elicited
incriminating evidence from him in the absence of counsel, and used it
against him at trial.635 The Court held that such statements were
inadmissible.636
In United States v. Henry,637 a Government informant testified at
trial to conversations held with the defendant. 63 The informant, an
inmate who shared defendant Henry's jail cell, had been instructed to
630. See id
631. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978). See also Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
632. 640 F.2d at 1010.
633. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
634. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
635. Id. at 206.
636. Id at 207.
637. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
638. Id at 267.
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"pay attention to the information furnished by Henry."639 The inform-
ant was to be paid only if he secured incriminating information; fur-
thermore, the Government knew that the custodial environment was
apt to facilitate a relationship of trust between persons sharing a com-
mon plight. 40 The Court found that under these circumstances the in-
formant's conduct was attributable to the Government 41 and held that
the statements should not have been admitted at trial.
42
In 1981, the Supreme Court considered the remedial aspects of a
sixth amendment violation in United States v. Morrison. " 3 Morrison
had been indicted on two counts of distributing heroin and had re-
tained private counsel.6 " Federal agents seeking to obtain her cooper-
ation in a related investigation met with Morrison on two occasions
without her counsel's knowledge or permission."5
On their first visit the agents disparaged Morrison's counsel and
indicated that Morrison would gain various benefits if she cooperated
and would face a stiff jail term if she refused.1 6 Morrison did refuse to
cooperate, however, and subsequently notified her attorney of the
meeting. 47 The agents' second meeting with Morrison was also con-
ducted in the absence of counsel and once again she refused to cooper-
ate or incriminate herself.6
8
The district court denied Morrison's motion to dismiss the indict-
ment with prejudice. 49 The motion, which asserted sixth amendment
violations by the federal agents, contained no allegations that the
agents' conduct had adversely affected her legal position.6 50 Rather,
the motion alleged merely that the agents' behavior had interfered with
the defendant's right to counsel.65 The Third Circuit reversed, finding
that dismissal of the indictment was the appropriate remedy despite the
absence of any negative effect on the defendant's representation.652
639. Id at 271 n.8. The Court noted that the informant "remained free to discharge his
task of eliciting the statements in myriad less direct ways." Id
640. Id at 270.
641. Id at 271.
642. d at 274.
643. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
644. Id at 362.
645. Id
646. Id
647. Id at 362-63.
648. 1d
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A unanimous Supreme Court held that dismissal of an indictment
is inappropriate when a sixth amendment violation has had no adverse
impact on a criminal proceeding.653 The Court stated:
At the same time and without detracting from the fundamen-
tal importance of the right to counsel in criminal cases, we
have implicitly recognized the necessity for preserving soci-
ety's interest in the administration of criminal justice. Cases
involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the
general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suf-
fered from the constitutional violation and should not neces-
sarily infringe on competing interests.654
Thus, even in cases of deliberate sixth amendment violations655 the
defendant must demonstrate either actual prejudice or a substantial
threat thereof.656 Because the defendant in Morrison made no showing
of prejudicial impact, no interference with the criminal proceeding was
justified657 and it could "go forward with full recognition of the defend-
ant's right to counsel and to a fair trial. 658
Several weeks after the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison, the
Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Bagley. 6 59 In Bagley, the de-
fendant argued that the Government's use of an informant who shared
his jail cell to elicit information from the defendant violated Massiah
653. Id at 366-67.
654. I at 364 (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (order directing
defendant not to consult with attorney during a 17-hour overnight recess falling between
direct examination and cross-examination of defendant held invalid); Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975) (state statute giving judge in bench trial authority to deny defense
counsel closing argument held invalid); O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345, 345 (1967)
(violation resulting from improper intrusion on pretrial attorney-client conversations); Black
v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 26-29 (1967) (law enforcement officers improperly overheard
conversations between defendant and attorney); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337,
345 (1963) (defendant denied assistance of counsel at criminal trial on the ground that state
law permitted counsel appointed for indigent defendants in capital cases only)).
The Court noted that none of the cases cited resulted in the dismissal of an indictment.
449 U.S. at 365. Rather, the appropriate remedy is to suppress evidence unconstitutionally
obtained, or if evidence has been wrongfully admitted, to order a new trial. Id Moreover,
certain sixth amendment violations may be disregarded as harmless error. Id (citing Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (constitutional error harmless where State proves
beyond reasonable doubt that error did not contribute to verdict)).
655. The Morrison Court termed the behavior of the government agents "egregious." 449
U.S. at 367.
656. 449 U.S. at 365.
657. Id at 366. "[T]here being no claim of any discernible taint, even the traditional
remedies were beside the point." Id at 365-66 n.2.
658. d at 365.
659. 641 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1981).
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and Henry.660 The court, however, ruled that absent a showing of
prejudice, defendant's sixth amendment claim did not warrant relief.
661
The court reviewed the record and concluded that the use of the in-
formant did not result in the introduction of any prejudicial evidence
against the defendant at trial.662 The informant provided only a lim-
ited amount of information and Government prosecutors made efforts
to insulate themselves from any information passed by the informant to
the investigative agents.663
The Bagley court distinguished Henry on the ground that the in-
formant in Henry testified against the defendant at trial, and thus the
prejudice was readily apparent.66 As the concurring opinion in Bagley
pointed out, such a situation requires no showing of prejudice and un-
der Massiah the evidence must be excluded.665 It is only when no evi-
dence obtained from an informant has been used at trial that the
defendant has the burden of demonstrating prejudice.66
The practical effect of the Bagley court's analysis is to place an
additional burden upon a defendant in proving sixth amendment viola-
tions. Arguably, once a defendant demonstrates that the government
has deliberately elicited incriminating evidence from him or her in the
absence of counsel after the sixth amendment right to counsel has at-
tached, he or she has established a sixth amendment violation. Once a
violation is established, the court must tailor a remedy to neutralize the
taint.667 If the defendant is found not to have been prejudiced by the
constitutional violation, a remedy would be unnecessary. Support for
this position may be derived from the decision in Morrison. While the
Morrison Court did not directly address the issue, the Court's reason-
ing would seem to indicate that the question of prejudice should be
approached from the perspective of a remedy to a constitutional viola-
tion and not as an integral element of a sixth amendment violation.668
660. Id at 1237.
661. Id at 1239. The Ninth Circuit has consistently required a showing of prejudice at
trial in order to establish Massah violations. See United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182,
1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 862-64 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 860 (1979).
662. 641 F.2d at 1239.
663. Id
664. Id
665. Id at 1242 (Fletcher, J., concurring). Accord United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182,
1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 862-64 (9th Cir.), cer. denied,
444 U.S. 860 (1979).
666. 641 F.2d at 1242 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
667. See Morrison, 449 U.S. at 361.
668. See id at 365.
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6. The right to self-representation
Although a defendant may waive the right to the assistance of
counsel, the assertion of the right to self-representation must constitute
a knowing, competent, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.6 69
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld the conviction of a defendant
who had "knowingly and intelligently" waived his right to counsel in
United States v. Romero.670 Romero, who had been convicted on five
counts of willffl failure to file income tax returns, had been represented
by a public defender for approximately two months. The defendant
then stated that he wished to appearpro se.671
The court concluded that, under the standards of Cooper v. Fitz-
harris,672 Romero had been adequately represented until he requested
discharge of the court-appointed counsel,673 and that he had made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.674 The trial
court's consent to the defendant's request, the court held, was based
upon Romero's constitutional right to represent himself.675 The Ninth
Circuit's holding was also influenced by the suspicion that Romero had
made the waiver in an attempt to assure error in the proceedings. 76
In United States v. Halbert677 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the
sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel does not necessarily
include the absolute right to both self-representation and the assistance
of counsel.678 Whether to allow hybrid representation remains within
669. United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
670. 640 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981).
671. Id at 1015-16.
672. 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978) (en band), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). See
supra text accompanying notes 524-26.
673. 640 F.2d at 1016.
674. Id
675. Id (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)); see also Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1308-09 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
676. Id at 1016. The court cited United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978), for the proposition that defendants often use the discharge of
counsel as a ploy to claim an unknowing waiver, thus delaying criminal proceedings. This
scenario is often used by tax protestors. 640 F.2d at 1016.
677. 640 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
678. Id at 1009. The court stated that "[w]hile effective legal counsel is an essential right
found in the Sixth Amendment, and the right to appearpro se is guaranteed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654,.. . the two rights are disjunctive." Id (citing United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394,
396-97 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 725-
26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958)). Accord United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d
535, 540 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Sacco, 571 F.2d 791,793 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 999 (1978); United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630, 634 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S.
972 (1977).
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the sound discretion of the trial judge.67 9 The Halbert court found that
the trial judge had not abused his discretion in denying the defendant's
motion to appear as his own attorney in addition to his retained
counsel.68 °
C. Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense
1. The right to confrontation
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
the right of an accused in a criminal proceeding "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him. ''68 ' This right serves primarily "to prevent
depositions or exparte affidavits. . .[from] being used against. . .[a
defendant] in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of
the witness." '682 In addition, when properly asserted, it incidentally af-
fords the judge and jury an opportunity to assess the demeanor and
reliability of those individuals testifying.6 8 3
a. right to cross-examine
Included within the right to confrontation is an additional right
empowering a criminally accused to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses.684 Because cross-examination constitutes the principal means of
assessing witness credibility and truthfulness, 685 federal courts recog-
nize that a defendant's ability to exercise this additional right should
remain relatively unfettered.686 Thus, while the extent to which cross-
679. 640 F.2d at 1009. Accord United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977);
United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir. 1977); and United States v. Bennett,
539 F.2d 45, 49 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976).
680. 640 F.2d at 1009-10.
681. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
682. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
683. Id at 242-43.
684. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) ("[T]he right of cross-examination is in-
cluded in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him
685. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
determined.").
686. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1968) (" 'It is the essence of a fair trial that
reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the
court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop. Prejudice ensues from a
denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his
testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly apprise them
.... '") (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692-94 (1931)).
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examination will be allowed remains within the trial court's discre-
tion,687 even a seemingly minor curtailment of this right win result in a
sixth amendment violation.688
The right to cross-examine was recently at issue in three Ninth
Circuit decisions. In United States v. Willis,689 the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered whether a district court had violated this right by limiting the
defendant's inquiry into the possible bias of a Government agent. De-
fendant Willis was indicted for possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. section
841(a)(1). 690 The indictment resulted from a search of Willis' apart-
ment by Drug Enforcement Administration agents which yielded ap-
proximately 400 grams of cocaine, chemicals used to process cocaine,
and assorted narcotics paraphernalia.
691
Willis' first trial began on December 11, 1978, but ended in a mis-
trial when he failed to appear two days later. He was subsequently
apprehended in July of 1979 by a state narcotics officer named Grif-
fin.692 At Willis' second trial,693 Griffin testified regarding the circum-
stances of the defendant's arrest. He informed the jury that: (1) the
arrest had occurred in a bar known by him to be frequented by drug
traffickers, and (2) during his initial questioning, Willis had asserted a
false identity.
694
In response to this testimony, Willis sought to cross-examine Grif-
fin regarding his possible sexual involvement with Annette Colemen,
the defendant's former live-in girl friend. The express purpose of this
inquiry was to attack Griffin's credibility by showing his bias. The dis-
trict court, however, prohibited this line of questioning, characterizing
it as irrelevant and improper cross-examination.695 Willis was subse-
687. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 766 (9th Cir.)
("The scope and extent of cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial court
."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
688. See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 130, 133 (1968) (trial court's refusal to allow
cross-examination of a prosecution witness regarding his correct name and address consti-
tuted a violation of defendant's sixth amendment rights).
689. 647 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1981).
690. Id. at 55. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides: "Except as authorized by this sub-
chapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(l) to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a con-
trolled substance."
691. 647 F.2d at 55.
692. Id
693. In addition to being retried for the initial offense, Willis also faced a charge of "bail
jumping" at this trial. 647 F.2d at 55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1976).
694. 647 F.2d at 55.
695. Id.
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quently convicted.696
On appeal, Willis argued that the district court had violated his
confrontation rights by restricting his ability to cross-examine Grif-
fin.697 The Ninth Circuit agreed, 6 98 reasoning that "'[t]he right to con-
front witnesses guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments
includes the right to cross-examine witnesses to show their possible bias
or self-interest in testifying.' ,699 The court also specified, however,
that a violation of the confrontation clause occurs only when the re-
striction placed on cross-examination precludes inquiry into matters
which are actually relevant to the issue of bias or prejudice.""0 It then
noted that since disclosure of the relationship between Griffin and
Coleman "might have shown a possible motive [on the part of Griffin]
to lie . . . [and] might also have impugned his general character and
believability in the eyes of the jury,""'' this relevancy requirement was
satisfied in the instant case.70 2
In United States v. Seifert,703 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
a Government witness' invocation of the fifth amendment had resulted
696. Id at 56.
697. Id at 57.
698. Id at 58.
699. Id at 57 (quoting Burr v. Sullivan, 618 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1980)). The court's
reasoning is consistent with that articulated in decisions of the Supreme Court, see supra
notes 685-86 and accompanying text, as well as that articulated in previous decisions of the
Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1980) (right to cross-
examine witnesses to impugn general credibility or demonstrate bias or self-interest included
in right to confrontation); United States v. Uramoto, 638 F.2d 84, 87 (9th Cir. 1980) (right to
cross-examination embodied in right to confrontation impermissibly limited when defend-
ant given inadequate scope to impeach witness' credibility).
700. 647 F.2d at 58. See Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1980). In Chniran
an eyewitness named Ketchum testified at trial that she saw defendant Chipman acting sus-
piciously near the scene of a burglary. The defense offered to show that Ketchum was po-
tentially biased against Chipman because he resided in a care facility for the mentally ill
located in the proximity of Ketchum's home. On previous occasions, Ketchum had, among
other things, accused residents of this facility of possessing stolen property. The trial court,
however, refused to allow any questioning in these areas. Id at 529-30.
The Ninth Circuit held that Chipman's right to confrontation had been violated. In so
holding, the court recognized that although the area of cross-examination restricted was
clearly relevant to the trial, some areas "'may be of such minimal relevance that the trial
court would be justified either in totally prohibiting cross-examination about them or in
allowing only limited questioning."' Id at 531 (quoting Skinner v. Caldwell, 564 F.2d
1381, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009 (1978)).
701. 647 F.2d at 58.
702. Id
703. 648 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980).
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in a violation of the defendants' right to cross-examine. Defendant Sei-
fert and co-defendant Ehrlich were indicted for conspiring to transport
and transporting in interstate commerce property taken by fraud in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. sections 2314704 and 371. 705  The indictment
charged both defendants with executing a scheme to swindle suppliers
of photographic and electronic merchandise.0 6
At trial, a prosecution witness named Murray Saka testified that
he had purchased a large quantity of such merchandise from Seifert
and Ehrlich on at least three separate occasions.70 7 Saka further testi-
fied that in order to finance the final purchases, he had found it neces-
sary to procure a substantial loan.70 8 On cross-examination, Saka was
questioned regarding the identity of the individual from whom he had
borrowed the money, but he declined to reply on the ground that his
answer might incriminate him.Z In response to this assertion of the
fifth amendment, the defendants twice moved to strike his testimony.71 0
The district court denied both motions and found the defendants
guilty.7
11
Relying on Davis v. Alaska,7 1 2 Seifert and Ehrlich argued on ap-
704. Id at 559. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever transports
in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the
value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud
... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
705. Id at 559. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any man-
ner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both ....
706. 648 F.2d at 559. The scheme allegedly created by Seifert and Ehrlich operated in the
following manner the defendants established a retail store in Phoenix, Arizona which spe-
cialized in the sale of photographic and electronic equipment. For a number of months,
they operated this store legitimately in order to establish a good credit rating with their
suppliers. On the pretense of opening another store in the Phoenix area, the defendants then
ordered large quantities of merchandise on credit. When the merchandise arrived, it was
shipped out of state and sold in another part of the country. The defendants retained the
proceeds and never paid any accounts outstanding. Id
707. Id at 559-60.
708. Id at 559.
709. Id at 560. Saka's express reason for refusing to provide the requested information
was fear for his life. Id
710. Id When the fifth amendment is legitimately invoked by a witness during cross-
examination, the appropriate remedy is to strike all or part of that witness' testimony if
inquiry is blocked into matters which are "direct" and not merely "collateral." See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 (1980).
711. 648 F.2d at 560.
712. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). In Davis, a key Government witness was on probation for prior
commission of a felony when he testified at the defendant's trial. On cross-examination, the
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peal that Saka's refusal to answer the question regarding his loan
source deprived them of their sixth amendment rights to cross-examine
and confront witnesses.7 13 The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected this
argument, holding that the defendants' sixth amendment rights had
not, in fact, been violated. 4 The court reasoned that any reliance on
Davis was misplaced because that case involved a disparate fact pat-
tern. 15 In addition, the court noted that in seeking to protect Saka
from an attempted invasion of his privilege against self-incrimination,
the district court had operated in accordance with Supreme Court
mandate.71 6
Finally, in United States v. Benedic, 7 17 the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered the effect on a defendant's right to cross-examine occasioned by
the Government's use of secondary evidence. Defendant Benedict was
indicted for conspiring to import heroin into the United States from
Thailand in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 963,718 and for conspiring to
possess and distribute heroin within the United States in violation of 21
defendant sought to elicit this information from the witness in order to demonstrate a possi-
ble bias in favor of the prosecution. The district court, however, refused to allow the in-
quiry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the restriction on the defendant's ability to
cross-examine resulted in a violation of his sixth amendment rights. Id at 318.
713. 648 F.2d at 562-63.
714. Id
715. Id The court noted that while the defendant in Davis had attempted to elicit testi-
mony from a Government witness regarding that witness' prior conviction and then current
status as a probationer, defendants Seifert and Ehrlich sought to question Saka regarding
the source of a loan. Id This distinction apparently formed the basis for the court's dual
determination that the Davis ruling was inapplicable, and that the defendants' sixth amend-
ment rights had, therefore, not been violated. Id
While the court's reasoning is cursory, the decision reached has considerable merit,
The defendant in Davis based his entire defense on a theory that the Government witness
was not credible because he may have equated failure to cooperate with revocation of his
probation. 415 U.S. at 311. See supra note 712. The defendant's inability to cross-examine
that witness regarding his probation, thus, effectively prevented him from proving this the-
ory and, accordingly, resulted in a violation of his confrontation rights. Id
In contrast, the defense theory asserted in Seifert was that Saka and another individual
had created the scheme to defraud, not Seifert and Ehrlich as the indictment charged. 648
F.2d at 562. Development of this theory was not, however, dependent on Saka's disclosure
of his loan source. Consequently, his invocation of the fifth amendment neither prevented
the defendants from adequately presenting their defense, nor resulted in a confrontation
clause violation. Id See /d at 561-62.
716. 648 F.2d at 562-63. The mandate referred to by the Ninth Circuit is found in the
very case relied on by the defendants, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). There, the
Court recognized that the trial court has a duty to protect a witness from "'an attempted
invasion of his constitutional protection from self-incrimination, properly invoked."' Id at
320 (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692-94 (1931)).
717. 647 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1088 (1981).
718. Id at 929. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976) provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires
to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or
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U.S.C. section 846.719 Part of the heroin in question was discovered by
customs officials during a routine inspection of large-model radio sets
that Benedict had marked for exportation.720 The remaining portion
was located in his Thailand apartment following a search by the Royal
Thai Police and United States Drug Enforcement Administration
agents.721 This search also yielded shipping documents and various
packing tools.
7 22
During Benedict's trial, Thai authorities refused to release most of
the relevant physical evidence.723 The Government was thus com-
pelled to rely on secondary evidence which consisted of: (1) oral testi-
mony of the witnesses who had personally examined or handled the
primary evidence;724 (2) photographs of the radios and a bag allegedly
containing the heroin found at Benedict's residence;725 and (3) photo-
copies of any necessary documents, reports, etc.7 2 6 On the basis of this
evidence, Benedict was subsequently convicted.7 27
On appeal, Benedict argued that his confrontation rights had been
violated by the unavailability of physical evidence that allegedly would
have aided him in cross-examination.728 His only supporting authority,
however, was United States v. Loud Hawk. 7 29 The Ninth Circuit ini-
both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the com-
mission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
The subchapter referred to delineates offenses for the importation and exportation of con-
trolled substances.
719. d at 929. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires
to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or
both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the com-
mission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
The subchapter referred to delineates offenses for the manufacture, possession, and distribu-
tion of controlled substances.
720. 647 F.2d at 929.
721. Id at 930.
722. Id
723. Id at 931. This unwillingness stemmed from the fact that Thai authorities were
maintaining a pending prosecution against Benedict and required the presence of the physi-






729. 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). In Loud
Hawk, state police officers destroyed dynamite seized from the defendant before federal
officials could obtain a sample. As a result, when the defendant was subsequently tried for
the federal crime of possessing a destructive device, the Government was forced to introduce
secondary evidence of the contraband consisting of photographs and testimony of state of-
ficers. Acknowledging that when evidence is lost or destroyed, the proper balance is that
between "the Government's conduct and the degree of prejudice to the accused," id at 1152,
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tially noted that the individuals "who observed, handled or tested the
primary evidence. . .[were] the subject of cross-examination,. . . not
the evidence itself.''130 The court then reasoned that since Benedict had
been able to question those individuals, the absence of any primary
evidence had not violated his right to cross-examine.7 3 1 The court fur-
ther explained that the defendant's reliance on Loud Hawk was inap-
propriate for two reasons: (1) the court in Loud Hawk considered an
issue unrelated to that presented in Benedict, 732 and (2) even after em-
ploying the balancing test articulated in Loud Hawk, there was no evi-
dence of Government misconduct and only "nonexistent or minimal"
the Ninth Circuit concluded that: (1) a federal agent's presence at the destruction of the
dynamite amounted to misconduct, but was excusable in light of the fact that the agent had
not encouraged the destruction, and (2) there was no prejudice to the defendant. Id at
1154-55.
730. 647 F.2d at 932.
731. Id The court's reasoning is consistent with that enunciated in previous Ninth Cir-
cuit decisions. See United States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1972) (unavailability
of blood sample taken from defendant and tested for alcoholic content did not violate his
right to confrontation since technician who performed test was available for cross-examina-
tion), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973). Cf. United States v. Ortiz, 603 F.2d 76, 80 (9th Cir.
1979) (destruction of heroin before trial did not compel suppression of chemist's testimony
regarding nature of substance since defendant exercised right to cross-examine), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1020 (1980); Munich v. United States, 363 F.2d 859, 860-61 (9th Cir. 1966) (destruc-
tion of evidence before retrial did not preclude defendant's conviction since he cross-ex-
amined witness who testified as to nature of evidence), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 974 (1967).
It should be noted that the Benedict court also relied on two additional lines of author-
ity providing apt, if somewhat more remote, support for the admission of secondary evi-
dence. In the first line of cases, the Government's good faith attempt, but ultimate failure, to
obtain the presence at trial of an informant was not considered grounds for reversing a
conviction. United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 799 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1120 (1977); United States v. Leon, 487 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1973). Reasoning that a
similar rule should apply when physical evidence is unavailable, the court noted that the
defendant did not suggest a valid basis for impugning the Government's good faith. There-
fore, the court concluded that the Government's use of secondary evidence, after failing to
secure primary evidence, did not warrant reversal of the defendant's conviction. 647 F.2d at
932.
In the second line of cases, when the prosecution was unable to obtain a witness from a
foreign jurisdiction, it was permitted to use reliable secondary evidence as a substitute with-
out violating the confrontation clause. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1972).
Again reasoning that a similar rule should apply when physical evidence was unobtainable,
the court concluded that since the defendant cross-examined all witnesses who had observed
the primary evidence, their testimony established the reliability of the secondary evidence.
The admission of that evidence had not, therefore, violated the confrontation clause. 647
F.2d at 932.
732. 647 F.2d at 932. In Loud Hawk, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the trial court
properly suppressed secondary evidence when the Government had in fact destroyed any
relevant primary evidence prior to the defendant's trial. In contrast, the issue presented in
Benedict was whether the use of secondary evidence deprived the defendant of his right to
confront witnesses. Id at 931.
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prejudice to the defendant.7 33
b. hearsay evidence
Hearsay is defined as any out-of-court statement "offered. .. to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."7 34  When such a statement is
both adverse to the interests of a defendant, and is admitted into evi-
dence at that defendant's trial through a recognized hearsay excep-
tion,73 5 the confrontation clause has potentially been violated.
7 36
In an effort to simplify the process of determining precisely when
such a violation occurs, the Supreme Court has devised the following
test: unless the prosecution can prove the "necessity" and "reliability"
of otherwise admissible hearsay evidence, the rights afforded a defend-
ant under the confrontation clause are deemed to have been violated
and the evidence is rendered inadmissible.737 According to the Court,
the requirement of "necessity" is satisfied when the prosecution demon-
strates the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to
use against the defendant.738 "Reliability," on the other hand, is estab-
lished when the prosecution demonstrates the trustworthiness of the
evidence.739
In United States v. Perez,74 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
hearsay evidence admitted under the co-conspirator exception had vio-
733. Id at 932. See supra note 729.
734. FED. R. EVit. 801(c).
735. Hearsay exceptions vary among jurisdictions as to number, nature, and detail.
Those applicable at the federal level are described in FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. For an exam-
pie of state exceptions, see CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1220-1340.
736. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980) (defendant's confrontation rights poten-
tially violated when hearsay evidence admitted under unavailability exception); Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86-89 (1970) (defendant's confrontation rights potentially violated when
hearsay evidence admitted under co-conspirator exception); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 155-56 (1970) (defendant's confrontation rights potentially violated when hearsay evi-
dence admitted under prior inconsistent statements exception).
The Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that hearsay evidence found in dying
declarations and cross-examined prior trial testimony "rest[s] upon such solid foundations
that [its] admission. . . comports with the 'substance of the [confrontation clause]."' Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244
(1895)).
737. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
738. Id at 65. The requirement of "necessity" is not, however, absolute. When the "util-
ity of trial confrontation is remote," the prosecution is not required to produce a seemingly
available witness. Id at 65 n.7. In addition, testimony that is neither "crucial" to the prose-
cution nor "devastating" to the defendant is conceivably exempt from the "necessity" re-
quirement. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (1970); United States v. Fielding, 630
F.2d 1357, 1368 (9th Cir. 1980).
739. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
740. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
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lated the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Defendant, Ruvalcaba-Villalobos ("Villalobos"), was convicted of con-
spiring to distribute and distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
sections 84611 and 841.742 His conviction was based, in part, on the
admission of testimony given by two undercover Drug Enforcement
Administration agents in which they related statements made by co-
conspirator Perez.743
On appeal, Villalobos argued that in admitting this evidence, the
district court had effectively denied him his constitutional right to con-
front and cross-examine the absent co-conspirator declarant. 7 " Specif-
ically, he contended that the co-conspirator's statements were
inadmissible because their "reliability" could not be established 74
After noting that an inquiry into possible confrontation clause vio-
lations is especially necessary when hearsay evidence is admitted under
the co-conspirator exception,746 the Ninth Circuit examined Perez'
statements in light of four "reliability" factors enunciated in Dutlon v.
Evans. 747 Based on this examination, his statements were found to be
741. Id at 658. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires
to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or
both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the com-
mission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
742. Id at 658. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides: "Except as authorized by this
subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(1) to manufac-
ture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance."
743. 658 F.2d at 658. Perez was initially indicted with Villalobos, but pled guilty to the
charge of distributing cocaine. Id at 661. The statements he made concerned a prospective
drug transaction between himself, Villalobos, and the DEA agents. Id at 657.
744. Id at 660.
745. Id at 661. Villalobos did not contest the "necessity" of the statements. Id
746. Id at 660. The Ninth Circuit has consistently so held. See United States v. Field-
ing, 630 F.2d 1357, 1366 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[The admissibility of a statement under [the co-
conspirator] exception does not normally establish compliance with the confrontation
clause."). See also United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 423
U.S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 177 (9th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416
U.S. 940 (1974). However, not all circuits apply such a strict level of scrutiny. See Ot-
tomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972) (hearsay evidence admissible
under co-conspirator exception automatically results in satisfaction of all possible confronta-
tion clause infirmities), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128 (1973).
747. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The Court, in Dutton, held that the "reliability" of hearsay evi-
dence admitted under the co-conspirator exception is generally established when: (1) the
declaration in question contains no assertions of past fact; (2) the declarant has personal
knowledge of the identity and role of the participants in the crime; (3) the declarant cannot
possibly have been relying upon faulty recollection; and (4) the circumstances under which
the statements were made provide no reason to believe that the declarant has misrepresented
the defendant's involvement in the crime. Id at 88-89. The Court did not, however, specify
how many of these factors need be present in order to indicate reliability. This ambiguity
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reliable. According to the court, the statements contained no assertions
of past fact because they consisted primarily of telephone conversations
between the declarant Perez and the defendant;7 48 Perez had personal
knowledge of the participants because he was the brother-in-law of the
defendant and had conducted drug transactions with him in the past;
749
there was little risk that Perez was relying on faulty memory because
the statements concerned an ongoing or prospective activity;750 and
finally, Perez had little to gain by misrepresenting the defendant's in-
volvement in the crime because the statements were clearly contrary to
his penal interests.7 ' The Ninth Circuit, therefore, concluded that the
admission of these statements at Villalobos' trial did not result in a
violation of his confrontation rights.7 52
2. The right to compulsory process
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution also guar-
antees the right of an accused in a criminal proceeding "to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."753 This clause
essentially affords a defendant the right to present a defense by offering
the testimony of favorable witnesses and compelling their attendance if
necessary.754
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the right to compulsory pro-
cess in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. 755 Defendant Valenzuela-
Bernal ("Bernar'), a Mexican citizen, was arrested by the United States
Border Patrol while attempting to transport five illegal aliens by auto-
mobile from Escondido, California to the Los Angeles area.756 Three
of the five aliens who had been traveling as passengers in Bernars vehi-
cle were also taken into custody. 57 According to border patrol agents,
none of these passengers made any statements exculpating Bernal dur-
led the Ninth Circuit to rule in at least one instance that the presence of factors (2) and (3)
established the "reliability" of hearsay evidence. United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 735
(9th Cir. 1975).
748. 658 F.2d at 661.
749. Id
750. Id at 662.
751. Id
752. Id at 660.
753. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
754. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) ("Just as an accused has the right to
confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.").
755. 647 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1981).
756. Id at 72-73.
757. Id at 73. Two of the illegal aliens escaped on foot and were never located by the
border patrol. Id
1982]
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ing their interrogation.7 58 Following a discussion with an assistant
United States Attorney, the border patrol detained one passenger and
deported the others to Mexico.759
Bernal was subsequently indicted on one count of transporting an
illegal alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. section 1324(a)(2). 760 After unsuc-
cessfully attempting to secure the appearance of the aliens deported,7 6 '
Bernal moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the Gov-
ernment's deportation action violated his fifth amendment right to due
process and his sixth amendment right to compulsory process. 762 The
trial judge denied Bernars motion and convicted him of the offense
charged.763
On appeal, Bernal argued that the trial court had erred by failing
to apply the doctrine enunciated in United States v. Mendez-Rodri-
guez. 764 This doctrine provides that the due process and compulsory
process clauses are deemed to have been violated when the Govern-
ment places a potential alien witness beyond the court's subpoena





760. Id at 73. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding
officer, agent, or consignee of any means. . . of transportation who-
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and knowing or
having reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into the United States
occurred less than three years prior thereto, transports, or moves, or attempts
to transport or move, within the United States by means of transportation or
otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law;. . . any alien. . . shall be
guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or
both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection occurs
761. 647 F.2d at 73.
762. Id
763. Id
764. 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971).
765. Id at 5. In Mendez-Rodriguez, the defendant was convicted of transporting six ille-
gal aliens within the United States. Three of the aliens were detained by the Government
and three were deported before the defendant was able to interview them. At trial, the
defendant raised the defense that he had not known the individuals transported were illegal
aliens. Testimony which tended to corroborate this claim was offered by the aliens remain-
ing in the United States. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment of convic-
tion, holding that the Government's deportation of the aliens violated the defendant's fifth
amendment right to due process and his sixth amendment right to compulsory process. Id
at 4-5.
As the Ninth Circuit explained later in United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420, 423
(9th Cir. 1974), "[t]he thrust of Mendez-Rodriguez is to prevent the basic unfairness of al-
lowing the government to [unilaterally] determine which witnesses will not help either side
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In considering the applicability of Mendez-Rodriguez, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the doctrine was not controlling when: (1) a defend-
ant would not "conceivably benefit" from the deported alien's testi-
mony,766 or (2) the alien's unavailability was not the result of unilateral
Government action.767 The court reasoned, however, that because the
instant case involved the deportation of two aliens who were both eye-
witnesses to and active participants in the offense with which Bernal
was charged, there existed "a strong possibility that [these aliens] could
have provided material and relevant information concerning the events
constituting the crime. 768  Moreover, they may have corroborated
Bemal's claim that although he had provided them with transportation,
he remained unaware of their status as illegal aliens.76 9 The circuit
court, thus, concluded that not only was the Mendez-Rodriguez doc-
trine applicable, but once applied, it required a reversal of Bernil's
conviction.770
and then to release those witnesses, for all practical purposes, beyond the reach of the
defendant."
766. 647 F.2d at 74. A deported alien's testimony is normally considered of "conceivable
benefit" to a defendant when that alien was an eyewitness to the criminal offense and may
have been able to offer evidence in support of the accused. See United States v. Gonzales,
617 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir.) (testimony of "conceivable benefit" to defendant when de-
ported alien was present at crime scene and may have been material witness to defendant's
alleged criminal conduct), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
Conversely, however, when a deported alien was not an eyewitness to the offense, the
Ninth Circuit has been unwilling to assume that the alien's testimony could "conceivably
benefit" the defendant. See United States v. Martinez-Morales, 632 F.2d 112, 115 (9th Cir.
1980) (Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine considered not controlling when missing alien did not
witness criminal act); accord United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, 608 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Castellanos-Machorro, 512 F.2d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. McQuillan, 507 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir. 1974).
767. 647 F.2d at 75 n.3. The Ninth Circuit has consistently found the Mendez-Rodriguez
doctrine inapplicable in such circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Gonza-
les, 608 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1979) (Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine inapplicable when po-
tential alien witness escaped country through self-effectuated trickery); United States v.
Francisco-Romandia, 503 F.2d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 1974) (Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine inap-
plicable when potential alien witness left country following release by court order), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. Carrillo-Frausto, 500 F.2d 234, 235-36 (9th Cir.
1974) (Mendez-Jodriguez doctrine inapplicable when potential alien witness fled following
release by magistrate); United States v. Verduzco-Macias, 463 F.2d 105, 106-07 (9th Cir.)
(Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine inapplicable when Government did not physically move poten-
tial alien witness outside court's jurisdiction), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883 (1972).
768. 647 F.2d at 75.
769. Id
770. Id
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9. The Right to a Speedy Trial
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. sections 3161-3174771 (the Act),
implements the right of the accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed by
the sixth amendment of the Constitution.772 Embodied in the Act is a
set of time limits for carrying out major events in the prosecution bf
federal criminal cases, such as the information, indictment, arraign-
ment, and trial.
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit addressed several
questions arising under the Speedy Trial Act, including whether a dis-
trict court violated the Act when it excluded from the allowable period
the delay caused by a volcanic eruption773 and when it granted a con-
tinuance to enable the Government to locate three essential wit-
nesses.774 The Ninth Circuit also confronted the issue of whether an
appellant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial when the
Government obtained a second indictment against him following the
district court's refusal to order his extradition. 775 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit was asked to determine whether the speedy trial rights of in-
mates in a federal penitentiary were violated by a ten-month delay be-
tween their detention in an Administrative Detention Unit and the date
of their trial.
7 76
1. The Speedy Trial Act
In Furlow v. United States, 7 77 the Ninth Circuit affirmed appellant
Furlow's conviction of possessing and uttering a United States Treas-
ury check with intent to defraud the United States.778 One of the
grounds upon which Furlow sought reversal of his conviction was that
he had been denied his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial
Act. Furlow's trial, scheduled to begin on May 20, 1980, was delayed
771. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976).
772. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
773. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981).
774. United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981).
775. United States v. Moore, 653 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1981).
776. United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1981).
777. 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981).
778. Ad at 769. Furlow's actions constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 495 (1976).
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by the May 18 eruption of Mt. St. Helens, a volcano in western Wash-
ington. It was rescheduled for June 17, 1980.
7
1
The Speedy Trial Act requires that the trial of "a detained person
who is being held in detention solely because he is awaiting trial...
shall commence not later than 90 days following the beginning of such
continuous detention or designation of high risk by the attorney for the
Government. '780 Furlow claimed that 116 days had elapsed between
his arrest on February 22 and the beginning of the trial on June 17. As
he conceded, however, the United States Magistrate had released him
from custody on May 13, within the ninety-day period. Although
Furlow protested that he had been immediately reincarcerated, the
court was satisfied that the reincarceration had been for additional
charges unrelated to the federal charges. Therefore, he was no longer
being detained "solely because he [was] awaiting trial" on federal
charges.
78'
The Speedy Trial Act also requires that a defendant be brought to
trial within 70 days "from the filing date (and making public) of the
information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has ap-
peared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is
pending, whichever date last occurs. '782 In Furlow, the 70-day period
began to run when the appellant was arraigned on March 12, 1980.
Thus, May 21, 1980 was the last day trial could have begun within the
time limit.
783
On April 24, however, Furlow filed a motion to dismiss the case
for lack of prosecution, which was denied on May 5. In the order deny-
ing the motion, the district court found the period between April 24
and May 5 to be excludable time under 18 U.S.C. section
3161(h)(1)(F). Section 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes from the computation of
the time within which an information or indictment must be filed or a
trial must commence any delays resulting from pretrial motions "from
the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on...
such motion. '784 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling and concluded
that this period of excludable time extended the last possible date of
779. 644 F.2d at 768. Although Furlow was indicted on October 1, 1979, he was not
apprehended until February 22, 1980, and was returned to Washington on or about March
3, 1980. Ad at 767.
780. 18 U.S.C. § 3164 (1976).
781. 644 F.2d at 768.
782. 1.8 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1976).
783. 644 F.2d at 768.
784. Id
1982]
LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW V
trial to June 2.785
Finally, the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court was
justified in finding June 4 through June 17 to be excludable under 18
U.S.C. section 3161h)(8)(A)716 in light of the impact of the volcanic
eruption.78 7 The Ninth Circuit considered the following factors: the
length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, defendant's assertion of
his rights, and the resulting prejudice. 7 8 Because the delays in Furlow
were "relatively brief," no prejudice occurred.78 9
The Furlow court was also satisfied that the district court "pre-
served the procedural safeguards" required by the due process
clause.7 9° In this respect, Furlow was distinguishable from other cases
in which the court had found a violation of the Speedy Trial Act.79
785. Id
786. Section 3161(h)(8)(A) provides for the exclusion of:
Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the judge on his own
motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the
attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of
his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay
resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this para-
graph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the
record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of
justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1976).
787. 644 F.2d at 768-69. The eruption of Mt. St. Helens on May 18, 1980 necessitated a
rescheduling of the trial. In its order, the district court ruled that the period from June 4
through June 17 was excludable time because of emergency conditions. The Ninth Circuit
observed that the district court may have erred in not including June 2 and 3 in its order,
because the time period from March 12 to June 17, less the time encompassed by the two
exclusion orders, was 72 days. This exceeded the 70 days permitted by § 3161(c)(1). The
Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that the district court's clear intention to exclude the
delay caused by the eruption was controlling, notwithstanding the error. Id at 768.
788. Id at 769.
789. Id (citing United States v. Metz, 608 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1979), ceri. denied, 449
U.S. 821 (1980)). Appellant Metz appealed his conviction of conspiracy to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976), on numerous grounds, one of
which was violation of the Speedy Trial Act. His indictment came 64 days after arrest,
rather than 45 days, as required by §§ 3161(b) & (f). He was arraigned 14 days after the
indictment, rather than within 10 days, as required by § 3161(c). Sections 3161(c) and (g)
require that trial take place within 120 days of the arraignment, but the appellant's trial
began 172 days after arraignment. Id at 151-52. The Fifth Circuit found that these. rela-
tively brief delays did not rise to the level of presumptive prejudice, and therefore there was
no unconstitutional delay. Id
790. 644 F.2d at 769.
791. The Ninth Circuit found Furlow to be "clearly distinguishable" from Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). In Klopfer, the defendant had been indicted for a
misdemeanor. Following the jury's failure to reach a verdict, the trial judge declared a
mistrial and ordered the case continued for the term. Some eighteen months later the prose-
cutor moved that the state be permitted to take a nolleprosequi with leave. Id at 217-18.
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The court concluded: "Within the limits of the Sixth Amendment and
the Speedy Trial Act a district court has inherent power to control its
own docket to ensure that cases proceed before it in a timely and or-
derly fashion."792 The court thus found no violation of the Speedy
Trial Act and affirmed Furlow's conviction.
793
In United States v. Fielding,7 94 the Ninth Circuit held that the dis-
trict court properly acted within its discretion in granting a motion for a
continuance pursuant to section 3161(h)(8)(A).7 9 Appellant Fielding
was indicted on July 15, 1975, but was not arrested until April 1979.
He was arraigned on May 30, 1979. On the scheduled trial date, July
16, 1979, the Government was unable to locate three essential witnesses
and moved for a one-month continuance. The district court granted
the Government's motion, finding that the continued time was excluda-
ble under the "ends of justice" exclusion provision of the Speedy Trial
Act.796 Fielding claimed that the continuance was unjustified and that
it delayed his trial in violation of the Speedy Trial Act.79 7 He con-
tended, therefore, that the case against him should be dismissed pursu-
This North Carolina procedural device permitted the Government to remove a case from
the calendar with leave to restore it for an indeterminate period. During that period, the
defendant could not obtain a dismissal or have the case restored to the calendar for trial. Id
at 214. The Supreme Court held that even though the defendant had been discharged from
custody, his liberty remained restricted by the social implications of the pendency of the
indictment, and therefore his right to a speedy trial had been denied. Id at 222.
The Ninth Circuit found "[n]o such shadowy process" at work in Furlow, where the
district court had specified a trial date. 644 F.2d at 769. The court cited United States v.
Didier, 542 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976), as an additional example of abuse of procedural
safeguards. In Didier, as in Klopfer, the district court granted a sine die continuance. The
Second Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, finding no excuse for the excessive de-
lay. Id at 1189-90.
792. 644 F.2d at 769. The court distinguished United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298
(9th Cir. 1976). In Tirasso, the defendants argued successfully that they should be released
from custody because they had been held without bail longer than the 90-day permissible
period, in violation of § 3164(c), which provides that "[n]o detainee. . . shall be held in
custody pending trial after the expiration of such ninety-day period." Furlow involved a
defendant's right to have his conviction reversed because of the violation of his rights under
the Speedy Trial Act, not his right to release from custody if the 90-day period were
exceeded.
793. 644 F.2d at 769.
794. 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981). Fielding was convicted of importation and conspiracy
to import marijuana with intention to distribute the drug. Id at 720.
795. Id at 722; see supra note 786.
796. 645 F.2d at 720 (citing § 3161(h)(8)(A)).
797. Id at 720-21. He did not claim, however, that his constitutional right to a speedy
trial had been violated by the granting of a continuance nor that the District Plan for
Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases had been violated. Id at 721 n.4.
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The Ninth Circuit explained that the appropriate standard for re-
view of the district court's granting of the motion for continuance de-
pends upon whether the challenged determination is legal, factual, or
both.7 99 Noting that only factual findings were at issue in Fielding, the
court stated the standard of review set forth in section 3161(h)(8)(A):
"the judge must explicitly set forth his reasons for finding that the ends
of justice served by the continuance outweigh other interests protected
by the Act.' '"" ° The court continued: "[S]uch a factual finding should
not be disturbed unless 'clearly erroneous.' "801
In applying these standards to the district court's factual findings
at the hearing on the motion,80 2 the Ninth Circuit found that the trial
judge had stated his reasons for believing that the ends of justice served
by the continuance outweighed the other interests protected by the Act.
The reasons were set forth in the trial court's order granting the motion:
(1) The Government, despite the exercise of due diligence,
has been unable to determine the whereabouts of three essen-
tial witnesses. . . (2) Failure to grant the requested continu-
ance would be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice. (3)
Therefore, the ends of justice served by the granting of such
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial .... o3
Fielding contended that, although the section 3161 (h)(8) exclusion
and finding were appropriate, the standard for the continuance should
have been that of subsection (h)(3)110 because the continuance was
798. Id at 720. Section 3162 (1976) establishes sanctions for failure to indict or bring to
trial within the time limits imposed by § 3161.
799. 645 F.2d at 721.
800. Id at 722 (citing § 3161(h)(8)(A)).
801. 645 F.2d at 722 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
802. At the hearing, the following facts were disclosed: (1) the indictment had been
handed down four years prior to the time of the motion; Fielding was a fugitive during this
time; (2) attempts to locate witnesses began in May 1979, but the United States had trouble
locating those witnesses; although the witnesses' current addresses were unknown, the Gov-
ernment believed it could locate the witnesses and subpoenas were issued on June 19, 1979;
and (3) on July 11, 1979, material witness warrants were issued. At the time of the hearing,
only one of the witnesses, who was hostile and unwilling to talk to the United States Attor-
ney, had been located. 645 F.2d at 722.
803. Id
804. Section 3161(h)(3)(A) provides that periods of delay resulting from the absence or
unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness shall not be included in the time
period within which a defendant must be indicted or tried. "Absence" and "unavailability"
are defined in subparagraph B of § 3161(h)(3):
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, a defendant or an essen-
tial witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown and, in
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based upon the unavailability of a witness.8" 5 The Ninth Circuit noted,
however, that even if the standard of subsection (h)(3) was appropriate,
the record of the hearing revealed that this standard had in fact been
applied.80 6 Futhermore, the court observed that under section
3162(a)(2), 80 7 the defendant bears the burden of supporting a motion to
dismiss, although the Government has the burden of going forward
with the evidence in connection with a section 3161(h)(3) exclusion.
Holding that the government had met its burden with a showing of
necessity and unavailability, and that Fielding had failed to rebut these
showings, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the continuance was justi-
fied and that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated.
80 8
2. Sixth amendment right to a speedy trial
In United States v. Moore, 809 appellant asserted that the Govern-
ment had violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Appellant
was convicted of three counts of soliciting money in exchange for his
promise not to testify at the trial of another, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 201(e).810 One of the five grounds upon which Moore appealed
was that the delay in bringing him to trial violated his speedy trial
rights.
81
addition, he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his whereabouts
cannot be determined by due diligence. For purposes of such subparagraph, a
defendant or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his
whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due dili-
gence or he resists appearing at or being returned for trial.
805. 645 F.2d at 722.
806. Id at 723. See supra text accompanying note 804.
807. Section 3162(a)(2) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit required by section
3161(c) as extended by section 3161(h), the information or indictment shall be dis-
missed on motion of the defendant. The defendant shall have the burden of proof
of supporting such motion but the Government shall have the burden of going
forward with the evidence in connection with any exclusion of time under subpara-
graph 3161(h)(3).
808. 645 F.2d at 723.
809. 653 F.2d 384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981).
810. Id 18 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1981) provides:
Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, ac-
cepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for another
person or entity in return for being influenced in his testimony under oath or affir-
mation as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in return
for absenting himself therefrom-
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary equivalent
of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen
years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.
811. 653 F.2d at 387. The facts surrounding Moore's conviction are unusual in nature.
While serving a life sentence for murder in Belize (formerly British Honduras), Moore met
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Moore relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Barker v. Wingos8 2 for his contention that his sixth amendment rights
were violated by the ten and one-half month delay between his arraign-
ment under the first indictment on February 20, 1979 and his trial on
Dail, a fellow prisoner, who offered to help Moore escape from prison, to pay for his return
to the United States, and to pay him $20,000 if Moore would murder one Hudson, who had
testified against one of Dail's business associates. Moore accepted the offer, escaped from
the Belize prison, and presented himself to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in
Guatemala City, where he offered to become an informer against Dail. Id at 386.
The DEA accepted Moore's offer and returned him to the United States, where he was
to pretend to seek out and kill Hudson while gathering evidence against Dail, who had also
returned to the United States. While Moore carried out his instructions, the DEA recorded
his telephone conversations with Dail and observed deliveries of weapons by Dail to Moore.
Moore ultimately faked Hudson's murder so convincingly that Dail paid him for the murder
and sought to have Moore murder other individuals. Id
Shortly thereafter, Moore appeared before a federal grand jury. Approximately one
month later he was arrested on a warrant for his extradition to Belize. He was held for forty-
five days and then released, as the extradition papers had not arrived from Belize within this
period. Id A few days later, one of Dairs associates discovered that Hudson was not dead.
To protect Moore from Dail, the Government had Dail arrested and charged with conspir-
acy to commit murder and interstate transportation of guns to commit a felony. Id
At this point Moore began to consider those who might have an interest in Dail's avoid-
ance of a successful prosecution. Moore and his wife commenced a series of telephone calls
to Dai's wife and one of Dail's business associates, offering not to testify in Dail's trial in
exchange for a sum of cash. When the DEA learned of these conversations, it confronted
Moore, concerned that he would destroy its case against Dail. Moore claimed that he was
attempting to incriminate other members of Dail's organization. Unconvinced, the DEA
obtained from Moore a written promise not to make any more calls to Dail's wife. Id
Moore violated this agreement and was arrested and charged with violating § 201(e).
After his arraignment, the Government offered Moore a plea bargain under which he would
plead guilty to one count of violating § 201(e). In return, the Government agreed (1) to
request that Belize withdraw its extradition request; (2) not to initiate extradition proceed-
ings upon Moore's release as long as he did not violate any federal or state law; (3) to
recommend a sentence of five years; and (4) not to prosecute Moore's wife for her participa-
tion in the telephone calls to Dai's wife and associate. To encourage Moore to accept this
offer, the Government indicated that, should he reject the offer, the indictment would be
dismissed and extradition proceedings instituted, which the Government believed would be
successful. Moore rejected the offer, and the Government began the extradition proceed-
ings. Id at 386-87.
However, the Government's effort to penalize Moore with extradition proceedings
failed when the district court refused to order Moore's extradition. In response, the Govern-
ment again arrested Moore and obtained a second indictment against him, charging him
with three counts of violating § 201(e), and charging him and his wife with conspiracy to
violate § 201(e). The trial resulted in Moore's conviction on the three counts of violating
§ 201(e) and the acquittal of Moore and his wife on the conspiracy charge. Id at 387.
812. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The.Barker Court held that a defendant's constitutional right to
a speedy trial cannot be determined by any inflexible rule, but instead can be determined
only on an adhoc balancing basis in which the conduct of the prosecution and that of the
defendant are weighed. The Court established a balancing test in which the following fac-
tors were considered: the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant. Id at 530.
[Vol. 15
19821 CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
the charges in the second indictment.8 13 Applying the first of the Barker
criteria,8 14 length of the delay, the Moore court stated that although the
delay was of a length sufficient to require scrutiny,815 it was not suffi-
ciently long to weigh heavily against the Government.816 The court
next addressed the second factor, the reason for the delay, and con-
cluded that it clearly resulted from the Government's decision to seek
extradition and, as such, gave the Government no advantage in the
trial pursuant to the second indictment. The court observed that the
decision to seek extradition was not only understandable, but foresee-
able by Moore.
817
With regard to Moore's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the
third Barker factor, the court initially noted that Moore's timely asser-
tion was a factor in his favor. However, the court observed that from a
tactical point of view, his assertion of his speedy trial rights had to be
viewed as an effort to forestall extradition and therefore did not en-
hance the persuasiveness of his constitutional argument. 88
Considering the final Barker criterion, the Moore court concluded
that Moore was not prejudiced by the delay. The only possible source
of prejudice to Moore was the fact that an associate of his fellow pris-
oner Dail, whom Moore telephoned when he attempted to "market"
813. 653 F.2d at 388. The Ninth Circuit measured the period of delay for the arraign-
ment pursuant to the first indictment and stated that this period would not be reduced for
any period of time between the dismissal of the first indictment and the arraignment under
the second indictment. Id See United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1232-34 & n.13 (9th
Cir. 1980).
814. See supra note 812.
815. 653 F.2d at 388; see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972); see also United
States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 829-31 (9th Cir.) (six month delay sufficient to trigger
inquiry into other factors), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 (1976).
816. 653 F.2d at 388-89; see United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 1980)
(delay of one year does not establish plaintifis claim); see also United States v. Santos, 588
F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979). In Santos, the Ninth Circuit held that
appellants were not denied their right to a speedy trial, despite an 11-month pre-indictment
delay and despite a delay of 15 months from the date of the first indictment to the date of the
trial. Id at 1302-03.
817. 653 F.2d at 389. The Moore court remarked that the Government could have
avoided the possibility of a speedy trial issue by extending the plea offer prior to any indict-
ment and promptly commencing extradition proceedings in the event that the plea offer was
rejected. According to the court, the availability of this expedient provided no basis for
refusing to consider Moore's speedy trial argument, but its availability suggested that
Moore's argument was not substantial. Id
818. Id The court reasoned that the assertion of speedy trial rights prior to the com-
mencement of extradition proceedings, if it were to be given compelling weight, would re-
quire that prosecution pursuant to the first indictment precede the initiation of extradition
proceedings. If conviction resulted, this requirement would postpone extradition indefi-
nitely. Id
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his testimony, was in a Canadian prison at the time of trial. The court
pointed out, however, that Moore had failed to depose that individual
although he could have done so. 81 9 The court also noted the unlikeli-
hood that the associate would have provided exculpatory testimony.
820
The Ninth Circuit thus rejected Moore's argument that his speedy trial
rights had been violated by the delay in .bringing him to trial.
821
United States v. Mills82  introduced the question whether the
speedy trial rights of prison inmates were violated when they were de-
tained in the prison's Administration Detention Unit (ADU) for ten
months pending arraignment for the murder of a fellow inmate.823 The
Ninth Circuit held that their rights were not violated. 24
The Mills court stated that the sixth amendment speedy trial pro-
vision applies only when a defendant is "accused. ' 825 The court stated
that this occurs when a formal indictment or information is filed, 826 not
when the defendant is segregated by the prison board.827
819. Id
820. Id
821. Id The Ninth Circuit stated that if it were to accept appellant's contentions, it
would be required to hold that Moore had a right to be tried under the first indictment prior
to any extradition efforts and that the failure of those efforts followed by a delay equal to
that in this case precluded further prosecution. Although the court acknowledged that exces-
sive delay caused by extradition proceedings might violate an accused's speedy trial rights, it
concluded that "Itihe government moved with reasonable alacrity both before and after, as
well as during, the extradition proceedings." Id at 388.
822. 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981).
823. Id at 787. Appellees Mills and Pierce were believed to be implicated in the stabbing
death of a fellow prison inmate at a federal correctional institution on August 22, 1979. The
day after the stabbing, prison officials committed Mills and Pierce to the ADU. The Gov-
ernment indicted Mills and Pierce for murder on March 27, 1980. They remained in segre-
gation until their arraignment on April 21, 1980. Their trial, which originally had been set
for June 30, 1980, was continued to July 29, 1980, at their request.
The trial court dismissed the indictments, concluding that the Government had failed to
justify its delay in seeking the indictments or in bringing Mills and Pierce to trial and finding
that the dimming of the memories of exonerating witnesses, the loss of witnesses, and the
deterioration of physical evidence had irreparably prejudiced them. Id at 786-87.
824. Id at 787.
825. Id; see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977).
826. 641 F.2d at 787. "[l]t is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual
restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the partic-
ular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment." United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
827. 641 F.2d at 787. The court cited United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646 (5th Cir.
1979), in which appellant, a federal prisoner, had attacked a fellow inmate and was placed in
administrative segregation pending institution of criminal proceedings. The Fifth Circuit
stated that his confinement was not an "arrest" or an "accusal" for sixth amendment pur-
poses. Id at 647.
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The court followed the decision in United States v. Clardy, 8 1u in
which the appellants had been placed in segregated confinement after
they had attacked a fellow inmate. On appeal, the appellants had con-
tended that their sixth amendment rights had been violated for failure
to commence trial sooner829 and that they had been subject to defacto
arrest when placed in segregated confinement after the attack. Stating
that segregation is not an "arrest" for speedy trial purposes, the court
held that the factors indicating defacto arrest were generally absent,
30
and that the appellants' speedy trial rights had not come into play until
they were indicted on April 1, 1975.3
The Mills court followed the holding of Clardy. 832 It noted that
the Bureau of Prisons had requested the appellees' detention in the
ADU. The detention orders stated that the appellees were to be inves-
tigated for violations of prison regulations and possibly tried for a
criminal act, and that their continued presence in the general prison
population threatened the life and property of those in the institution
and the security of the prison itself.8 33 The court held that there was no
arrest or accusation until the appellees were indicted on March 27,
1980.834 For purposes of their speedy trial rights, therefore, the delay
was only three months and three days.
8 35
E. The Right to a Jury Trial
The sixth amendment guarantees an accused the right to a jury
828. 540 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976).
829. Id at 441. The stabbing occurred on October 27, 1974. Appellants were indicted on
April 1, 1975, and arraigned on April 18, 1975. The trial commenced July 28, 1975. Id
830. Id
The prison discipline did not focus public obloquy upon appellants, did not disrupt
their "employment" or drain appellants' financial resources. In short, it was not a
public act with public ramifications, but a private act. Actual physical restraintmay have increased and free association diminished, but unless we were to say thatimprisonment rsofacto is a c ntinuing arrest, these criteria bear little weight in the
peculiar context of a penal institution where the curtailment of liberty is the gen-
eral rule not the exception.
Id
831. Id
832. 641 F.2d at 787.
833. Id
834. I.d
835. Id Three months and three days elapsed between March 27 and June 30, 1980, the
date for which the trial was set prior to the granting of appellees' request for a continuance
to July 29, 1980.
The Mills court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the ad hoc balancing test of Barker
did not apply to the pre-accusation delay about which appellees complained. Id at 787. See
also United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1979).
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trial in all criminal prosecutions.8 36 However, this provision has been
interpreted in light of the common law rule which requires a jury for
"serious" but not "petty" offenses.8 37 The characterization of an of-
fense as "petty" or "serious" is usually based upon the nature of the
offense, and courts have often relied upon the maximum authorized
penalty for an offense as an objective indication of the seriousness of
each particular crime.
8 38
In Baldwin v. New York,8 39 the Supreme Court concluded that "no
offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized."840 How-
ever, in a series of cases involving criminal contempt, the Court looked
to the punishment actually imposed to determine whether the defend-
ant had a right to a jury trial.841 In addition, the Court has left open
the possibility that an offense may be serious enough to require trial by
jury, notwithstanding an assigned penalty which would otherwise class-
ify the offense as petty8 42
In 1981, the Ninth Circuit addressed a defendant's right to a jury
trial in United States v. Craner.8 43 Craner had been convicted at a
bench trial of driving under the influence of alcohol in a national
park.8 " On appeal, he contended that the district court had erred in
denying his motion for a jury trial.s45 Although Craner's sentence was
only probation and attendance at traffic school, the offense carried a
836. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In cases involving the federal judiciary, Article III pro-
vides: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
837. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (battery punishable by twd
year sentence considered a serious crime entitling defendants to jury trial); District of Co-
lumbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (right to jury trial guaranteed in case of reckless
driving since offense was malur in se and of a serious character); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540, 551 (1888) (conspiracy to prevent another from pursuing lawful avocation considered a
serious offense entitling defendant to jury trial).
838. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 161-62. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,
210 (1968) (seriousness of crime should determine assessment of penalty).
839. 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (plurality opinion).
840. Id at 69.
841. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476-77 (1975) (no jury trial under federal stat-
ute for criminal contempt); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (right to jury
trial mandated if sentences imposed aggregate to more than six months); Taylor v. Hayes,
418 U.S. 488, 495 (1974) (no absolute right to jury trial in cases of criminal contempt); Cheff
v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966) (plurality opinion) (no imposition of
sentences exceeding six months absent jury trial or waiver thereof).
842. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970).
843. 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1981).




maximum authorized penalty of six months' imprisonment or a $500.00
fine, or both, plus payment of costs.846 Thus, Craner argued that the
offense was serious enough to warrant the constitutional guarantee of
trial by jury147
The Craner court observed that "the maximum penalty for an of-
fense is usually more important than any other criterion used in charac-
terizing the offense as serious or petty."8 48 The court justified this
conclusion by reference to the general acceptance of penalties as in-
dicators of the public's assessment of the gravity of a particular of-
fense . 49 However, the court also recognized that the maximum
penalty is not the only criterion to be considered in characterizing an
offense as serious or petty.850
The court noted that because the maximum penalty in Craner had
been set by the Secretary of the Interior, rather than by Congress, it
could not be considered a legislative reflection of the public's assess-
ment of the gravity of driving under the influence of alcohol in a na-
tional park. Rather, the penalty authorized by the Secretary was the
most severe penalty possible within the Secretary's congressionally lim-
ited power.851
The court indicated that the gravity of an offense could also be
gauged by the potential future legal consequences of a conviction.,52
Accordingly, the court found merit in Craner's argument that notwith-
standing the sentence imposed for the violation, he also faced the possi-
bility of losing his California driver's license. The court found this
collateral consequence, whether actually imposed or not, to be a rele-
vant indicator of the gravity of the offense.85 3 Relying upon precedent
which held that the analogous offense of reckless driving was a serious
offense requiring the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury,8 54 the
846. Id
847. Id
848. Id at 25.
849. Id
850. Id at 25. The court noted that "lain offense is not 'serious' because it is severely
punished; it is severely punished because it is 'serious."' d at 24.
851. Id at 25. The court noted that the penalty for drunk driving was the same as that
imposed for other offenses, including climbing Mount Rushmore and digging for bait in a
national park. The court drew a distinction between the Secretary's "indiscriminate authori-
zation of this penalty" and a "considered legislative judgment of the gravity of the offense of
DUI." Id
852. Id at 26.
853. Id
854. Id (citing District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (reckless driving
found to be serious in that it was both indictable at common law and malum in se)). The
court rejected the Government's contention that Colts had been superseded, noting that the
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court reasoned that the comparable seriousness of driving under the
influence of alcohol also required trial by jury.
855
In addition, the court looked to the standards adopted by those
states within the Ninth Circuit, 85 6 and noted that at least seven required
that a defendant accused of driving under the influence be accorded the
right to jury trial. 7 This survey was characterized as an "objective
gauge of the common perception of the gravity of the offense."
858
The court concluded its analysis by balancing the relative values
involved in guaranteeing a right to jury trial against the administrative
convenience of summary proceedings.8 59 Noting that federal prosecu-
tions for driving under the influence of alcohol were rare, the court
characterized the administrative benefits resulting from summary pro-
ceedings as relatively slight.8 60 Therefore, constitutionally, the benefits






Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that an "indictment . . . be a plain, concise and written statement of
the essential facts constituting the offense charged."8 62 The Ninth Cir-
cuit has recently considered cases in which it was claimed that indict-
ments are fatally defective because they failed to allege essential
elements of the charged offenses. Particularly pertinent to these cases is
the Supreme Court's holding that "[c]onvictions are no longer [to be]
reversed because of minor and technical deficiencies which [do] not
prejudice the accused,"8 63 and the Court's enumeration of certain crite-
Supreme Court has not repudiated Colts even though presented with many opportunities to
do so. 652 F.2d at 26.
855. 652 F.2d at 26.
856. Id at 27.
857. The court observed that the following states had provided for a right to jury trial in
cases of driving under the influence of alcohol: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, and Washington. It further noted that only five states denied such de-
fendants the right to a jury trial. Id. at 27 n.5.




862. FED. R. CuM. P. 7(c)(1).
863. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959).
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ria for evaluating a challenged indictment:
These criteria are, first whether the indictment "contains the
elements of the offense intended to be charged, and suffi-
ciently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to
meet," and, secondly, "in case any other proceedings are
taken against him for a similar offence, whether the record
shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former
acquittal or conviction." 864
The Ninth Circuit considered these criteria in United States v. Ells-
worth. 865 Ellsworth appealed his conviction for assaulting a federal of-
ficer with a deadly weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 111866 and
1114.867 He argued that the indictment against him was fatally defec-
tive because it failed to allege that the officer's official duties consisted
of investigative, inspection, or law enforcement functions.868
The Ninth Circuit, however, held that because the crux of the al-
leged crime was the assault, not the particulars of the victim's job
description, the indictment had sufficiently advised the defendant of
the charge against him .8 6 9 The court stated that because the defendant
had raised the issue of the indictment's insufficiency during post trial
864. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962) (quoting Hagner v. United
States, 285 U.S. 427, 431 (1932) (citations omitted)). The defendant had been summoned to
testify before a congressional committee and was later convicted of violating 2 U.S.C. § 192
(1938) (refusing to answer "any question pertinent to the question under inquiry"). The
Court held that the indictment's failure to identify the question under the subcommittee's
inquiry constituted a failure to meet the requirement that the defendant be sufficiently ap-
prised of the charges against which he must be prepared to defend. Id at 764.
865. 647 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's crite-
ria for evaluating a challenged indictment in United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 363
(9th Cir. 1976).
866. 18 U.S.C. § I 11 (1976) proscribes the forcible assault, resistance, impedence, intimi-
dation, or interference with any person designated in 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. III 1979).
867. 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. III 1979) designates the persons referred to in 18 U.S.C.
§ 111 as those officers or employees of the Department of the Interior who have either been
assigned to perform investigative, inspection, or law enforcement functions or to enforce any
act of Congress for the protection, preservation, or restoration of game and other wild birds
and animals.
868. 647 F.2d at 962. The indictment charged:
That on or about the 15th day of October, 1979, Anchorage, Alaska, in the District
of Alaska, PHILLIP JOHN ELLSWORTH, unlawfully, wilfully and by means of
a dangerous weapon, . . . did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate
and interfere with Jerry Lee Cox, a Petroleum Engineer Technician of the Conser-
vation Division of the United States Geological Service of the Department of the
Interior, while he was engaged in the performance of his official duties, all in viola-
tion of Title 18, United States Code, Section 11 and 1114.
Id at 958.
869. Id at 962 (citing United States v. Tijerina, 407 F.2d 349, 353 (10th Cir. 1969) (indict-
ment for assaulting forest ranger and alleging time, place, identity of victim, his official
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proceedings, the indictment required a liberal construction.8 70 It con-
cluded that even if there were a missing statutory element, it could eas-
ily be implied from the indictment's actual language.
871
In United States v. Tavelman,872 the defendants appealed their
convictions for two offenses: (1) conspiracy to possess cocaine for dis-
tribution and (2) interstate travel in furtherance of the conspiracy.1
73
They argued that their indictments under Count I for conspiracy were
fatally defective because of the omission of either a substantive count
of cocaine possession or the absence of any overt acts committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 874 Furthermore, the defendants claimed
that their indictments under Count II for interstate travel were fatally
defective for omitting overt acts committed in furtherance of the un-
lawful intent to distribute cocaine.
875
The Ninth Circuit began its examination of the indictments under
Count I by emphasizing the Supreme Court's holding that a statement
of the elements of an offense under a conspiracy count does not require
as much detail as under a substantive count.8 76 The court adopted the
Fifth Circuit's position that an indictment for conspiracy to distribute
drugs requires only allegations of the existence of the conspiracy, the
time during which the conspiracy was operative, and the statute vio-
lated.877 The court concluded that, despite the absence of an allegation
of an overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, the indict-
capacity, and performance of official duties when assaulted was not defective for omitting
that ranger was enforcing congressional statute protecting game, wild birds, and animals)).
870. 647 F.2d at 962 (citing United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 363 (9th Cir. 1976)).
871. 647 F.2d at 962 (citing Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir,
1971)). The defendants in Kaneshiro were charged with violating a statute prohibiting an
unlicensed manufacturer or dealer from transporting any firearm in interstate or foreign
commerce. The indictment, however, failed to allege that the defendants were manufactur-
ers or dealers. The court held that the missing statutory elements could be implied because
the statute had been expressly cited, and the allegation that firearms were unlawfully trans-
ported suggested that the transaction was a business venture necessarily involving a dealer.
Id at 1269.
872. 650 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981).
873. Id at 1135.
874. Id at 1137. Count I of the indictments charged that, between July 12 and July 20,
1979, the defendants had conspired to possess cocaine with an intent to distribute in viola-
tion of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976). 650 F.2d at 1137.
875. 650 F.2d at 1138. Count II of the indictments charged that, on or about July 20,
1979, the defendants traveled from Los Angeles to Reno with an intent to distribute cocaine
(in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976)) and that, on the same day, they committed acts
facilitating that unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1976). 650 F.2d at
1138.
876. 650 F.2d at 1137 (citing Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 81 (1927)).
877. 650 F.2d at 1137 (citing United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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ments under Count I were sufficient.8 78
The Ninth Circuit then reviewed the essential elements of the of-
fense charged under Count II: (1) use of interstate commerce or an
interstate facility, (2) with intent to promote unlawful activity and (3) a
subsequent overt act in furtherance of that unlawful activity.8 79 The
court concluded that because the indictments contained all of the above
elements, they were sufficient under Count 11.880
In United States v. Dufur,"'I the defendant appealed his conviction
for the first-degree murder of a customs officer. He argued that the
indictment was fatally defective because it did not allege the time and
place of the victim's death with sufficient specificity to meet the
Supreme Court's requirements in Ball v. United States. 882 The Ball
Court reversed a murder conviction because the indictment failed to
allege the place of death with sufficient specificity. 8 3 It held that the
indictment must state the "particulars of time and place, that the ac-
cused may be enabled to prepare his defence and avail himself of his
acquittal or conviction against any further prosecution for the same
cause."88 4 After considering Ball, the Ninth Circuit found that the
Dufur indictment followed Form 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.885 The court concluded that the time and place of death
were stated with sufficient certainty to satisfy the requirements of
878. 650 F.2d at 1137. The defendants had relied on United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d
1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), where the court held a similar indictment to be
invalid. The Cecil court, however, had determined the indictment to be invalid because it
had failed to place the alleged conspiracies within any time frame. The Tavelman court
declared Cecil inapposite. 650 F.2d at 1137.
879. The Ninth Circuit established that these three elements were essential to charging a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1976) in United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 897 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975). The Third Circuit subsequently compared
these elements to those alleged in an indictment for the same charge. United States v.
Wander, 601 F.2d 1251 (3d Cir. 1979). The court concluded that the Wander indictment
was insufficient for failing to mention the occurence of an overt act committed in further-
ance of the unlawful activity. Id at 1258-59.
880. 650 F.2d at 1138.
881. 648 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1980).
882. 140 U.S. 118 (1891). The.Dufur indictment charged that "on or about May 24, 1979,
at Lynden, within the Western District of Washington, ARTIE RAY BAKER a/k/a
MICHAEL JOSEPH ARRINGTON with premeditation and by means of shooting, mur-
dered Kenneth Ward." 648 F.2d at 514.
883. 140 U.S. at 136. The Ball indictment charged that on June 26, 1889, in Pickens
County, in Chickasaw Nation, in the Indian Territory, the defendant assaulted the victim
with a loaded gun and inflicted mortal wounds by the discharge of its contents, "of which
mortal wounds the. . .[victim] did languish, and languishing died." Id at 121-22.
884. Id at 136.
885. 648 F.2d at 514.
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Ball 886
Similarly, in United States v. Davis,88 7 the defendant challenged
his conviction for involvement in a continuing criminal enterprise, ar-
guing that the indictment against him under this particular count was
fatally defective for failing to specify the property, which would be sub-
ject to forfeiture, that he had allegedly obtained from the criminal en-
terprise.8 18  The Ninth Circuit held, however, that because the
Government had advised the court and Davis before trial that no at-
tempt would be made to seek a forfeiture of any property upon convic-
tion, it was unnecessary to describe any specific interest in the
property.
889
In United States v. Thordarson, 89 the Government appealed from
the dismissal of an indictment charging the defendant union officials
with five counts of misusing union funds to destroy an employer's
trucks. The Government argued that the defendant had violated sec-
tion 501(c) of the Landrum-Griffith Act, which "prohibits a union of-
ficer or employee from converting union funds to his own use, or to the
use of another."8 91 The district court dismissed the indictment for a
failure to allege essential elements of a section 501(c) offense: (1) a
fraudulent intent to deprive the union of its funds and (2) either a lack
of union authorization or an absence of a good faith belief in benefit to
the union from the use of the funds.
892
886. Id Because there is no appreciable difference between the Dufur and Ball indict-
ments, it seems doubtful that the Dufur indictment actually does satisfy the requirements of
Ball However, the Ball Court seemed to base its decision on the question of jurisdiction
('The accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and jurisdiction should not be exercised when there is doubt as to the authority to
exercise it."). 140 U.S. at 136. Therefore, the better justification for the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Dufur is its statement that it may no longer be necessary to allege the place of death
in an indictment. After the Supreme Court had decided Ball, Congress declared jurisdiction
over a murder conviction in the district where the injury had been inflicted rather than
where death occurred. See 18 U.S.C. § 3236 (1976). Because the place of death no longer
determines jurisdiction, it may no longer be an essential element of the offense of murder.
The Dufur court found it unnecessary to decide this issue as it found the indictment "suffi-
ciently specific even if such averment is still required." 648 F.2d at 514 n.l. The District of
Columbia Circuit has, however, held that an indictment need not allege the place of death.
Bostic v. Rives, 107 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
887. 663 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1981).
888. Id at 833.
889. Id
890. 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1981).
891. Id at 1325; 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1976).
892. 646 F.2d at 1332. The indictment charged under counts six, nine, and ten that the
defendants "did embezzle, steal, and unlawfully and wilfully abstract and convert to their
own use and the use of another" the union's funds. Id at 1337.
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The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that fraudulent
intent is an essential element of a section 501(c) offense.8 93 However, it
held that the word "wilfully," appearing in three of the counts, was
sufficient to allege the requisite criminal intent when read in the context
of the entire statutory language of the indictment.894 The court further
held that although the language in the remaining two counts was less
complete, it adequately informed the defendants of the charges against
them.
895
The court implicitly acknowleged that the indictment did not al-
lege either a lack of union authorization or an absence of a good faith
belief in benefit to the union under any interpretation.896 However,
after a lengthy analysis of the cases construing section 501(c), it con-
cluded that while a lack of authorization or an absence of belief in
benefit might be important factors in determining fraudulent intent,
neither is an essential element of a section 501(c) offense that must be
included in an indictment. For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court's dismissal and reinstated the indictment.897
893. Id. at 1334 (citing United States v. Andreen, 628 F.2d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Marolda, 615 F.2d 867, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1980) (Larson, J., concurring);
United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 126-27 (2d Cir.), mod#Fed on other grounds 439
F.2d 1198 (1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971)). In these cases, both the
Ninth and Second Circuits interpreted section 501(c) as stating a "larceny-type" offense,
thereby leading the Thordarson court to conclude that a specific criminal intent to deprive
the union of its funds is required for a section 501(c) violation. 646 F.2d at 1336-37. The
court declined to follow United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 764 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1076 (1973), where the District of Columbia Circuit held that when union funds are
knowingly transferred for an unlawful use, the transfer constitutes aper se violation of sec-
tion 501(c). 646 F.2d at 1337 n.25. The Thordarson court stated that such a rule improperly
presumes the requisite criminal intent and converts a "larceny-type" statute into one which
criminalizes union expenditures for prohibited purposes. Id at 1333.
894. 646 F.2d at 1337. In United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 242 (1938),
the Supreme Court defined "wilfully" as meaning "with evil purpose, criminal intent or the
like" when used to describe offenses involving moral turpitude. Furthermore, the First and
Eighth Circuits have held that language like that used in counts six, nine, and ten is suffi-
cient to allege criminal intent under section 501(c). See, e.g., Colella v. United States, 360
F.2d 792, 798-99 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966); Doyle v. United States, 318
F.2d 419, 420-22 (8th Cir. 1963).
895. 646 F.2d at 1337. The court noted that the district court may have dismissed the
indictment not because it failed to allege fraudulent intent, but because the court doubted
that fraudulent intent could be proven at trial. The court stated that if this was the district
court's reasoning, it was in error. Id at 1337 n.25.
896. Id at 1337.
897. Id at 1331-37. The court agreed with Judge Larson's concurring opinion in United
States v. Marolda, 615 F.2d 867, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1980), that neither lack of authorization
nor an absence of belief in benefit to the union is an essential element of a section 501(c)
violation. It stated that because section 501(c) is a "larceny-type" statute, the only essential
elements are fraudulent intent and conversion. 646 F.2d at 1334-35.
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The Ninth Circuit's evaluation of allegedly defective indictments
appears to follow that of the Supreme Court.8 98 Rather than rigidly
requiring specific language in an indictment, the Ninth Circuit exam-
ines whether the indictment has served its basic purposes of apprising
the defendant of the charges against him and of protecting him from
double jeopardy. Although an indictment must state the essential ele-
ments of an offense, the district court is allowed some flexibility in de-
termining which elements are essential (Dufur, Davis, and Thordarson).
The ability of the court to assume the existence of facts not expressly
stated (Ellsworth and Tavelman), or to ascribe certain logical meanings
to those that are stated (Thordarson), ensures that essentially adequate
indictments will not be dismissed for purely technical reasons.
2. Jurisdiction unlawfully obtained
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine provides that an indictment or conviction
is valid even though the defendant may have been abducted into the
jurisdiction of the United States."99 The doctrine has been followed by
almost every circuit;9°° however, the Second Circuit created an excep-
tion to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in United States v. Toscanino. 901 Tos-
canino had been tortured and drugged in Brazil by American agents,
then kidnapped and returned to the United States. The Second Circuit
held that such an outrageous invasion of Toscanino's constitutional
rights necessitated dismissal of the indictment.90 2
The Ninth Circuit recently considered the application of the outra-
geous conduct exception in United States v. Fielding. 903 Fielding had
been kidnapped and tortured in Peru before being abducted to the
United States for prosecution under various drug related charges. He
alleged that United States agents had participated in his kidnapping
898. See supra note 864 and accompanying text.
899. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (no constitutional requirement that court per-
mit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial
against his will); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (forcible removal of Uniled States citi-
zen from foreign country for trial in state court not a violation of due process).
900. United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975);
United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States
v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975); Klink v. Looney, 262 F.2d 119 (10th Cir. 1958);
Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 US. 918 (1949);
Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), aft'd, 324 U.S. 282 (1944); Sheehan v.
Huff, 142 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 764 (1944); United States v. Marzano,
388 F. Supp. 906 (D.C. Ill. 1975); United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Mass. 1948).
901. 500 F.2d 267 (2d. Cir. 1974).
902. Id at 275-76.
903. 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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and torture, and that the outrageous conduct exception to the Ker-Fris-
bie doctrine therefore applied to his case.9° 4
The Ninth Circuit emphasized the limitations placed upon the out-
rageous conduct rule since Toscanino. For example, the Second Circuit
has held that the outrageous conduct exception does not apply when
the defendant's deprivation was no "greater than that which he would
have endured through lawful extradition," 905 or when there was no
proof that the United States had been involved in the actual arrest and
detention." 6 The Ninth Circuit has also held that the outrageous con-
duct exception does not apply unless the defendant "makes a strong
showing of grossly cruel and unusual barbarities inflicted upon him by
'persons who can be characterized as paid agents of the United
States." 907
After examining Fielding's evidence, the court concluded that
there was no proof that the United States had participated directly in
any part of the kidnapping and torture.908 While there was some evi-
dence that Fielding had advised embassy representatives of his treat-
ment, there was no proof that they had failed to help alleviate the
situation. The Ninth Circuit thus reaffirmed the rule that absent cogent
proof that the United States itself had engaged in the outrageous con-
duct, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine applied, and the indictment was held to
be valid.909
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Fielding reflects its reluctance to
start a new trend in the area of due process. However, as stated by the
court in Toscanino, 91o the concept of due process had already been ex-
904. Id at 723.
905. United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001 (1975). In Lujan, the defendant, a resident of Argentina, had been abducted from
Bolivia and transported to the United States. The Second Circuit held that because there
was no evidence that he had been subjected to torture or custodial interrogation, or that
either Argentina or Bolivia had protested his abduction, the outrageous conduct rule did not
apply. Id
906. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 70-71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
In Lira, the defendant had been tortured by Chilean police before being forcibly expelled
from Chile at the United States' request. The Second Circuit held that because there was no
showing that the United States itself had participated in the torture, the outrageous conduct
rule did not apply. Id at 71.
907. United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985
(1975). InLoato, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no Toscanino showing, even though
the defendant had been forcibly expelled from Mexico into the custody of waiting United
States officers. I.d
908. 645 F.2d at 723-24.
909. Id
910. 500 F.2d at 273.
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panded by the Supreme Court in Rochin v. Calfornia911 and Mapp v.
Ohio. 912 Neither of those cases involved an application of the Ker-Frs-
bie doctrine, but they did involve situations in which the Court invali-
dated convictions resting on evidence obtained from police brutality
(Rochin)913 and from an illegal search and seizure (Mapp). 
914
The Second Circuit has distinguished Toscanino and Rochin from
cases involving an absence of physical cruelty to the defendant.
915
However, whether or not physical cruelty has been inflicted upon the
defendant, an obvious similarity still exists between the illegal abduc-
tion of a defendant and evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure. The Supreme Court has stated that the exclusion-
ary rule serves a dual purpose: deterring the police from violating an
accused's constitutional rights9 16 and preserving judicial integrity.
917
Exercising jurisdiction over a defendant who has been kidnapped by
United States agents is plainly inconsistent with both of these purposes
and should be discouraged by the courts just as they discourage the use
of illegally obtained evidence.
911. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
912. 367 U.S. 642 (1961).
913. The Rochin Court set aside the defendant's conviction of drug offenses because of
the method used by the police to obtain incriminating evidence. 342 U.S. at 172-74. The
evidence, two morphine capsules, had been swallowed by the defendant to conceal it from
the police. The police took the defendant, handcuffed, to a hospital where they persuaded a
doctor to force emetic solution through a tube into his stomach. The defendant vomited the
capsules, and the police submitted them as evidence at his trial. Id at 166.
914. Although the exclusionary rule was originally invoked to bar illegally obtained evi-
dence from federal prosecutions, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Mapp
decision was the first to extend the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions. 367 U.S. at 654-
55.
915. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
916. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
917. Id at 222-23. The Elkins Court included in its discussion of "the imperative of
judicial integrity" a statement made by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928):
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means--to declare that the
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
Court should resolutely set its face.
Id at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Since Elkins, however, the Court has stressed police deterrence over the preservation of
judicial integrity as a justification for the exclusionary rule: "The primary justification for
the exclusionary rule ... is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amend-
ment rights." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). "While courts... must ever be
concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force
as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence." Id at 487.
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When defendants have been abducted and tortured by foreign
agents, the Second Circuit has reasoned that divesting United States
courts of jurisdiction would not deter misconduct by United States of-
ficers.918 This rationale, however, applies only when defendants have
been abducted solely on the initiative of foreign agents. 919 Conversely,
where requests to arrest and expel originate with the United States, the
refusal to exercise jurisdiction over defendants who have been mis-
treated by foreign agents might encourage United States officials to
pursue alternative means of securing such defendants. Furthermore,
even if such "requests" do not constitute "police misconduct," refusing
to exercise jurisdiction under these circumstances would serve to pro-
tect the integrity of the court.
Extradition alone protects against the abuses that recur in ob-
taining a defendant's presence from a foreign jurisdiction. When ab-
duction, rather than extradition, procures the defendant, and United
States agents act directly in the abduction or instigate an abduction by
foreign agents, existing concepts of due process should be extended to
require dismissal of the attending indictment.
3. Time limitations
An indictment must be filed within the time prescribed by the stat-
ute of limitations applicable to the particular offense charged. Such
statutes specify "a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presump-
tion that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced." 920 An
indictment is clearly invalid when filed after the expiration of the appli-
cable limitation period. However, questions may arise concerning the
interpretation of the applicable statute involved. In United States v.
Akmakjian, 92 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the statute of limitations
for income tax evasion to require the Government to obtain an indict-
ment within six years after the commission of the offense.9 22 However,
if a complaint is instituted before a commissioner of the United States
within six years, the time to obtain an indictment will be extended until
nine months after the date of the complaint's institution.923
In Akmakjian, the Government filed a complaint against the de-
fendant on April 15, 1975. The complaint charged the defendant with
918. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
919. See, e.g., United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985
(1975).
920. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971).
921. 647 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
922. Id at 13.
923. 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (1976).
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income tax evasion for the calendar year of 1968. For the purpose of
the statute of limitations, the court deemed the commission of the al-
leged offense to have occurred on April 15, 1969.924 On May 6, 1975,
the complaint was dismissed pursuant to the Government's motion that
the ends of public justice did not require prosecution.925
On January 12, 1976, Akmakjian was indicted for six tax offenses,
count three of which was the 1969 offense. Akmakjian moved to dis-
miss this count as barred by the statute of limitations.926 Before the
hearing on the motion, however, Akmakjian entered into a plea agree-
ment with the Government whereby he pleaded guilty to count three,
and the remaining counts were dismissed. Before accepting the guilty
plea, the district court determined that Akmakjian was expressly waiv-
ing the statute of limitations defense.927 Four years later, Akmakjian
moved to set aside the guilty plea count three on the ground that the
statute of limitations barred his indictment.
Because Akmakjian was indicted six years, eight months, and
twenty-seven days after his alleged tax evasion, the indictment against
him could be timely only if the filing of the Government's initial com-
plaint triggered the nine-month extension of the limitation period.928
The Ninth Circuit approached this issue by examining the Supreme
Court's opinion in Jaben v. United States. 929 The Jaben Court held
that only a complaint establishing probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed activates the nine-month extension of the
statute of limitations.930 The Court reasoned that the statutory purpose
of the nine-month extension provision:
is to afford the Government an opportunity to indict criminal
tax offenders in the event that a grand jury is not in session at
the end of the normal limitation period . . . . Clearly the
statute was not meant to grant the Government greater time
in which to make its case (a result which could have been
accomplished simply by making the normal period of limita-
tion six years and nine months) ....
The Court concluded that a complaint that states only the essential
924. 647 F.2d at 13 n.2.




929. 381 U.S. 214 (1965).
930. Id at 220.
931. Id at 219.
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facts constituting the offense,932 but does not establish probable cause,
is insufficient to trigger the nine-month extension of the limitation
period.933
The Akmakjian court therefore held that a complaint dismissed
before the indictment is returned fails to satisfy the probable cause re-
quirement that activates the nine-month extension.934 However,
because Akmakjian had expressly waived the statute of limitation de-
fense, the court affirmed his conviction despite the untimely
indictment.
935
Questions involving the interpretation of statutes of limitations are
not the only problems arising from imposing time limitations upon an
indictment. The Supreme Court has held it necessary to dismiss an
indictment where delay in its filing although within the statute of limi-
tations, has "caused substantial prejudice to [the defendant's] rights to
a fair trial ' 936 and "was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage
over the accused. ' 937 Therefore, a court must not only determine
whether a defendant has suffered actual prejudice, but must also deter-
mine the reasons for the pre-indictment delay.938
The Ninth Circuit has not followed the Court's requirement that
the delay be intentional and improper.939 Instead, it has enumerated
three factors to be balanced in evaluating a delayed indictment: (1) the
actual prejudice caused to the defendant; (2) the length of the delay;
and (3) the reasons for the delay.940 The Ninth Circuit has held, how-
932. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 defines a complaint as simply "a written statement of the essen-
tial facts constituting the offense charged."
933. 381 U.S. at 220.
934. 647 F.2d at 14.
935. Id. (citing Biddinger v. Commissioner, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917)).
936. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (emphasis added).
937. The Marion defendants argued that their indictment should be dismissed because of
a three year pre-indictment delay that was "bound to be" prejudicial to their defense. Id at
313. The Court refused to dismiss the indictment, however, because the defendants had not
asserted any specftc prejudice. Id at 325.
938. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977). The Lovasco defendants argued
that the indictment should be dismissed because an eighteen month pre-indictment delay
had caused them to lose the testimony of a material witness. The Government argued that
the delay had been necessary to discover other participants in the crime. The Court ac-
knowledged that the defendants had established the existence of actual prejudice, but never-
theless refused to dismiss the indictment because it found the Government's reasons for the
delay to be valid. The Court specifically stated that prosecutors are under no duty to file
charges as soon as probable cause exists if they are not also satisfied that their investigations
are complete, or if they are unable to establish a suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id at 790-96.
939. United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1977).
940. Id at 677-78. The Mays defendants established that three material witnesses had
1982]
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ever, that without proof of actual prejudice, it is unnecessary to con-
sider the length of or reasons for the delay.941 The Ninth Circuit has
recently considered cases in which pre-indictment delay has allegedly
prejudiced the defense.
In United States v. Cederquis, 942 the Government appealed the
dismissal of an indictment charging the defendants with using the mails
to defraud certain banks through a check kiting scheme. The Govern-
ment did not obtain the indictment until almost five years after it had
been alerted to the possible existence of the defendants' scheme.943 The
district court agreed with defendants that the pre-indictment delay had
prejudiced their defense of lack of fraudulent intent.944 Any evidence
showing that the defendants had reasonably expected that deposits
would cover the banks' checks when they were presented for payment
would have negated the element of fraudulent intent,945 and the de-
fendants argued that this evidence had once existed in documents per-
taining to loans being processed during the operation of the check
kiting scheme.946 These documents, however, were allegedly lost dur-
ing the four year delay. The defendants therefore contended that they
were no longer able to prove their defense.947
The Ninth Circuit stated that the dispositive issue was not whether
the pre-indictment delay had resulted in the loss of certain documents,
"but whether the delay had actually impaired [the defendants'] ability
died and the memories of other witnesses had dimmed during a four and one-half year pre-
indictment delay. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's dismissal of the
indictment because the defendants had neither proved exactly what evidence their witnesses
would have provided, nor how the loss of this evidence would have prejudiced them. Id at
679-80.
941. United States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1979). The West defendant as-
serted that pre-indictment delay had caused him to lose certain witnesses necessary to his
defense. The court held that this assertion was insufficient to establish actual prejudice be-
cause the defendant could only speculate about the testimony of these witnesses. Further-
more, the court found that the testimony would have been irrelevant. Id
942. 641 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1981).
943. Id at 1350. The check kiting scheme allegedly began in October 1973 and contin-
ued until April 16, 1974. On March 21, 1974, the First National Bank of Arizona informed
the United States attorney's office of a possible check kiting scheme operated by the defend-
ants. Grand jury subpoenas for records of the defendants' inancial activities were issued to
several lending institutions, and to the defendants in September 1975, November 1977, and
December 1977. On December 27 and 28, 1978, testimony was presented to the grand ju.y,
and an indictment was returned on December 28, 1978. Id
944. Id at 1351.
945. See Williams v. United States, 278 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1960).
946. 641 F.2d at 1351.
947. Id
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meaningfully to defend [themselves]."94 It observed that substitute ev-
idence existed, for example, memoranda written by bank employees or
the possible testimony of bank representatives who had been at meet-
ings where the defendants' overdrafts and pending loans had been dis-
cussed.949 The court concluded that although the missing documents
might have been the best proof of the asserted defense, their loss was
insufficient to establish the actual prejudice necessary to invalidate the
indictment.
950
In United States v. Mills,951 the Government appealed the dismis-
sal of an indictment charging the defendants with killing a fellow in-
mate at a federal corrections institution. The Government did not
obtain the indictment until seven months after the murder.952 The de-
fendants claimed that because of this delay, they had lost various wit-
nesses, and certain physical evidence had deteriorated.953 The district
court agreed that the defendants had suffered irreparable prejudice.954
The Ninth Circuit first noted that in order for the defendants to
prove that the loss of witnesses had prejudiced their defense, they must
identify the witnesses, relate the efforts made to locate them, and ex-
plain the substance of their testimony.955 It further stated that this
proof must be definite, not speculative.956 The court concluded that the
defendants' assertions concerning the loss of witnesses were speculative
and, therefore, the loss did not constitute actual prejudice.
957
948. Id (quoting United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 436
U.S. 911 (1978)).
949. 641 F.2d at 1351-52.
950. Id at 1352-54.
951. 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981).
952. Id at 787. The murder occurred on August 22, 1979, but the defendants were not
indicted until March 27, 1980.
953. Id The defendants specifically asserted that they had been unable to locate wit-
nesses who had been known only by prison nicknames, and had since been transferred to
other facilities or released, and that the memories of witnesses who allegedly could have
supported their alibis or who "might" have had some useful information had dimmed. They
further contended that documents which might have been useful had been routinely dis-
carded or lost by the Government, that blood stains on the defendants' clothes could no
longer be typed to prove their origin, and that wounds and finger impressions on the defend-
ants' arms were no longer present. Id at 788-89.
954. Id at 787.
955. Id at 788 (citing United States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1980)).
956. 641 F.2d at 788 (citing United States v. Swacker, 628 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1980)).
957. 641 F.2d at 789 (citing United States v. Rogers, 639 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 679-
80 (9th Cir. 1977)). The court determined that the defendants' assertions were speculative
because: (1) there was no proof that the prison nicknames of the alleged witnesses had been
recorded or that the actual identities of the witnesses were ascertainable; (2) there was no
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The court next examined the defendants' contentions regarding
the loss of physical evidence and observed that this evidence could
have been lost even if the Government had indicted the defendants one
month after the murder.958  It concluded, therefore, that the loss was
not related to the pre-indictment delay and did not cause actual
prejudice;95 9 thus, the court reinstated the indictment.960
The Ninth Circuit's decisions concerning time limitations on ob-
taining indictments demonstrate that it is willing to dismiss those not
obtained within the period of the applicable statute of limitations
(kmakjian). The Ninth Circuit is justifiably reluctant, however, to
dismiss indictments that have been filed within the statutory period but
are alleged to have been delayed to the defendant's detriment. The
court stringently requires that defendants establish actual prejudice,
with proof of the loss of specfc evidence (Mills) which has deprived
them of any ability to present a defense (Cederquist) and is a direct
result of the delay (Mills), thus assuring that indictments will not be
dismissed solely on the basis of allegations that are more likely to be
self-serving than legitimate.
4. Competence and legality of evidence
The Supreme Court has held that an indictment is sufficient to
initiate trial if it is valid on its face.9 6 1 An indictment cannot, therefore,
be attacked on the ground that evidence before the grand jury was in-
evidence regarding the content of the witnesses' testimony except the defendants' self-serv-
ing affidavits; and (3) there was no actual proof of the prospective witnesses' memory im-
pairment. 641 F.2d at 789.
958. 641 F.2d at 789. The court noted that there was no evidence concerning the deterio-
ration rate of blood stains, when the defendants' wounds had healed, or when the documents
had been destroyed or lost. 1d
959. Id (citing United States v. Walker, 601 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1979)). The
Walker defendants had been indicted for the arson of a prison dormitory. They argued that
because of pre-indictment delay, the dormitory had been rebuilt and evidence concerning
the origin of the fire had been lost. The court noted that, due to an inmate housing crisis,
construction of the new dormitory had begun within a few days after the fire. It concluded,
therefore, that there was no way the indictment could have been obtained before the dormi-
tory was rebuilt. Thus, the loss of evidence was not related to the pre-indictment delay and
did not constitute actual prejudice. Id at 1057.
960. 641 F.2d at 789. The court stated that because the defendants had failed to establish
actual prejudice, it was unnecessary to consider the length of, or the reason for, the delay.
Nevertheless, it noted that an eight month delay is not inordinate compared to the thirteen
month delay in Walker, supra note 959, and the four and one-half year delay in Mays, supra
note 939, and considering that here there was no evidence of intentional or reckless govern-
mental delay. 641 F.2d at 789 n.2.
961. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
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competent or inadequate96 2 or obtained in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights.96 3 The Ninth Circuit has recently considered
cases in which indictments have been attacked on all of these grounds,
and it has relied heavily on Supreme Court opinions to support its
decisions.
In United States v. Seifert,96" the defendants challenged their in-
dictment, alleging that it was based exclusively on the misleading and
inaccurate hearsay testimony of an FBI agent.965 The defendants also
alleged that the Government had failed to present certain favorable
evidence to the grand jury that would have revealed that the prosecu-
tion's witness had made prior inconsistent statements and had been
previously convicted of a drug offense.966
The Ninth Circuit upheld the indictment, stating that the Govern-
ment was neither required to present exculpatory evidence,967 nor was
962. Id The Costello Court upheld an indictment charging the defendant with income
tax evasion that was based exclusively on hearsay evidence from three investigating officers.
The Court stated:
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was
inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay
would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the
merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine
the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not
required by the Fifth Amendment. An indictment returned by a legally constituted
and unbiased grand jury ... is enough to call for trial of the charges on the merits.
Id at 363-64.
963. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.
339, 350 (1958). In Calandra, the Court considered whether a witness before a grand jury
could refuse to answer questions on the ground that they were derived from evidence ob-
tained from an unlawful search and seizure. The Court weighed the potential damage to the
role and function of the grand jury against the potential benefits of applying the exclusion-
ary rule to grand jury proceedings. It concluded that the application of the rule to grand
jury proceedings would achieve little towards furthering the rule's goal of deterring police
misconduct. Thus, any "benefit" would be far outweighed by the delay and disruption
caused by suppression hearings and litigation of issues previously reserved for trial on the
merits. The Court, therefore, decided against the witness. 414 U.S. at 349-51, 355.
In Lawn, the Court considered whether the defendants were entitled to a hearing to
determine whether the grand jury had based its indictment on evidence obtained in violation
of the defendants' fifth amendment rights. The Court held that they were not entitled to a
hearing, primarily because the facts did not indicate that the grand jury had used such evi-
dence. However, it indicated that even if the grand jury had used such evidence, the indict-
ment still would have been upheld. 355 U.S. at 349-50.
964. 648 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980).
965. ld at 564.
966. Id
967. Id (citing United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1335-38 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978)). The Kennedy defendant had been convicted of a scheme to
illegally obtain money from a federally insured bank to purchase an insurance business.
The court upheld the indictment even though the prosecutor had not presented to the grand
jury evidence, e.g., affidavits from the other participants and the defendant's polygraph,
19821
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it required to present evidence relating to the credibility of the prosecu-
tion's witness.96 It further stated that an indictment may be based
solely on hearsay evidence,969 even when percipient witnesses could
have been produced,9 70 and that the inaccuracies in the agent's testi-
mony were not sufficiently flagrant to dismiss an otherwise valid
indictment.
97'
In United States v. Trass, 972 the Government appealed from a sec-
ond dismissal of an indictment based on an FBI agent's hearsay testi-
mony. The Government had informed the grand jury that the agent's
testimony was hearsay, and that the witnesses would be produced if the
grand jury wished to hear them.973 The Government had also dis-
closed the witnesses' prior arrest records and that the witnesses had
been told that they might not be prosecuted for their dealings with the
defendants if they testified.974 The Assistant United States Attorney
stated that although he had not personally made promises to the wit-
nesses, had he been asked, he probably would have offered immunity
from pr.osecution.975
Nonetheless, the district court dismissed the indictment because
the Government had not made the witnesses immediately available,
and the proceedings would have been delayed if the grand jury had
decided to call them.976 The court also criticized the Government for
not having made an even more complete statement of the prosecutor's
which the defendant regarded as exculpatory. The court stated that "only in a flagrant case,
and perhaps only where knowing perjury, relating to a material matter, has been presented
to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss an otherwise valid indictment. . . ." id at
1338.
968. 648 F.2d at 564 (citing United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Y. Hata and Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976)). The Lasky court upheld an indict-
ment despite the prosecutor's failure to inform the grand jury that a complaint against the
defendant containing the same allegations had been dismissed for lack of evidence. 600
F.2d at 768. The court in Y Hata upheld an indictment although the prosecutor had not
provided the grand jury with all of the evidence tending to exculpate the defendant. 535
F.2d at 512.
969. 648 F.2d at 564 (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956)).
970. 648 F.2d at 564 (citing United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1974)).
971. 648 F.2d at 564 (citing United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978)).
972. 644 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1981).
973. Id at 794.
974. Id
975. Id The Government had taken care to disclose this information to the grand jury
because the district court had already dismissed an identical indictment for the Govern-
ment's failure to make these disclosures. Id at 792-93.
976. Id at 794.
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agreement with the witnesses.977
The Ninth Circuit held that the manner in which the evidence had
been presented to the grand jury did not require dismissal of the indict-
ment.97 8 It stated that the Government's failure to have witnesses im-
mediately available did not justify dismissal because even exclusive
reliance on hearsay evidence does not invalidate indictments.979 The
court further stated that the incomplete explanation of the prosecutor's
agreement with the witnesses also did not warrant dismissal because
the Government is neither required to present all available exculpatory
evidence, nor is it required to present all evidence respecting the credi-
bility of potential witnesses.9 0 The Ninth Circuit reinstated the indict-
ment,981 concluding that under controlling precedent it should not have
been dismissed for inadequate or incompetent evidence.
982
In United States v. Kenny,983 one defendant challenged his indict-
ment, arguing that the Government had deliberately destroyed certain
records that might have exculpated him.9 8 4 Another defendant argued
that a valid indictment could not have been returned because the prose-
977. Id
978. Id at 796.
979. Id
980. Id at 796-97. In Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1968), the court
upheld an indictment even though the Government had not informed the grand jury that
one of its witnesses had a criminal record and was under indictment in several other cases,
that a second witness had been charged with embezzlement, and that a third witness had
been enjoined from dealing in securities. Id at 339.
981. 644 F.2d at 795 (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956); United
States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977)). The
Chanen court held that hearsay testimony was sufficient to support an indictment. It ex-
plained that "given the constitutionally-based independence of the... court, prosecutor
and grand jury," a court should not encroach upon the manner in which the prosecutor
presents a case to the grand jury "unless there is a clear basis in fact and law for doing so."
Any other rule "could readily prove subversive to the doctrine of separation of powers." 549
F.2d at 1313.
982. 644 F.2d at 795. In United States v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981), the defend-
ant challenged his murder indictment, arguing that the Government had implicitly assured
the credibility of one of its witnesses by having him testify in two cases before the same
grand jury. The Ninth Circuit found the indictment valid, thereby reaffirming the principle
that indictments cannot be challenged for incompetent or inadequate evidence. Id at 406
(citing United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 871, 880 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979)).
983. 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981).
984. Id at 1347. This defendant had been indicted for engaging in fraudulent govern-
ment contracting activities. The Government alleged that no "deliverable" had ever been
produced under certain of the fraudulent contracts which the defendant had supervised dur-
ing his employment with the Navy. The defendant, however, argued that when he retired
from the Navy, he had left certain records and deliverables in a secure area, and that these
records and deliverables had been intentionally destroyed by Government agents at a time
when the defendant was a known target of the investigation, Id
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cutor had failed to instruct the grand jury on the applicable law, and
some of the evidence presented to the grand jury had been obtained in
violation of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments.98
The Ninth Circuit upheld both indictments. 8 6 The court deter-
mined that the first defendant's contention regarding the destruction of
exculpatory records was factually incorrect. Thus, the court did not
address whether dismissal of the indictment would have been required
if the Government had deliberately destroyed such evidence.
987
The other defendant's contention regarding the insufficient jury in-
struction was rejected because an indictment need only be prepared by
a prosecutor whose presumed familiarity with the "applicable law" is
sufficient to acquaint the grand jury with a case's legal aspects.9 8 The
court stated that it could find no constitutional requirement that grand
jurors receive instructions on the applicable law.989 It expressed con-
cern that to require such instructions would result in protracted review
of their adequacy and correctness, both by the trial court during mo-
tions for dismissal, and later by the appellate court.990 Finally, the
court concluded that even if the defendant could prove a violation of
his constitutional rights, this would not require the dismissal of an
otherwise valid indictment. 99'
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to dismiss indictments challenged for
incompetent or illegal evidence demonstrates its adherence to the
Supreme Court's holding that an indictment need only be valid on its
face.992 Ninth Circuit decisions recognize that rigid rules upon the con-
duct of the grand jury would greatly limit its ability to ferret out and
985. Id at 1338-39, 1347. Before this defendant had been indicted, the prosecutor ar-
ranged with the FBI to record a telephone conversation between an informant and the de-
fendant. The defendant answered the informant's call, then returned the call after entering
a telephone booth for "more privacy." From the booth he made a number of damaging
admissions which were recorded by the informant. This recording was subsequently played
before the grand jury. Id at 1337-38.
986. Id at 1347.
987. Id The court noted that the record showed that: (1) any destruction of the defend-
ant's records had been part of the normal housekeeping functions of the Navy; (2) the de-
struction had been unrelated to and had occurred long before the defendant became a target
of the criminal investigation; and (3) because there was no record of what had been de-
stroyed, there was no assurance that any exculpatory materials had been destroyed. Id
988. Id (citing United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1977)).
989. 645 F.2d at 1347 (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); United States
v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978)).
990. 645 F.2d at 1347.
991. Id at 1338 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)).
992. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956).
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charge wrongdoers, and that permitting challenges to an indictment for
imperfections in the presentation of evidence would greatly delay and
frustrate the prosecutorial process.993 These considerations, when bal-
anced against the accused's opportunity to test the Government's evi-
dence during trial, have caused most courts to refuse to scrutinize
grand jury proceedings for the use of incomplete or illegal evidence.
994
The refusal of the courts to establish a rule which would delay the
indictment process might be justifiable only when incompetent or inad-
equate evidence is at issue. However, when evidence has been illegally
obtained, the efficiency of grand jury proceedings must be balanced not
only against the accused's opportunity to exonerate himself later during
trial, but also against the need to protect an individual's constitutional
rights.
The Supreme Court has reasoned that the exclusionary rule should
not be applied to grand jury proceedings because this extension would
not significantly deter police misconduct.995 In fact, the Court has
stated:
Such an extension would deter only police investigation con-
sciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for
use in a grand jury investigation. The incentive to disregard
the requirement of the Fourth Amendment solely to obtain an
indictment from a grand jury is substantially negated by the
993. United States v. Trass, 644 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1981).
994. United States v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082, 1089 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853
(1979); United States v. Siegel, 587 F.2d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Barone,
584 F.2d 118, 122-25 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); United States v.
Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 518-19 (3d Cir. 1978), affid, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); United States v.
Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 865 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1161-
62 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Akin, 464 F.2d 7, 8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 981
(1972). The Second Circuit, however, has indicated that it would consider dismissing an
ihdictment based on hearsay if- (1) non-hearsay evidence was readily available; (2) the
grand jury was misled into believing that it was hearing direct, rather than hearsay, testi-
mony; or (3) it is doubtful that the grand jury would have indicted had it heard eyewitness
testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1134-37 (2d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725,
730-31 (2d Cir. 1966).
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor must inform a
grand jury of any evidence that might exculpate the defendant. Johnson v. Superior Court,
15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975) (peremptory writ of prohibition issued
because prosecutor failed to inform grand jury that defendant's testimony at preliminary
hearing resulted in dismissal of complaint). This decision more closely resembles the stan-
dards imposed by the American Bar Association than do federal court decisions. See STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-3.6(b) (1980) (requiring disclosure of
exculpatory evidence to grand jury).
995. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974).
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inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. . .. For the most part, a prosecutor
would be unlikely to request an indictment where a convic-
tion could not be obtained. We therefore decline to embrace
a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly
minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct at the
expense of substantially impeding the role of the grand
jury.
9 9 6
The Supreme Court's statement reveals a certain inconsistency in
that if a prosecutor is unlikely to request an indictment when a convic-
tion could not be obtained, then the number of cases where the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule would even have to be considered is
relatively small. Extending the rule to grand jury proceedings would
not, therefore, substantially impede the functioning of most grand ju-
ries, but would preserve the integrity of the courts by requiring them to
reject indictments supported by tainted evidence.997 Thus, a strong ar-
gument exists for establishing a rule requiring dismissal of indictments
that are based on illegally obtained evidence.
5. Amendments
There are two types of indictment amendments. The first is an
"actual" amendment, and occurs when the prosecutor or court alters
the indictment's charging terms, either literally or through jury instruc-
tions.998 The second type is a "variance" or "constructive" amend-
ment, and occurs when the indictment's charging terms remain
unaltered but the evidence at trial proves facts different from those al-
leged in the indictment. 999 Both types are considered harmless error if
they (1) arise from simple clerical mistakes or textual redundancy, and
(2) do not impair the defendant's notice of the charges or right against
double jeopardy.' w° However, if either type substantially alters or
broadens the essential elements of the offense, it is considered per se
996. Id at 351-52.
997. For a discussion ofjudicial integrity in relation to the exclusionary rule, see Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1959).
998. See, e.g., Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
999. See, e.g., United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 501 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 931 (1979); Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
1000. See, e.g., United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 500-01 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 931 (1979); United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 832 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 744 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 832 (1974); Stewart v. United States, 395 F.2d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1968).
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reversible error.'00 The Ninth Circuit has recently considered cases in
which arguments to reverse convictions have been based upon indict-
ment amendments.
In United States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratory, Inc. ,1002 the indict-
ment charged the defendants with offering remuneration as an induce-
ment for the referral of patients to their laboratory. Their convictions,
however, were based upon evidence of referrals for laboratory
work."' °3 Thus, the indictment had been constructively amended from
charging an offense under 42 U.S.C. section 1396h(b)(2)(A)' ° to
charging an offense under 42 U.S.C. section 1396h(b)(2)(B).
00 5
The Ninth Circuit held that such an amendment, or variance, was
fatal to the defendants' convictions." 6 The court observed that the
variance did not arise from a clerical error or surplusage in the indict-
ment's text;1007 nor could the reference to "patients" in the indictment
be interpreted to include "parts and substances" removed from pa-
tients.100 8 It further determined that Congress, by dividing section
1396h(b)(2) into two subsections, had obviously intended to proscribe
1001. See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-19 (1960); United States v. Bee-
ler, 587 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1978); Edgerton v. United States, 143 F.2d 697, 698 (9th Cir.
1944).
1002. 652 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981).
1003. Id. at 805.
1004. 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979) proscribes offering or paying any remu-
neration to any person to induce that person to "refer an individual to a person" for furnish-
ing services.
1005. 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1979) proscribes offering or paying any remu-
neration to any person to induce that person to "purchase, lease or order. . . any good,
facility, service, or item."
1006. 652 F.2d at 807.
1007. Id (citing United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 500-01 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 931 (1979); United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 832 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 953 (1978)). In Lyman, the indictment charged the defendants with conspiracy.
They moved to reverse their convictions because twenty out of the twenty-four overt acts
alleged in the original indictment had been deleted before the trial; and certain of the facts
alleged in the indictment had not been proved at trial. The court held that these amend-
ments were not fatal to the convictions because they neither altered nor broadened the of-
fense charged, and because the facts that were not proven at trial were not essential elements
of the charged offense. 592 F.2d at 500-01.
InAbascal, the indictment charged the defendants with conspiracy to import, distribute,
and possess with an intent to distribute LSD. At trial, the defendants moved for acquittal
because the Government failed to present any evidence of LSD importation. The trial court,
however, denied the motion and simply deleted the word "import" from the indictment.
The court of appeals upheld the indictment, stating that because the Government was not
required to prove all three elements of the conspiracy, the term "import" was surplusage.
564 F.2d at 832.
1008. 652 F.2d at 806.
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two entirely different types of behavior.'009 The court concluded that
the variance between the facts alleged in the indictment and the evi-
dence produced at trial resulted in the defendants' conviction for a
crime completely different from the one charged in the indictment.
This constituted reversible errorper se. 1010
In United States v. Fekri,0 11 the defendants were convicted of of-
fering physicians discounted laboratory services in exchange for refer-
rals of Medi-Cal laboratory work. As in Stewart, the indictment
charged them with violating 42 U.S.C. section 1396h(b)(2)(A) rather
than 42 U.S.C. section 1396h(b)(2)(B), but, unlike Stewart, the indict-
ment correctly charged them with attempting to induce referrals of
"work" rather than "patients."10 1 2 The Ninth Circuit held that because
the error was merely one of citation10 13 and the defendants were not
prejudiced, the variance did not require a reversal of the
convictions.1
0 1 4
1009. Id at 806-07.
1010. Id at 807 (citing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-19 (1960); United States
v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1978)). In Stirone, the indictment alleged that the
defendant had interfered with interstate commerce by extortion. The only interstate com-
merce mentioned in the indictment was the importation of sand into Pennsylvania to build
a steel plant. The defendant moved to reverse his conviction because the evidence at trial
showed an additional interference with the exportation of steel to be manufactured in the
new plant. The Court held that such a variance was fatal to the defendant's conviction,
because the conviction was based on proof of his interference with the exportation of steel,
thereby depriving the defendant of his right to be tried only on the charges presented in the
indictment. 361 U.S. at 217.
The Beeler indictment charged the defendant with extortion, alleging that he had re-
ceived certain payments from January 1973 to November 1975. The defendant moved to
reverse his conviction because the evidence at trial showed that he had accepted an even
larger payment in July, 1972. The Sixth Circuit held that this variance was fatal to the
conviction because it created a "substantial likelihood" that the defendant was convicted of
an offense other than the one charged in the indictment. 587 F.2d at 342.
In addition to its reliance on Sirone and Beeler, the Ninth Circuit noted the resem-
blance between Stewart and United States v. Prejean, 494 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1974). 652 F.2d
at 807 n.2. In Prejean, the court held an indictment invalid because the Government had
proven a violation of Texas Penal Code article 1391, instead of article 1389 as alleged in the
indictment. 494 F.2d at 498.
1011. 650 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1981).
1012. Id at 1046.
1013. Id (citing Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 389 (1897); FED. R. CRIM. P.
7(c)(3)). Rule 7(c)(3) provides that "[e]rror in the citation or its omission shall not be ground
for dismissal of the indictment. . . if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to
his prejudice."
1014. 650 F.2d at 1046. The defendants in Fekri had not objected on appeal to the vari-
ance between the indictment and the proof offered at trial. The Ninth Circuit apparently
raised the issue because of its similarity to the one in Stewart, and the consequent need to
distinguish it.
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The Ninth Circuit's decisions regarding indictment amendments
reflect its concern with furthering the twin purposes of an indictment:
notifying the defendant of the charges and protecting the defendant
against double jeopardy. The courts are careful to protect a defend-
ant's rights by assuming that any alteration of the essential elements of
an offense is prejudicial per se. However, the courts recognize that
when the text of an indictment is substantially correct, a simple error in
citation without proof of prejudice does not violate a defendant's rights.
The Ninth Circuit's position protects a defendant's rights without per-
mitting the reversal of convictions for insignificant technical errors.
6. Dismissal for selective prosecution
Dismissal of an indictment may be sought on the ground of selec-
tive prosecution where charges were filed in response to a defendant's
exercise of his or her constitutional rights.10 15 The subject of selective
prosecution was recently addressed by the Ninth Circuit in two
decisions.
In United States v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., Inc. ,1016 the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered the method of proof applicable to selective prosecution
claims. Defendant Sears was indicted for making false statements and
furnishing false invoices to the United States Customs Service in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. section 542.1017 Sears moved to dismiss the indict-
ment, arguing that because it interfered with the right to engage freely
in business and foreign commerce, the indictment constituted selective
prosecution.1018 The district court denied the motion, and Sears filed
an interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Circuit. 1019
Noting that a claim of selective or discriminatory prosecution can
be the proper subject of an interlocutory appeal,10 20 the Ninth Circuit
1015. United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1981).
1016. 647 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1981).
1017. Id at 902.
1018. Id at 904-05.
1019. Id at 903. An interlocutory appeal is an appeal which is not completely determina-
tive of a controversy, but is necessary for a suitable adjudication on the merits of that con-
troversy. The Sears court stated:
InAbney [Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977)], the Supreme Court estab-
lished a three-part test to determine whether an interlocutory appeal should be
allowed. An order before final judgment may be appealed if. (1) it completely
disposes of the issue in question; (2) it is totally unrelated to the merits of the case;
and (3) the right asserted would be irreparably lost if the appeal were delayed until
after final judgment.
Id (quoting United States v. Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d 766, 768 (9th Cir. 1981)).
1020. 647 F.2d at 904. In United States v. Abney, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), the United States
Supreme Court held that a double jeopardy ruling is subject to interlocutory appeal under
1982]
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set forth the test to be applied to such claims:
The law in this Circuit places the burden squarely upon the
defendants to prove in a selective prosecution: 1. That others
are generally not prosecuted for the same conduct; 2. [That]
[the] decision to prosecute this defendant was based on imper-
missible grounds such as race, religion or the exercise of con-
stitutional rights.' 2 '
The court concluded that Sears had failed to prove or even allege
that the Government's decision to prosecute was based on impermissi-
ble grounds. 0 22 Sears could not claim that it had been prosecuted be-
cause of its race or religion, 0 23 and Sears did not assert that the
decision to prosecute was in response to its exercise of a constitutional
right. 10 24 In regard to Sears' assertions that the prosecution interfered
with its right to engage freely in business and foreign commerce, the
court held that these were not adequate to support a claim of selective
prosecution. 1
025
In United States v. Ness, 1026 the Ninth Circuit rejected the defend-
the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. Id at 662. In United States v.
Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit extended the Abney exception to
orders denying motions alleging vindictive prosecution. The court in United States v. Wil-
son, 639 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1981), extended the exception again to cases of selective prosecu-
tion. The Wilson court noted that there is little substantive difference between selective and
vindictive prosecution, and that the interests involved in both types are the same: "the de-
fendant seeks protection from criminal prosecution initiated punitively, in response to the
exercise of his constitutional rights." 639 F.2d at 502.
1021. 647 F.2d at 904 (citing United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1981)).
1022. 647 F.2d at 904.
1023. Id The court cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448 (1962). The Oyler petitioners were serving life sentences under West Virginia's
habitual criminal statute which requires a mandatory life sentence upon the third conviction
"of a crime punishable by confinement in a penitentiary." Id at 449. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which denied the
petitioners' writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners had alleged in the writ that the Act had
been applied to only a minority of those subject to its provisions, thereby denying them
equal protection. The Court stated: "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforce-
ment is not in itself a federal constitutional violation," and continued: "it was not stated that
the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or
other arbitrary classification. Therefore, grounds supporting a finding of a denial of equal
protection were not alleged." Id at 456.
1024. 647 F.2d at 904. See supra text accompanying note 1015.
1025. Id at 904-05. In United States v. Choate, 619 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1980), the defendant
claimed he was prosecuted because he was suspected of another offense which Government
attorneys felt they could not prove at the time. The Choate court held that because the
defendant's appeal did not present a claim that his prosecution was based on his exercise of
a first amendment right or his race or religion, there was no discriminatory prosecution and
no denial of equal protection of the law. Id at 23-24.
1026. 652 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1981).
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ant's claim of selective prosecution and affirmed his conviction for
willfully filing a false W-4 form in violation of 26 U.S.C. section
7205.1°27 At a pretrial hearing defendant Ness attempted to make a
prima facie showing that he was a victim of selective prosecution.
10 28
He argued on appeal that he was improperly denied the discovery and
hearing necessary to prove his selective prosecution claim and that
therefore his case should have been remanded for an evidentiary hear-
ing on that issue. 0 29
The Ninth Circuit restated the two-part test that a defendant must
meet to succeed on a claim of selective prosecution. 0 30 It then held
that Ness had failed to make an adequate prima facie showing on
either part of the test.10 3' Ness did not establish that similarly situated
1027. Id at 891-93. Ness fied an exempt W-4 form, falsely claiming that he had no in-
come tax liability during the previous year and expected none for the year in which he filed
the form. Id at 891. Ness also renewed his claim for exemption from withholding even after
the Internal Revenue Service notified him that he was ineligible, and that he could be crimi-
nally prosecuted for falsifying his W-4. Id
1028. Id at 892.
1029. Id See United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1974), in which defendant
Oaks contended that he was selected for prosecution solely because he protested publicly
against federal tax policies. Id at 1404. The court stated that the district court should allow
a defendant to present evidence that he or she has been singled out for discriminatory prose-
cution upon a proper offer of proof. It held that Oaks had alleged facts sufficient to require
such a hearing and remanded the cause for a hearing on discriminatory prosecution. Id at
1405.
1030. 652 F.2d at 892. "[A] defendant has the burden of establishing that others similiarly
situated have not been prosecuted and that the allegedly discriminatory prosecution of the
defendant was based on an impermissible motive." Id (citing United States v. Wilson, 639
F.2d 500, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1981)).
The court noted that if a defendant seeking to prove a claim of selective prosecution
fails to carry this burden such a claim might be used by the defendant to obtain information
to which he or she would not be entitled under normal discovery provisions. 652 F.2d at
892. See United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211-12 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally United States v. Steele, 461
F.2d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 1972).
The court further noted that the records in this case did not contain any motion for
discovery adequate under FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C). 652 F.2d at 892 n.L FED. R. CRIM.
P. 16(a)(1)(C) provides:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to in-
spect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examina-
tions, and of scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, which are within the
possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of which is known,
or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the
government, and which are material to the preparation of the defense or are in-
tended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial.
The court stated that discovery could properly have been denied solely on this basis. 652
F.2d at 892 n.1.
1031. 652 F.2d at 892.
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violators had not been prosecuted, 0 32 nor had he suggested any dis-
crimination in the decision to prosecute him.0 33 The court emphasized
that "[t]ax violations are not a protected form of political dissent," and
that ';proper prosecutorial considerations, such as deterrence of wide-
spread tax evasion, will inevitably lead to the prosecution of numerous
protest violators."' 1 34
1032. Id The court compared Ness with United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1972). Defendant Steele had engaged in public attacks upon the census and was subse-
quently convicted for refusing to answer questions on 1970 census forms, Id at 1150. Six
others who had also refused to answer questions, but had not publicly attacked the census,
were not prosecuted. Id at 1151. According to the court, this created an "inference of dis-
criminatory selection." Id at 1152. The only explanation offered by the Government in
justification of the discrepancy was prosecutorial discretion, which, the court held, was inad-
equate to rebut the inference. Id
The Ninth Circuit observed in Ness that the defendant had failed to show that similarly
situated, but nonprotesting, tax violators had not been prosecuted. 652 F.2d at 892. Rather,
his evidence consisted of proof that other members of his tax protest group had also been
prosecuted. Id
1033. Id at 892. "To make out a prima facie case of selective prosecution a defendant
must show evidence of impermissible motive at some crucial stage in the procedures leading
to the initiation of prosecution." Id In United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1972), the Government had bypassed normal procedures for selecting cases for prosecution.
Id at 1151. The resulting prosecution of only those who hadpublicly attacked the census
aided the court in concluding that the prosecution had been impermissibly motivated by the
defendant's first amendment protest activities. Id at 1152.
The Ness court contrasted Steele with United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.
1978), where the defendant contended that the district court improperly refused to hold an
evidentiary hearing on his claim of discriminatory prosecution. Id at 213. The court held,
however, that Erne did not allege sufficient facts to justify an evidentiary hearing. Id
Erne's allegations were aimed at particular internal revenue officers, whereas the decision to
prosecute was made by the United States Attorney, after consulting with the Intelligence
Division and the Regional Counsel. 1d The Ninth Circuit stated that even if the revenue
officer's motives were improper and discriminatory, the entire prosecution would not be
tainted because the prosecutor's decision was independent and based on nondiscriminatory
policies. Id at 216-17.
1034. 652 F.2d at 892 (emphasis in original). See United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864
(8th Cir. 1978), in which the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of discovery
and a hearing on the defendant's selective prosecution claim. The defendant claimed that he
was prosecuted for having willfully and knowingly failed to file his income tax returns be-
cause of the publicity his protests received. Id at 866. The court held that the decision to
prosecute rested on the protest publicity and that this was not an impermissible ground for
prosecution. Id at 867. The court stated that the decision to prosecute "serve[d] a legiti-
mate governmental interest in promoting public compliance with the tax laws" and that
"ft]he government is entitled to select those cases for prosecution which it believes will
achieve this objective." Id at 868. See also United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976), in which defendant Gardiner argued that his prose-
cution for failure to file an income tax return and for supplying a false withholding certifi-
cate was unconstitutionally selective. Id at 954. He contended that the decision by the
Internal Revenue Service to prosecute him was based on public expression of his views. Id
However, the Ninth Circuit held that Gardiner failed to make the requisite showing to es-
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The court also noted that Ness was not improperly denied the dis-
covery and hearing necessary to prove his claim, because the record
revealed that, when granted the opportunity at the hearing on his mo-
tion to present evidence, he declined to do so, stating that he needed
more time to prepare.135 In light of Ness's failure to subpoena wit-
nesses or request discovery, the court found it unnecessary to consider
the related question: whether, in the event that he had presented evi-
dence and made out a prima facie case of selective prosecution, it
would have been error not to grant a continuance if the Government
had resisted Ness's efforts to meet his burden of proof.
0 36
7. Dismissal for vindictive prosecution
Dismissal of an indictment may be sought based on vindictive
prosecution when the Government escalates the severity of the alleged
charges or brings additional charges in response to a defendant's exer-
cise of his or her constitutional or statutory rights. 0 37 The Supreme
Court has stated that such action on the part of the Government consti-
tutes a "due process violation of the most basic sort," because it penal-
izes an individual for doing what the law plainly allows. 0 38 The Ninth
Circuit recently considered a number of decisions in which a claim of
vindictive prosecution was raised.
In United States v. Robison, 39 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the filing of an indictment after the defendant had exercised
his procedural and appellate rights in unrelated actions constituted vin-
dictive prosecution.' 4 Defendant Robison was charged under 18
U.S.C. section 844(i) with conspiring to destroy a building by means of
explosives.'0 4' This charge stemmed from the bombing of a tavern in
Phoenix, Arizona. Before the indictment was filed, Robison had de-
fended himself against a variety of state and federal charges, including
five felony assaults, extortion, and an attempt to blow up a federal
building. In addition, Robison sought and received from the Arizona
Supreme Court a reversal of his then pending death sentence for the
murder of a newspaper reporter in another dynamite blast. Robison
tablish a claim of selective prosecution. Id It stated that Gardiner's violation of the law
was so flagrant that the authorities had no choice but to prosecute him. Id
1035. 652 F.2d at 892.
1036. Id at 892-93.
1037. United States v. Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981).
1038. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
1039. 644 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1981).
1040. Id. at 1272.
1041. Id at 1271.
1982]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW
moved for dismissal of the indictments, arguing that the Government
sought to punish him for exercising his procedural and appellate rights
in the unrelated state and federal proceedings. 10 2 The trial court de-
nied this motion, concluding that there was no appearance of vindic-
tiveness, and Robison appealed.
04 3
In its analysis of Robison's vindictive prosecution claim, the Ninth
Circuit relied on its recent ruling in United States v. Grffin. 0 4 The
Grin court held that "the presumption of vindictiveness may be in-
ferred even in the absence of evidence that the prosecution. . . acted
with a . . . retaliatory motive in seeking the [challenged] indict-
ment." 104 5 The presumption arises when the overall circumstances of
the prosecutor's decision suggest the "appearance of vindictive-
ness."' 0  The defendant has the burden of establishing the threshold
appearance of vindictiveness.1047 Once established, the prosecutor
must show that independent reasons or intervening circumstances jus-
tify his or her decision and therefore dispel the appearance of
vindictiveness. "
In applying the Griffin analysis to the Robison facts, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that Robison had failed to meet his burden. Therefore, the
court refused to inquire into the prosecutor's "motives. 1049 In distin-
guishing this case from those in which vindictive prosecution had been
found, the court stated that "[i]n almost every case in which courts have
condemned prosecutions as vindictive, the defendant, after exercising
some procedural right, had been confronted with a more serious or an
additional charge arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts as
the original charge."1050 The court then noted that federal authorities
1042. Id
1043. Id at 1272.
1044. 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980).
1045. Id at 1346 (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974)).
1046. 617 F.2d at 1347.
1047. Id See United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980).
1048. 617 F.2d at 1347. See United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980).
1049. 644 F.2d at 1272.
1050. Id See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). In h'ackledge, the defendant was
convicted of misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon while serving a term of imprison-
ment in a North Carolina penitentiary. The defendant subsequently filed a notice of appeal,
requesting a trial de nova. This was an absolute right accorded him under North Carolina
law. Between the time the defendant filed the notice and appeared for the trial de nova, the
prosecutor obtained a grand jury indictment charging him with the felony of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflict serious bodily injury. The basis for this indict-
ment was the same conduct which had resulted in the defendant's previous conviction. The
Black/edge Court stated: "A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statu-
tory right to a trial de nova, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting
[Vol. 15
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had not brought more serious or additional charges against Robison for
exercising his procedural rights." 1 Although the challenged indict-
ment was ified after he sought and received reversal of his death sen-
tence in an unrelated state proceeding, the court concluded that a
subsequent federal prosecution for a crime punishable by a maximum
ten year prison term would not have deterred the defendant from seek-
ing to avoid the loss of his life.
0 52
The court further observed that "It]he instant prosecution arose
from events separate and distinct from those on which the earlier pros-
ecutions were based."'1 5 3 While acknowledging that this fact is neither
dispositive, 10 54 nor essential,1055 the court noted that it is one of the key
indicia considered by courts when ruling on charges of vindictive
prosecution. o56
Robison's claim of vindictive prosecution was also weakened by
the fact that although the challenged prosecution "followed immedi-
ately upon the heels of his successful state appeal of the unrelated mur-
der conviction,"'10 57 this prosecution was brought by the Federal
Government, a different sovereign.10 5 8 The court stated that "[tihough
we do not now hold that a second prosecution can never be vindictive
a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased
potential period of incarceration." Id at 28. The Supreme Court held that "it was not
constitutionally permissible for the State to respond to Perry's invocation of his statutory
right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial de novo." Id
at 28-29.
The Blackledge Court based its analysis on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), where the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment prohibits state trial
courts from imposing heavier sentences upon reconvicted defendants in order to punish
them for succeeding in having their original convictions set aside. "IT]he very threat inher-
ent in the existence of such a punitive policy would ... serve to 'chill the exercise of basic
constitutional rights."' Id at 724 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582
(1968)).
1051. 644 F.2d at 1273.
1052. Id
1053. Id at 1272.
1054. Id In United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit
stated, "[w]e ... do not regard the factual similarity/dissimilarity of the two charges as
dispositive on the question of vindictiveness; rather, we regard it as only one of the factors
bearing on the issue." Id at 454.
1055. 644 F.2d at 1272. In United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977), the defendant's second indictment was based on substantially the
same facts as his first indictment, with the addition of another charge. The Ninth Circuit
held that even if the indictments were not based on essentially the same set of facts, the
second indictment could still be dismissed if it appeared that the Government was attempt-
ing to discourage the defendant from exercising his statutory venue rights. Id at 1226-27.
1056. 644 F.2d at 1272-73 (citing United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1347-48).
1057. 644 F.2d at 1273.
1058. Id
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when it follows a successful defense in a foreign jurisdiction, we do
hold that the involvement of separate sovereigns tends to negate a
vindictive prosecution claim."'" 59
The Ninth Circuit concluded by holding that "[tihe mere fact that
this prosecution followed the exercise of certain procedural rights in
other, unrelated cases is insufficient to raise the appearance of vindic-
tiveness."'' 0 60 Having determined that Robison had not met his burden
of establishing that appearance, the court granted the Government's
motion for summary affirmance of the district court's finding.'0 6'
The Ninth Circuit again considered the validity of a vindictive
prosecution claim in United States v. Shaw.1 62 The claim was based
on the Government's motion to vacate the defendant's plea-bargained
guilty plea in response to his effort to arrest judgment on that plea for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
0 63
The Government notified defendant Shaw that he was the subject
of an investigation into bid-rigging, bribery, kickbacks, and conspiracy
relating to Federal Reserve Bank contract awards. 0 64 Shaw's attorneys
and the Government negotiated a plea agreement whereby Shaw
would submit to interviews with investigators and testify before the
grand jury as well as at the trials of others who might be indicted.
0 65
In return for his cooperation, Shaw would be allowed to plead to one
count of the indictment, and, if named in more than one count, would
be allowed to choose the count under which he wished to plead.
0 66
According to the terms of the agreement, the Government would move
at the time of sentencing to dismiss all remaining counts in which Shaw
was named, agree to a sentence of probation, and recommend a
fine. 10
67
1059. Id In United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1980), the court noted that in
previous Ninth Circuit decisions where vindictive prosecution had been found, see United
States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (91h
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367
(9th Cir. 1976), the same prosecutor's office had attempted to re-indict or re-try the defend-
ant. 619 F.2d at 836. In Burt, the State of California filed the initial indictment and the
Federal Government filed the subsequent charges that carried the more substantial penalty.
Id at 837. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion
to dismiss the indictment on grounds of vindictive prosecution. Id at 838.
1060. 644 F.2d at 1273.
1061. Id
1062. 655 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1981).
1063. Id at 170.
1064. Id at 169.
1065. Id




When Shaw's attorneys learned that an indictment would be
sought against him for bribing a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 201, they informed the Government of a possible subject matter
jurisdiction problem. Specifically, they questioned whether employees
of a Federal Reserve Bank were public officials within the meaning of
section 201.1068
Following his grand jury testimony, Shaw was nevertheless in-
dicted for conspiracy, mail fraud, and two section 201 bribery
counts. 1069 Exercising his option under the terms of the plea agree-
ment, Shaw chose to plead guilty to one of the bribery counts. 7 ° He
then filed a timely motion in arrest of judgment under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 34,1071 arguing that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to try the offense. The Government moved to vacate
Shaw's guilty plea and to set a trial date on the ground that Shaw had
entered into the plea agreement with the intention of violating it, thus
defrauding the Government and the court.1 0 7 2 In opposition to this
motion, Shaw argued that he had complied with the plea agreement
and that the Government's motion amounted to vindictive prosecu-
tion. 0 73 The district court granted the Government's motion and en-
tered a plea of not guilty to all four counts of the indictment, stating
that the issue surrounding Shaw's arrest of judgment motion was moot
in light of its order vacating the guilty plea.
0 74
The Ninth Circuit initially considered whether the district court's
order constituted a "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
section 12911075 and was therefore appealable.0 7 6 Noting that "[ult is
the law in this Circuit that the complete and final determination of a
1068. Id While plea negotiations were underway, Shaw's attorneys submitted to the Gov-
ernment an extensive legal memorandum concerning this issue but the Government con-
cluded that subject matter jurisdiction did exist. During the final stages of plea negotiations,
Shaw's attorneys again raised the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Id The Govern-
ment responded that the plea agreement prevented Shaw from litigating the issue, and that




1071. FED. R. CRIM. P. 34 states:
The court on motion of a defendant shall arrest judgment if indictment or informa-
tion does not charge an offense or if the court was without jurisdiction of the of-
fense charged. The motion in arrest of judgment shall be made within 7 days after
verdict or finding of guilty, or after plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or within such
further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.
1072. 655 F.2d at 170.
1073. Id
1074. Id
1075. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals shall have
1982]
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vindictive prosecution claim is subject to interlocutory appeal under
the 'collateral order' exception to the final judgment requirement,"'
10 77
the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider Shaw's claim of
vindictive prosecution.
0 78
The court then held that Shaw had made a prima facie showing of
vindictiveness. °79 This ruling was based on the Government's admis-
sion that it had moved to vacate Shaw's guilty plea in retaliation for his
motion to arrest judgment. 0 80 Thus, under the principles set forth in
Black/edge v. Perry,'08' the effect of the trial court's vacation of the plea
was to "up the ante" against Shaw by forcing him to go to trial on all
four counts of the indictment instead of permitting him, as was his bar-
gained for right, to plead guilty to one charge and have the remaining
charges dismissed.1
8 1
Restating the well-established principle that subject matter juris-
diction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time,10 83 the Ninth
Circuit also held that Shaw did not violate the terms of his plea agree-
ment by challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 08 4 Nor did
Shaw attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the Government by pleading
guilty to a charge when he doubted that the offense fell within the
court's jurisdiction. 085 The court reaffirmed Shaw's right, as well as
that of any defendant who pleads guilty, to file a motion to arrest judg-
ment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34. 086 Conclud-
ing that the Government failed to remove the appearance of
vindictiveness, the court ordered the district court to reinstate Shaw's
guilty plea to the single count of bribery.
0 87
In United States v. Herrera,0 88 the Ninth Circuit held that the
Government's decision to proceed to trial on an indictment after offer-
ing to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge did not constitute vindic-
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, .
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
1076. 655 F.2d at 170.
1077. Id at 170-71 (citing United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 863 (1980)).
1078. 655 F.2d at 171.
1079. Id
1080. Id
1081. 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974). See supra note 1050 and accompanying text.
1082. 655 F.2d at 171.
1083. Id (citing United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974)).
1084. 655 F.2d at 171.
1085. Id
1086. Id
1087. Id at 171-72.
1088. 640 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1981).
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tive prosecution. 08 9 Defendant Herrera and three co-defendants were
indicted on ten counts of racketeering, conspiracy, and transportation
of stolen property'0 90 stemming from an alleged scheme to convert to
the defendants' own use approximately $5.5 million in union health
insurance funds.' 09 ' All four defendants entered pleas of not guilty,
and a trial date was set.1
0 92
Shortly before the scheduled trial date, Herrera's counsel began
plea negotiations with the Government. Counsel for both sides met
and tentatively agreed that Herrera would plead guilty to one felony
count if he could be assured that he would not lose his California con-
tractor's license. 0 93 If it appeared that the felony conviction would
cause Herrera to lose that license, the parties agreed that he would
plead guilty to a misdemeanor. 0 94 Having reached an apparent plea
agreement, the parties cancelled the trial.1
09 5
It soon became clear, however, that the parties disagreed as to the
terms of the plea agreement. Herrera contended that the Government
had agreed to stipulate that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
Sll(e)(1)(C), 1' 6 he would receive neither fine nor jail time if he pled
guilty to a misdemeanor. 0 97 The Government, however, contended
that it had agreed to recommend no fine and no jail time. 0 98 Under
the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 l(e)(1)(B), a trial court is not
bound to follow such a recommendation. 0 99
Herrera subsequently filed a motion to compel specific perform-
1089. Id at 961-62 & n.6.
1090. Id at 960.
1091. Id at 960 n.1.




1096. FED. R. CiuM. P. 1 I(e)(1) provides:
The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant or the defend-
ant when acting pro se may engage in dicussions with a view toward reaching an
agreement that, upon entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendre to a charged of-
fense or to a lesser or related offense, the attorney for the government will do any
of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request,
for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommenda-
tion or request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
1097. 640 F.2d at 960.
1098. Id
1099. See supra note 1096.
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ance of the plea agreement as he understood it.ll°0 The trial court de-
nied the motion, stating that: (1) it had a policy of not permitting the
Government to agree to a sentence under rule 1 l(e)(1)(C); "I and (2)
in any event, Herrera had failed to prove that the Government vio-
lated the plea agreement." 0 2 In a telephone conversation with counsel
for the Government, Herrera's counsel stated that Herrera would plead
guilty in exchange for the Government's recommendation of proba-
tion.'10 3 In a written reply, the Government informed Herrera's coun-
sel that to prevent further misunderstanding, the Government would
respond in writing to any written plea proposals submitted by Her-
rera.1" ° The Government further advised Herrera's counsel that if
Herrera submitted no formal proposal, the case would proceed to
trial.105 Herrera never submitted a written plea proposal."
06
Shortly before trial, Herrera filed a second motion to compel spe-
cific performance of the plea agreement, this time adopting the Gov-
ernment's original characterization of the agreement, which offered a
misdemeanor plea in exchange for a recommendation of probation."
07
In the alternative, he moved to dismiss on grounds of prosecutorial de-
lay.1' 0 8 Without ruling on Herrera's motion, and characterizing the
Government's conduct as "vindictive prosecution of an outrageous na-
ture," the trial court dismissed the indictment with prejudice." 0 9 Fol-
lowing denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Government
appealed. " '1
0
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Herrera from the Supreme
Court's decision in Blackledge v. Perry, II stating that, unlike the
Blackledge defendants, the Government had not taken action to penal-
ize Herrera." 12 The court reiterated the proposition that "[a] defend-
ant's right to due process is violated whenever the Government
'increases the severity of the alleged charges in response to the exercise
1100. 640 F.2d at 960.
1101. Id at 960 n.4.
1102. Id




1107. Id at 960-61.
1108. Id at 961.
1109. .Id
1110. Id
1111. 417 U.S. 21 (1974); see supra note 1050 and accompanying text.
1112. 640 F.2d at 961.
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of constitutional or statutory rights.' "1113 The court noted, however,
that the Government did not increase the severity of the charges
against Herrera by deciding to proceed to trial on the ten-count indict-
ment. Such an increase, the court observed, could only have occurred
if any of the original charges had been dismissed, or if Herrera had
been subjected to subsequent indictments." 
1 4
Finally, the court stated that plea bargaining is not a constitutional
right, and thus the Government can refuse to bargain altogether as well
as terminate or limit negotiations if it chooses to do so.11 15 Therefore,
the court concluded, neither the breach of a plea bargain nor the deci-
sion to terminate plea negotiations constitutes vindictive
prosecution. 1116
In United States v. Moore, 1117 the Ninth Circuit considered the va-
lidity of the defendant's claim that his prosecution was vindictive in
nature because it was precipated by the successful exercise of his consti-
tutional right to resist extradition. 118 He argued that Blackledge v.
1113. Id (quoting United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980)). See United
States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980); United
States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534
F.2d 1367, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1976).
1114. 640 F.2d at 961.
1115. Id at 962 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977)).
1116. 640 F.2d at 962. The Ninth Circuit relied on Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978), to further support its conclusion. 640 F.2d at 962. In Bordenkircher, the prosecution
indicated during the course of plea bargaining that it would indict the defendant under the
Habitual Criminal Act if he did not plead guilty. 434 U.S. at 358. The defendant refused to
enter a guilty plea, and the Government charged him under the recidivist statute. Id at 359.
The Supreme Court held that such action did not constitute a denial of due process. Id at
365. The Herrera court concluded that if the Government could constitutionally reindict the
defendant on more serious charges after offering to accept a plea agreement, as in
Bordenkireher, then the Government could proceed on the full range of charges in the origi-
nal indictment. 640 F.2d at 962.
The Herrera court did not, however, decide whether there was actually a plea agree-
ment. Id The court noted that had such an agreement existed, and had that agreement
been breached, the remedy of specific performance would have been available to the defend-
ant. Id (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971)). The court observed
that under such circumstances Herrera could have renewed his motion for specific perform-
ance on remand. 640 F.2d at 962.
1117. 653 F.2d 384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981).
1118. Id at 387. While serving a life sentence for murder in a prison in Belize (formerly
British Honduras), Moore met Dail, a fellow prisoner. Dail offered to help Moore escape
from prison, to help pay for his return to the United States, and to pay him $20,000 if Moore
would murder one Hudson, who had testified against one of Dail's business associates.
Moore accepted the offer, escaped from the Belize prison, and presented himself to an agent
of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Guatemala City. He then offered to
become an informer against Dail. Id at 386.
The DEA accepted Moore's offer and arranged for him to return to the United States
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Perry,1119 North Carolina v. Pearce, °11  and United States v. Grovesl l2 1
precluded his prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. section 201(e).l"
22
where he would pretend to seek out and kill Hudson while gathering evidence against Dail.
Dail had also returned to the United States, and many telephone conversations between
Moore and Dail were recorded. The DEA monitored the deliveries of weapons which Dail
made to Moore. Moore then faked Hudson's murder convincingly enough to induce Dail to
pay him for the murder and to seek to have Moore murder other individuals. Id
Moore appeared before a federal grand jury and was arrested approximately one month
later on a warrant for his extradition to Belize. He was held for forty-five days and then
released because the extradition papers had not arrived within this peiiod. Id
Shortly thereafter, one of Dai's associates discovered that Hudson, whom Moore was
supposed to have murdered, was still alive. To protect Moore the Government had Dail
arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit murder and interstate transportation of
guns to commit a felony. Id Dail pled guilty to one count of a two-count indictment and
was sentenced to a term of eight years. Id at 386 n.1.
At this point Moore began to consider those who might have an interest in Dail's avoid-
ance of successful prosecution. Moore and his wife commenced a series of telephone calls to
Dali's wife and one of Dali's business associates, offering not to testify in Dail's trial in
exchange for a sum of cash. The DEA learned of these conversations, which had been
recorded, and confronted Moore, concerned that he would destroy its case against Dail.
Moore produced the tapes of these calls, claiming that he was attempting to incriminate
other members of Dail's organization. Unconvinced, the DEA told Moore not to make any
more calls to Dail's wife. Id at 386.
Although Moore agreed in writing not to make these calls, he violated this agreement
and was arrested and charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1976). After his arraign-
ment, the Government offered Moore a plea bargain under which he would plead guilty to
one count of violating § 201(e), in return for which the Government would request that
Belize withdraw its extradition request, would not initiate extradition proceedings upon his
release as long as he did not violate any federal or state law, would recommend a sentence of
five years, and would not prosecute Moore's wife for her participation in the telephone calls
to Dail's wife and associate. To encourage Moore to accept this offer, the Government indi-
cated that if he rejected it, the indictment would be dismissed and extradition proceedings
instituted, which the Government believed would be successful. Moore rejected the offer,
and the Government began extradition proceedings. Id at 386-87.
However, the Government encountered a serious obstacle in its effort to penalize Moore
with extradition: during the extradition proceedings, the district court refused to order
Moore's extradition. In response to this obstacle, the Government again arrested Moore and
obtained a second indictment against him, charging him with three counts of violating
§ 201(e), and charging him and his wife with conspiracy to violate § 201(e). The trial re-
sulted in the acquittal of Moore and his wife on the latter charge and conviction of Moore
on the § 201(e) counts. Id at 387.
1119. 417 U.S. 21 (1974); see supra note 1050 and accompanying text.
1120. 395 U.S. 812 (1969); see supra note 1050 and accompanying text.
1121. 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978) (appearance of vindictiveness sufficient to evoke rule of
Blackledge). See also supra note 1054 and accompanying text.'
1122. 653 F.2d at 387. 18 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1976) provides:
Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, ac-
cepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other
person or entity in return for being influenced in his testimony under oath or affir-
mation as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in return
for absenting himself therefrom-
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary equivalent
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The Government contended that prosecuting Moore was the only re-
maining alternative following Moore's rejection of the plea offer and
following its failure to extradite.
112 3
The Ninth Circuit held that Moore's prosecution was not vindic-
tive1 24 under the standards set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 25 In Bordenkircher, the Supreme
Court held that the Government could, as part of a plea negotiation,
inform the defendant of its intention to reindict him on a more serious
charge if he refused to plead guilty to the charge contained in the origi-
nal indictment. 
126
Although the plea offer the Government made to Moore did not
explicitly state that Moore would be prosecuted if he rejected the offer
and the extradition efforts failed, the court reasoned that the Govern-
ment had not made the threat because it fully expected the extradition
to succeed.1 27 The court clarified that this case came within the frame-
work of Bordenkircher because a threat to prosecute Moore could be
reasonably implied under the circumstances surrounding the plea
offer.' 1.
28
8. Dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct (pretrial)
The fifth amendment mandates that a grand jury indictment be
returned before a federal criminal prosecution may proceed." 29 The
grand jury "has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the inval-
uable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the
accused." 113
0
of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen
years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.
1123. 653 F.2d at 387.
1124. Id
1125. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
1126. Id at 365. Accord Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
1127. 653 F.2d at 388.
1128. Id Moore could not reasonably have expected that he and his wife would be free
from all prosecution for "marketing" his testimony merely because extradition efforts had
failed. Id The Moore court also commented that had Moore and his counsel thoroughly
considered the Government's plea offer, the existence of the Government's secondary threat
could not have been in doubt. Id The court further reasoned that even if Moore's wife's
prosecution arguably could have fallen outside the limits of Bordenkircher and Corbit, the
Moores' acquittal of the conspiracy charge expunged any taint of vindictiveness that might
have been attached to her prosecution. Id
1129. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer to a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentation or indictment of a Grand Jury ...
1130. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
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The grand jury, however, is not subject to the same procedural
restrictions imposed on trial courts," 31 and certain rules of evidence
devised to protect the accused are inapplicable to grand jury proceed-
ings.'1 32 Moreover, although the purpose of the grand jury is to protect
the accused from unfounded or persecutorial prosecution, indictment
proceedings are normally mere formalities.1
33
The Ninth Circuit has been reluctant to dismiss grand jury indict-
ments for prosecutorial misconduct" 134 and two recent decisions illus-
trate no break with precedent. In United States v. Cederquist,H35 the
defendants were indicted for the substantive crime of mail fraud, as
well as aiding and abetting in that offense." 36 The indictment alleged
that the defendants made use of the mails to defraud various banks
through the operation of a check kiting scheme."1 37 The district court
dismissed the indictment on the grounds of prejudicial misconduct
before the grand jury.
138
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor's conduct
did not significantly affect the grand jury.'"" Although the court rec-
ognized that an indictment may be dismissed for prosecutorial miscon-
duct based upon the fifth amendment due process clause," 40 or upon
the court's inherent supervisory powers," 4 1 the court stated that the
"constitutionally-based independence of grand juries and prosecutors
necessarily limits a court's review of grand jury proceedings."' 1 42 As a
prerequisite to a dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct, it must be
shown that the prosecutor's conduct significantly infringed upon the
1131. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
1132. See, e.g., United States v. Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 399 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is well
established that a grand jury may return an indictment based solely on hearsay evidence.").
1133. See generally Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
1134. In United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977), the Ninth Circuit stated that it would not overturn an indictment unless prejudicial
misconduct by the prosecutor resulted in an intrusion on the defendant's constitutional
rights. Id at 1311.
1135. 641 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1981).
1136. Id at 1350.
1137. Id
1138. Id The prosecution presented a previously prepared indictment to the g-and jury.
The district court found that this action resulted in an unconstitutional "influence exerted on
the grand jury to the effect that [defendants]. . .in the mind of the prosecutor, were proba-
bly guilty and should be charged." Id at 1350 n.1.
1139. Id at 1353.
1140. Id at 1352 (citing United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974)).
1141. 641 F.2d at 1352 (citing United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977)).
1142. 641 F.2d at 1352.
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ability of the grand jury to exercise its independent judgment. 143 The
court stated that the "'[d]ismissal of an indictment is required only in
flagrant cases in which the grand jury has been overreached or
deceived in some significant way.""' The court applied the above
standard strictly and allowed the indictment to stand on the grounds
that the prosecutor's conduct had no significant effect on the grand
jury,"1 45 and that the submission of the indictment to the grand jury
prior to the close of testimony was proper as long as the grand jury had
reviewed the indictment and adopted it as its own."
46
B. Extradition
Extradition occurs when a state surrenders to a foreign state an
individual accused or convicted of an offense committed within the for-
eign jurisdiction. Certification of extradition can be appealed through
habeas corpus proceedings, but the review is restricted to whether: (1)
the extraditing judge had jurisdiction to conduct extradition proceed-
ings; (2) the extraditing court had jurisdiction over the fugitive; (3) the
treaty of extradition was in force; (4) the criminal offense was subject to
the treaty; and (5) competent legal evidence to support a finding of ex-
traditability existed.' 47 The Ninth Circuit has recently considered ap-
peals in which petitioners, certified as extraditable, have been denied
habeas corpus relief and have challenged the applicability of certain
extradition treaties to their particular offenses.
In Cucuzzella v. Keiikoa, " 48 petitioner Cucuzzella appealed the
certification of his extradition to Canada. Cucuzzella had allegedly
agreed in Vancouver to procure a mortgage for S.L. Scheves.
1 49
1143. Id See United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor inten-
tionally submitted transcript extremely prejudicial to defendant, resulting in indictment that
was deemed serious threat to judicial integrity); United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977) (reading transcripts of sworn testimony does not con-
stitute fundamental unfairness or threat to judicial integrity).
1144. 641 F.2d at 1352-53 (quoting United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784,786 (9th Cir.
1978)).
1145. 641 F.2d at 1353. "Grand jurors, as a practical matter, .. are aware that a case is
being presented to them because the prosecutor feels that an indictment is warranted. Thus
the fact that a prosecutor conveys such an impression to the grand jury does not require the
dismissal of the indictment." Id The court also rejected the defendant's claim that the
prosecutor's use of such words as "check-kiting" biased the grand jury. Id
1146. Id (citing United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1977)).
1147. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). E.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d
1360, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978).
1148. 638 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1981).
1149. Id at 105.
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Scheves had paid Cucuzzella an $11,000 commission, but Cucuzzella
neither procured the mortgage nor refunded the commission. 150 A few
months later, Cucuzzella entered into a similar agreement with A.W.
Deitcher, with the same result.'
1 5 '
The Canadian Government charged Cucuzzella with one count of
theft and one count of criminal breach of trust for each transaction."
52
When Cucuzzella failed to appear for trial in Vancouver, the United
States Attorney, on behalf of Canada, filed documents for extradition
on all four counts. Cucuzzella was then certified for extradition in the
district court of Hawaii." 5 3 He appealed his certification on the
grounds that: (1) the extradition documents were improperly authenti-
cated under the provisions of the extradition treaty between the United
States and Canada and under the United States Code; and (2) criminal
breach of trust was not an extraditable offense under the treaty's
provisions.'
1 54
Cucuzzella based his first argument on the treaty requirement that
evidence supporting an extradition request be authenticated by a Cana-
dian officer and certified by a United States officer,"155 and on a United
States Code requirement that such evidence be "properly and legally
authenticated so as to entitle. . . [it] to be received for similar purposes
in the tribunals" of the requesting country." 5 16 The documents seeking
1150. Id
1151. Id
1152. Id at 105-06.
1153. Id at 106.
1154. Id
1155. The treaty specifically provides:
(1) Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found sufficient, ac-
cording to the laws of the place where the person sought shall be found.., to
justify his committal for trial if the offense of which he is accused had been com-
mitted in its territory ....
(2) The documentary evidence in support of a request for extradition or copies
of these documents shall be admitted in evidence in the examination of the request
for extradition when, in the case of a request emanating from Canada, they are
authenticated by an officer of the Department of Justice of Canada and are certi-
fied by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in Canada
Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, art. X, 27 U.S.T. 985, 991, T.I.A.S.
No. 8237 at 9.
1156. The United States Code specifically provides:
Depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof offered in evidence
upon the hearing of any extradition case shall be received and admitted as evi-
dence.., if they shall be properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them
to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country from
which the accused party shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country
shall be proof that the same, so offered, are authenticated in the manner required.
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Cucuzzella's extradition were signed and sealed by the Associate Dep-
uty Minister of Justice for Canada and were accompanied by a Certifi-
cate of Authenticity, attesting that the indictment, information, arrest
warrants, and affidavits were proper, authorized, and "admissible in
evidence in Canadian Courts."" 57 The United States Ambassador had
certified the papers as "legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be
received in evidence for similar purposes by the tribunals of Ca-
nada."" 58 Cucuzzella contended that these documents were improperly
authenticated because the Canadian Certificate of Authenticity did not
conform to the language of the United States Code, requiring the docu-
ments to be "properly and legally authenticated" and to be admissible
"for similar purposes" under the law of the requesting state. 159
The Ninth Circuit, finding the omissions from the Canadian Cer-
tificate to be trivial, rejected this contention. 1 60 The court determined
that since there existed no proof of lack of authenticity, the documents
had provided a sufficient basis for the United States Ambassador's
certification. 1
6'
Cucuzzella based his second argument on the treaty requirement
that extraditable offenses be "punishable by the laws of both Con-
tracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.""162 He
contended that criminal breach of trust was not an extraditable offense
because no comparable offense was proscribed by either federal or state
law in the United States. 1 63 However, the Ninth Circuit determined
that offenses comparable to criminal breach of trust were proscribed by
United States law."16 The court relied on Collins v. Loisel, " 65 in which
18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1976).
1157. 638 F.2d at 106.
1158. Id
1159. Id
1160. Id at 107.
1161. Id (citing Shapiro v. Ferradina, 478 F.2d 894, 904 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S.
884 (1973)). In Shapiro, the United States Ambassador failed in his extradition certification
specifically to mention certain papers showing the petitioner's guilt. However, the attach-
ment of these papers to documents which were mentioned in the certificate convinced the
court that the ambassador had intended to certify the unmentioned papers. The Second
Circuit held that in the absence of any showing that the extradition documents were not
authentic, the United States Ambassador's certification was satisfactory. Id at 903-04.
1162. The treaty specifically provides that "[p]ersons shall be delivered up according to the
provisions of this Treaty for any of the offenses listed in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty
... provided these offenses are punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year." Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-
Canada, art. II, para. 1, 27 U.S.T. 985, 986, T.I.A.S. No. 8237 at 4.
1163. 638 F.2d at 108.
1164. Id
1165. 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
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the Supreme Court held that "[t]he law does not require that the name
by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be the same,
nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other re-
spects, the same in the two countries." "66 The Cucuzzella court further
observed that the treaty language itself provided for some
flexibility.11
67
In its analysis of criminal breach of trust, the court established the
necessity of examining the extraditability of each charged offense
rather than of each act. 68 The court rejected the proposition that the
expression, "the laws of both Contracting Parties" refers to state law or,
in this case, to the law of Hawaii." 69 Instead, it adopted the First Cir-
cuit's rule that when a treaty between the United States and a foreign
country refers to the laws of the "Contracting Parties," the United
States courts should look to proscription by federal law or, if none ex-
ists, to the law of the jurisdiction where the fugitive is found or to the
law of the majority of the states. 170 The Cucuzzella court concluded
1166. Id at 312. In Collins, the Indian Government had charged the petitioner with
"cheating." The petitioner claimed that such an offense did not appear in the applicable
treaty's list of extraditable crimes, and was not recognized as a crime in the state requesting
his extradition (Louisiana). The Court, however, determined that "cheating," as defined by
the Indian Penal Code, contained the same elements as the crime of "obtaining property by
false pretenses," which was recognized by both the treaty and Louisiana. Hence, "cheating"
was held to be an extraditable offense. Id
1167. 638 F.2d at 108 n.4. The treaty provides:
Extradition shall also be granted for any offense against a federal law of the United
States in which one of the offenses listed in the annexed Schedule. . .is a substan-
tial element, even if transporting, transportation, the use of mails or interstate facil-
ities are also elements of the specific offense.
Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, art. II, para. 3, 27 U.S.T. 985, 986,
T.I.A.S. No. 8237 at 4.
1168. 638 F.2d at 107 (citing Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 907, 909 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973)). In Shapiro, the Second Circuit held that it is necessary to
determine not only whether the alleged criminal acts are proscribed by similar criminal
provisions in the United States, but also whether the alleged offenses of foreign law corre-
spond to parallel United States offenses. The Second Circuit adopted this rule because of its
concern that, when multiple offenses have been charged for each act, there exist the "poten-
tial problems of greatly increased punishment through successive sentences." 478 F.2d at
909.
The First Circuit has recognized the same problems but has specifically held that, when
only a single offense has been charged for each act, it is only necessary to determine whether
the alleged criminal act is proscribed by similar criminal provisions in the United States.
Brauche v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 851 (1st Cir. 1980).
1169. 638 F.2d at 107.
1170. See Brauche v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 851 (1st Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit has
also looked to federal law when the pertinent treaty required that extraditable offenses be
punishable by the laws of both "Contracting Parties." Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894,
910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973). However, the Shapiro court looked to fed-
eral law, not because the term "Contracting Party" should always be interpreted as referring
1982] CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
that the Canadian breach of trust statute"17 1 was analogous to federal
embezzlement statutes." 72 Because these statutes provide for maxi-
mum prison terms of ten years, the Ninth Circuit held that criminal
breach of trust constituted an extraditable offense.' 
173
In Caplan v. yokes, 174 petitioner Caplan appealed the certification
of his extradition to the United Kingdom. A California district court
had certified Caplan on all but the first of sixty charges filed on behalf
of the British Government. The charges included theft, forgery, and
false accounting in the management of a collapsed London financial
firm.l"7 5 Caplan appealed his certification on the grounds that: (1) his
extradition on charges two through twenty-one was barred by the stat-
ute of limitations under the extradition treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom and under the United States Code; and
(2) the facts found under charges twenty-two through sixty did not es-
tablish extraditable offenses under the treaty's provisions."
176
Caplan based his first argument on the treaty requirement that ex-
tradition be prohibited on any charge for which "prosecution. . . has
become barred by lapse of time according to the law of the requesting
.. .Party," 1177 and on the United States Code requirement that non-
capital crimes be charged within five years.17 8 The petitioner's arrest
warrant was dated May 18, 1978, thus rendering any acts committed
to the federal government, but because the charged offense fell within the treaty only as it
was proscribed by federal, not state, law. Id at 909-10. The Shapiro court also considered
the extraditability of a different offense as proscribed by state law and completely neglected
to consider its proscription by federal law. Id. at 910-11. This approach has led other Sec-
ond Circuit courts to hold that an alleged offense need only be examined as proscribed by
state law, even when the term "Contracting Party" seems to indicate that federal law should
be applied. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (S.D.N.Y.), ae'don other grounds,
536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1973).
1171. The Canadian statute provides that a breach of trust has occurred when "one who,
being a trustee of anything for the use or benefit. . . of another person. . . converts, with
intent to defraud and in violation of his trust, that thing. . . to a use that is not authorized
by the trust." CAN. REV. STAT. ch. c-34 § 296 (1970).
1172. 638 F.2d at 108 (citing Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 1155, 1160 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1973)). In Jhirad, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that the Indian statute proscribing the offense of "breach of trust" was, in essence, the
crime of embezzlement, an extraditable offense under the extradition treaty between the
United States and India. Id at 1160.
1173. 638 F.2d at 108.
1174. 649 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1981).
1175. Id at 1338.
1176. Id at 1340.
1177. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, art. V, § l(b), 28
U.S.T. 229, 230, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 at 4.
1178. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976).
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prior to May 18, 1973, possibly barred by the statute of limitations.' 17 9
Charge two alleged the maintenance of a fictitious bank account be-
tween February 1968 and December 1973, and charges three through
twenty-one alleged the commission of acts which occurred no later than
April of 1973.'180 Caplan contended, therefore, that the five year stat-
ute of limitations barred his extradition on charges three through
twenty-one and on that part of charge two accruing before May 18,
1973.1181
The Ninth Circuit's primary inquiry into this argument concerned
whether the tolling provision in the United States Code, providing that
"[n]o statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from jus-
tice," I 8 2 applied to Caplan. Caplan had moved from England to
France shortly after the British Government completed its investigation
into his business affairs.' 11 3 The Government maintained that Caplan
had intended to evade arrest because: (1) the British Government's in-
vestigation had alerted him to the possibility of ensuing criminal
charges; and (2) his move to France had made his arrest more
difficult.'1
8 4
The court reviewed the requirement that "to establish that an ac-
cused was 'fleeing from justice' . . . the prosecution must meet the
burden of proving that the accused concealed himself with the intent to
avoid arrest or prosecution."' 8 5 It concluded that the Government
1179. 649 F.2d at 1340.
1180. Id
1181. Id
1182. 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1976).
1183. 649 F.2d at 1341.
1184. Id
1185. Id (quoting United States v. Wazney, 529 F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir 1976)). In
Wazney, the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the position taken by the District of Colum-
bia and Eighth Circuits that mere absence from the jurisdiction where an offense occurred is
enough to toll the statute of limitations. Id at 1289. See King v. United States, 144 F.2d
729, 731 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 854 (1944); McGowen v. United States, 105 F.2d
791, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 552 (1939). Instead, the Wazney court adopted
the rule of the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits, which requires that specific intent to avoid
ariest or prosecution be established to toll the statute of limitations. 529 F.2d at 1289. See
Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 486 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1973); Donnell v. United States, 229 F.2d
560, 565 (5th Cir. 1956); Brouse v. United States, 68 F.2d 294, 295-96 (1st Cir. 1933); Greene
v. United States, 154 F. 401, 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 596 (1907); Porter , United
States, 91 F. 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1898). The Wazney court stated:
The statute of limitations is made inapplicable whenever an accused flees from
justice because the failure to prosecute is attributable to the unacceptable conduct
of the accused. The accused should not be held responsible, however, for uninten-
tional and innocent delays, such, for example, as one caused by an open move to a
new residence where the accused is readily accessible to careful law enforcement
officers.
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had not met its burden of proof 18 6 The court stated that the Govern-
ment's first argument was negated by evidence of Caplan's open behav-
ior before and after his move. 187  The court further noted that
adopting the Government's second argument would abolish the re-
quirement of specific intent.1 188 The Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that
Caplan was not a "fugitive from justice" and that the statute of limita-
tions barred his extradition on charges three through twenty-one and
on a portion of charge two.' 189
Caplan based his second argument, that the facts did not establish
extraditable offenses, on the "principle of dual criminality": extradita-
ble offenses must be criminal in both the United States and the United
Kingdom.1 190 Charges twenty-two through sixty accused Caplan of vi-
olating several sections of the British Theft Act.119' Caplan contended
that the facts "found" by the extradition court 1 92 did not establish an
529 F.2d at 1289.
1186. 649 F.2d at 1341-42.
1187. Id at 1341. Caplan had apparently notified the British Government of his impend-
ing move several months before his departure in 1974. He had used his true name and
address while conducting business in France and had returned to England for short periods
in 1975 and 1977. Caplan's behavior had been equally honest during his move from France
to Monaco in 1975 and during his move from Monaco to California in 1976. The court
determined, pursuant to Wazney., that such behavior did not constitute "unacceptable con-
duct" and had not been the cause of the Government's delay in prosecution. Id
1188. Id The court stated that the Government's second argument implied that petitioner
could not have left England under any circumstances during the statute of limitations pe-
riod, and that the Government did not have any burden of diligence. Id at 1342.
1189. Id
1190. Id at 1343. The treaty specifically provides that:
(1) Extradition shall be granted for an act or omission the facts of which dis-
close an offense within any of the descriptions listed in the Schedule annexed to
this Treaty, which is an integral part of the Treaty or any other offense, ift
(a) the offense is punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment
• for more than one year or by the death penalty;
(b) the offense is extraditable under the.., law of the United Kingdom...;
and
(c) the offense constitutes a felony under the law of the United States of
America.
Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, art. III, § 1, 28 U.S.T. 229,
229-30, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 at 3-4.
1191. 649 F.2d at J342 (citing Theft Act, 1968, ch. 60, §§ 1, 16, 17, 19). Caplan was
charged with theft, false accounting, the publication of a misleading, false, or deceptive
statement of account with an intent to deceive, and the dishonest obtaining of a pecuniary
advantage. Most of these charges arose from a series of transactions referred to as "ware-
housing," involving the purchase of shares in the names of nominee holders and the subse-
quent transfer of funds to cover the costs of the purchases. 649 F.2d at 1342.
1192. Id The Caplan court noted that the "findings" of an extradition court are not true
findings of fact because an extradition court does not weigh the evidence and resolve dis-
puted factual issues. Id at 1342 n.10. The function of the extradition court is merely to
determine whether there is "any evidence warranting the finding that there was a reasonable
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actual violation of the Act; thus, his extradition under charges twenty-
two through sixty was prohibited.'
193
The Ninth Circuit first observed that the "principle of dual crimi-
nality" and the "principle of speciality" could not be satisfied without
making a specific determination of the extraditability of each
charge. 1 94 The court found that the record did not indicate the extra-
dition court's rationale for its determinations of extraditability: there
were no coherent legal connections between the factual allegations and
the extraditable offenses, and nothing in the record specifically demon-
strated that Caplan's alleged acts constituted crimes in either England
or the United States." 195 The court of appeals, therefore, remanded for
a more complete examination of each charge, admonishing the extradi-
tion court that:
[A]n adequate extradition proceeding must include in its rec-
ord a specific delineation, as to each charge, of the legal theo-
ries under the requesting country's law by which the accused's
conduct is alleged to constitute an extraditable offense, to-
gether with an identification of the corresponding offenses in
this country relied on to show that the "dual criminality" re-
quirement has been met. 196
ground to believe the accused guilty." Id (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312
(1925)). Thus, the findings of the extradition court serve only to indicate those items of
evidence, submitted by the requesting country, on which to base the decision to certify. 649
F.2d at 1342 n.10.
1193. Id at 1342. The Caplan court distinguished Cucuzzella in that Cucuzzella never
questioned the criminality of his charged conduct in Canada, but argued instead that there
was no comparable offense in the United States. Caplan, on the other hand, refused to
concede that his conduct was criminal in any jurisdiction. Id at 1342 n. 1 (citing 638 F.2d at
107-08).
1194. 649 F.2d at 1343. The "principle of specialty" limits prosecution in the requesting
country to those offenses for which extradition has been granted by the asylum country. The
treaty specifically provides that "[a] person extradited shall not be detained or proceeded
against in the territory of the requesting Party for any offense other than an extraditable
offense established by the facts in respect of which his extradition has been granted." Extra-
dition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, art. XII. § 1, 28 U.S.T. 229, 233,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468 at 7.
1195. 649 F.2d at 1344. The court noted that the extradition court's sole finding regarding
whether the charged offenses were extraditable consisted of the following statements:
The sixty charges contained in the London arrest warrant are ones enumerated
within the ... extradition treaty ... as being of an extraditable nature .... The
charges contained in the London arrest warrant are offenses which are also consid-
ered unlawful in this jurisdiction and would subject an offender to a possible sen-
tence in excess of one year imprisonment.
Id at 1343.
1196. Id at 1344-45. The court emphasized that it was not an appellate court's function to
furnish the connections between the factual allegations and the extraditable offenses; such
an attempt to cure a substantial deficiency would result in an inefficient and, without full
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The Ninth Circuit's extraditability decisions establish that, before
an individual may be certified for extradition, he must have committed
acts in the requesting country which constitute criminal offenses in both
that country and the United States. Once this threshold requirement
has been met, the Ninth Circuit exercises some flexibility in its analysis
of other factors determining extraditability. Defenses such as expira-
tion of the statute of limitations are, of course, accepted as sufficient to
rebut a certification of extraditability, but trivial errors in certificates
accompanying extradition documents are accorded little weight. Simi-
larly, a lack of absolute identity between the statute violated in the re-
questing country and the corresponding statute in the United States is
not considered fatal to extraditability. As long as the statute violated
proscribes the same type of conduct as that proscribed in the United
States, the Ninth Circuit will certify an individual's extraditability.
C Change of Venue
In United States v. Flores-Eias, "97 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the denial of a motion for change of venue based on pretrial
publicity resulted in unconstitutional prejudice." 98 Flores-Elias was
convicted of smuggling illegal aliens from El Salvador to the United
States. Widespread media coverage surrounding the tragic deaths of
thirteen illegal aliens in the Arizona desert prompted the defendant to
move for a change of venue. The defendant asserted on appeal that he
had been unconstitutionally prejudiced by the denial." 99
The Ninth Circuit noted that a district court is granted broad dis-
cretion in ruling on a change of venue, and that its determination will
not be altered absent an abuse of that discretion.1 20° The court then
adversary participation, error-prone application of time and energy. Id at 1344. The
Caplan court also expressed doubt that charges 55 through 59, accusing Caplan of false
accounting, could be considered extraditable. It observed that the Government had already
conceded that charges 56 and 58 were not extraditable and that a British judge had acquitted
Caplan's co-defendants of similar charges because the acts allegedly committed were a com-
mon occurrence among English banks. Id at 1344 n.17.
1197. 650 F.2d.1 149 (9th Cir. 1981).
1198. Id at 1150. A trial judge is required to grant a motion for change of venue when
"there exists in the district where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the
defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial at any place fixed by law for
holding court in that district." FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a).
1199. 650 F.2d at 1150. Defendant also contended that the district court erred in rejecting
his juror challenges, and that it conducted an inadequate voir dire. Id
1200. Id at 1151. See United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 552 (9th Cir. 1978) (up-
holding district court's denial of change of venue motion despite extensive local media cov-
erage of trial), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979).
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determined that such an abuse did not exist in the instant case.' 2°' The
publicity focused on the El Salvadorean victims, rather than on the de-
fendant, 120 2 and it "was largely factual, not emotional or accusa-
tory."' 120 3 Moreover,, although two of the jurors had heard of the case,
neither had formed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt.' 20 The court
thus concluded that the defendant demonstrated neither "inherent [n]or
actual prejudice from the publicity," and affirmed the judgment of the
district court. 20
5
D. Defendants Right to Discovery
In Brady v. Maryland, 120 6 the Supreme Court firmly established a
federal defendant's right to discover prosecutorial evidence favorable
to his or her defense. If the prosecution refuses to disclose exculpatory
information requested by the defendant, due process is violated, even if
the prosecution is acting in good faith. 20 7
This term the Ninth Circuit addressed a variety of issues pertain-
ing to the defendant's right to discovery: the disclosures of an inform-
ant's identity, a victim's FBI record, illegally obtained wiretap
information, the use of the deposition testimony of a key Government
witness, the production of statements of witnesses whom the Govern-
ment initially did not intend to call as witnesses, and the existence of
prejudice resulting from the Government's failure to comply with a dis-
covery rule.
In United States v. Buras, 120 1 the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant
Buras' conviction on four counts of willful failure to fie an income tax
return in violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7203.1209 The court also af-
firmed the district court's denial of Buras' motion for discovery of the
informant who disclosed his violation to the Internal Revenue
Service.1
2 10
1201. 650 F.2d at 1151.
1202. Id at 1150. Only one article referred to the defendant by name.
1203. Id
1204. Id at 1151.
1205. Id
1206. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
1207. Id at 87.
1208. 633 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980).
1209. Id at 1358. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax. . . who willfully
fails to pay such estimated tax. . . at the time or times required by law or regula-
tions, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misde-
meanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be Rued not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
1210. 633 F.2d at 1360.
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Buras had filed income tax returns listing wages earned as a free-
lance truck driver as income for eight years before 1974. Tax was with-
held from his paychecks during this time. Between 1974 and 1977
Buras did not file tax returns, having concluded that the tax laws did
not require him to report wages as income. Although he earned be-
tween $11,000 and $21,000 during this time, Buras filed withholding
certificates (Form W-43) so that no tax would be withheld from his
paychecks. 1211
On a motion to discover the identity of the individual who had
notified the I.R.S. of his actions, Buras argued that the informant could
have provided information bearing on whether his failure to file was
willful or in good faith.1 212 The Ninth Circuit applied the standard
established by the Supreme Court in Roviaro v. United States2 3 in
determining whether the district court acted properly in denying Buras'
motion. 214 The Roviaro Court held that disclosure of an informant's
identity is required when the identity "is relevant and helpful" to the
accused's defense "or is essential to a fair determination of a cause."'1
2 1 5
The Court noted that the crime charged, possible defenses, and the sig-
nificance and materiality of the informant's testimony were relevant
factors for consideration. 2 1 6 The Ninth Circuit held that Buras had
not met the Rovario test: his request was based on unfounded suspi-
cion and conjecture, he had not demonstrated the materiality of the
informant's testimony, nor had he shown "that disclosure of the in-
formant's identity . . . would [have been] relevant or helpful to the
1211. Id at 1363.
1212. Id at 1360. Section 7203 is not violated when failure to file an income tax return
results from a good faith misunderstanding of the law. United States v. Ross, 626 F.2d 77,
80 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Matosky, 421 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 904 (1970).
1213. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
1214. 633 F.2d at 1360.
1215. 353 U.S. at 60-61. In Roylaro, the defendant had been convicted in federal district
court of knowingly possessing and transporting unlawfully imported heroin. The Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Government must disclose the identity of an undercover
employee who had a material part in planning the commission of the crime and who was
present at its occurrence. Id at 55. The Court set forth a balancing test to determine the
justifiability of such disclosure. The public interest in protecting its sources of information
to preserve the flow of information must be weighed against the defendant's right to prepare
his defense. Factors to be considered include the circumstances of each case, such as the
crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance and materiality of the in-
former's testimony, and other relevant factors. Id at 62. The Court stated, "[w]here the
disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and
helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the
privilege must give way." Id at 60-6 1.
1216. Id See supra note 1215.
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defense or essential to a fair determination of the case."' 1217 Moreover,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that such disclosure was not required merely
because Buras' arrest resulted from an investigation undertaken pursu-
ant to the informant's tip.'
218
In Briggs v. Jaines, 1119 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the
district court had improperly dismissed a habeas corpus petition filed
by the defendant which alleged a Brady violation based on the prosecu-
tion's refusal to disclose the victim's F.B.I. record. 1220 In reaching its
decision, the Brggs court relied on Fifth Circuit authority wherein it
was held that the prosecution's suppression of exculpatory evidence
maintained by a related governmental agency violated due process. 1221
The court agreed with the State's contention that the record did not
1217. 633 F.2d at 1360. The court noted that Buras, like United States v. Kelly, 449 F.2d
329 (9th Cir. 1971), was not a case where the informant was a witness to the crime. 633 F.2d
at 1360. In Kelly, the defendant was found guilty of conspiring to import heroin and of
knowingly concealing and facilitating the transportation and concealment of heroin. He
appealed on the ground that the district court erred in not disclosing the identity of the
informant. The Kelly court held that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of show-
ing the need for disclosure. The court distinguished the case from Roviaro on the basis that
the Roviaro informant directly participated in and witnessed the crime, whereas the Kelly
informant neither dealt with the accused nor witnessed the crime. 449 F.2d at 330-31.
1218. 633 F.2d at 1360 (citing Simpson v. Kreiger, 565 F.2d 390, 391 (6th Cir. 1977), cer.
denied, 435 U.S. 946 (1978)). The Simpson court interpreted Roviaro as not requiring the
disclosure of the informant's identity when there is no indication that the informant partici-
pated in or witnessed the offense charged. 565 F.2d at 391-92 (citing Phillips v. Cardwell,
482 F.2d 1348, 1349 (6th Cir. 1973)).
1219. 652 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1981).
1220. Id at 863-64. At trial, Briggs testified that the victim initiated a fight after Briggs
resisted the victim's homosexual advances. The state trial court denied Briggs' request that
the prosecution produce the victim's criminal record, including his FBI "rap sheet." Id at
863.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Briggs' conviction, holding that the prosecution's
failure to produce the FBI "rap sheet" did not violate the Brady rule because the "rap sheet"
was in the possession of the FBI, and not under the prosecution's control. The prosecution
could therefore not have concealed this information. State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 383, 542
P.2d 804, 808 (1975).
In his subsequent habeas corpus petition, Briggs argued that the prosecution failed to
produce favorable evidence in violation of Brady. Briggs claimed that the FBI "rap sheet"
would have bolstered his claim of self-defense, as it would have revealed a series of sexual
assaults by the victim. The district court dismissed Briggs' petition without a hearing, find-
ing merely that the Brady issue was considered and properly decided. 652 F.2d at 864. On
appeal, the State conceded that a failure to obtain and disclose the FBI "rap sheet" of a
homicide victim can constitute a Brady violation. Id at 865; see also supra text accompany-
ing note 1207. The prosecution further admitted that the FBI records were in its control at
Briggs' trial. 652 F.2d at 865.
1221. 652 F.2d at 865 (citing Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1980)). The
Martinez court found that although a medical examiner had possession of the "rap sheet,"
the prosecutor had access to it. Id at 187. The court reasoned: "The rule of Brady would be
thwarted if a prosecutor were free to ignore specific requests for material information ob-
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adequately determine whether the victim's "rap sheet" was both mate-
rial and favorable to Briggs. The court observed, however, that Briggs
was never given an opportunity to demonstrate this fact. 1222 Thus, the
Briggs court concluded that the habeas corpus petition was improperly
dismissed, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the "rap sheet" would have produced material evidence
favorable to Briggs' defense at trial." 3
In United States v. Bissell, 1224 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to allow
either full disclosure of illegally obtained wiretap information or an
adversary hearing to determine if the defendant was convicted without
the use of illegally obtained evidence. 1225 Defendant Bissell had been a
member of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Telephones in
the SDS national headquarters had been monitored by use of an alleg-
tainable by the prosecutor from a related governmental entity, though unobtainable by the
defense." Id
The Briggs court also cited 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1976), which states that "[t]he Attorney
General shall:
(1) acquire, collect, classify and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime
and other records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, authorized officials of the
Federal Government, the States, cities and penal and other institutions."
Finally, the Briggs court recognized an Oregon appellate court decision, holding that in
almost every case, FBI "rap sheets" are in the constructive possession of the State. 652 F.2d
at 865 (citing State v. Ireland, 11 Or. App. 264, 268, 500 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Or. CL App.
1972)).
1222. 652 F.2d at 865-66. Neither the record nor the Arizona Supreme Court opinion
referred to the contents of the "rap sheet." The Arizona Supreme Court did not address the
materiality issue because it held that the FBI records, if any, were not in the prosecution's
control. The district court was asked to evaluate Briggs' assertions that the victim had a
record of sexual assaults and to decide whether this information would have been both
favorable and material to Briggs' defense; instead, it summarily dismissed Briggs' petition
without holding an evidentiary hearing. Id
1223. Id at 866. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court stated
that "[a] fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of
materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the
trial' Id at 104.
In the instant case, Briggs made a specific request for information, namely the contents
of the FBI "rap sheet.' The Agurs Court stated that if defense counsel requests specific
evidence, the standard of materiality is whether the evidence "might have affected the out-
come of the trial." Id at 104. If the defense makes a general request for "all Brady mate-
rial" or "anything exculpatory," the standard of materiality is higher. Id at 106-07. See,
eg., United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1979) (where no specific de-
fense request for evidence made, prosecution's failure to disclose violates due process only
"'if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt [about the defendant's guilt] that did
not otherwise exist."' (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112)).
1224. 634 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1980).
1225. Id at 1234.
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edly illegal national security wiretap. Bissell was later observed and
apprehended by a university guard while attempting to place a bomb
under the steps of an Air Force ROTC building.
226
Bissell was convicted of conspiring willfully and unlawfully to in-
jure the property of the United States and of willfully and knowingly
possessing an unregistered destructive device. 1227 After her conviction,
Bissell moved for an order to compel Government disclosure and for
discovery regarding the Government's alleged use of evidence obtained
from illegal electronic surveillance in violation of her fourth amend-
ment rights.122 The district court denied the motion, holding that none
of the evidence introduced at trial was obtained through electronic
surveillance. 1229
The Ninth Circuit initially stated that a discussion of.41derman v.
United States was essential to resolve the issue presented.123' In
Alderman, the Supreme Court considered the procedures to be fol-
lowed by the district court in resolving whether evidence against the
defendant-petitioner grew out of his illegally overheard conversations
or conversations occurring on the premises. 232 The Court held that (1)
the illegally obtained "surveillance records. . . should be turned over
to [defendant-petitioner] without being screened in camera by the trial
judge," 1211 and (2) a meaningful adversary hearing should then be held
1226. Id at 1229-30.
1227. Id at 1229.
1228. Id at 1230. Bissell filed a pretrial motion for discovery, disclosure and inspection,
and specific hearing procedures on the electronic surveillance matters to determine the legal-
ity of the wiretap, her standing, and the admissibility of evidence obtained by the wiretap.
In response to this motion, the Government ordered investigations of a number of federal
law enforcement agencies which revealed transcripts of three telephone conversations which
were made available to her. Id Bissell claimed that the meager amount of evidence uncov-
ered indicated that the investigation and disclosure process was inadequate. Nevertheless,
the district court postponed any hearing on electronic surveillance matters until after trial.
Id
1229. Id The trial court found that because of numerous demonstrations and previous
damage to ROTC facilities, the university had taken precautions against further damage by
stationing guards nightly in all campus ROTC buildings. According to the court, these
guards thus observed and apprehended the defendant independently of any illegally inter-
cepted conversations. id at 1231.
1230. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
1231. 634 F.2d at 1231.
1232. 394 U.S. at 180.
1233. Id at 182. The Court explained that the task of identifying the records which may
have contributed to the Government's case was too complex to permit reliance on the in
camera judgment of the trial court. The Court noted that certain information contained in
the surveillance records which might be meaningless to the trial judge may have had special
significance to someone well acquainted with the defendant. Id The Court continued:
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on the issue of tainted evidence.1 234
The Bissell court noted that in Taglianetti v. United States1231 the
Supreme Court held that "'[nothing in Alderman. . . requires an ad-
versary proceeding and full disclosure for resolution of every issue
raised by an electronic surveillance.' "1236 The Taglianetti Court dist-
inguished Alderman because the in camera procedures there would
have been inadequate to preserve the defendant's fourth amendment
rights; in contrast, the trial court in Taglianetti was asked to insure the
accuracy of the Government's voice identifications. 2 37 This task was
held to be less complex than that faced by the trial court in Alderman,
and thus the Taglianetti Court upheld the trial court's reliance upon the
in camera examination.
23 8
The Bissell court also noted that case law indicates that the district
court has some discretion when faced with requests for the disclosure of
illegally obtained wiretap information and adversary hearings.1
239
Such discretion is especially warranted when it is clear that the evi-
dence introduced at trial was obtained without the use of an illegal
wiretap. 1240
The Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that "the allegedly illegal
electronic surveillance was entirely unrelated to the stationing of the
single campus security guard instrumental in the apprehension of the
appellant,. . . [and, therefore,] the government's case was entirely in-
"[We think this resolution will avoid an exorbitant expenditure of judicial time and energy
and will not unduly prejudice others or the public interest." Id at 184.
1234. Id at 183-84. The Court noted that at such a hearing the defendant has the burden
of producing specific evidence demonstrating a taint; the Government must then purge the
taint by proving that its evidence was acquired from an independent source. Id at 183.
1235. 394 U.S. 316 (1969) (per curiam). In Taglianett the First Circuit affirmed defend-
ant's conviction on three counts of willfully attempting to evade payment of income.tax. Id
at 316. On remand, the district court examined in camera surveillance records obtained by
the Government to determine whether the Government had correctly identified defendant's
voice and had turned over to him each conversation. The defendant argued that he was
entitled to examine the records because neither the Government nor the district court had
definitively determined which of the conversations he had actually participated in. Id at
317.
1236. 634 F.2d at 1232 (quoting Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. at 317).
1237. 394 U.S. at 317.
1238. I1d at 317-18.
1239. 634 F.2d at 1233.
1240. Id (citing United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 874 (9th Cir.) (post-trial hearing
proper where no discernable nexus between surveillance and matters to be proved at trial),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840 (1977); United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1059 (10th Cir.)
(no abuse of discretion to refuse disclosure or adversary hearing where taint dissipated),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976); United States v. Sellers, 315 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (N.D. Ga.
1970) (Alderman implicitly requires that admission of tainted evidence could have resulted
in conviction)).
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dependent of any possible exploitation of any illegality."' 1241 Based on
this determination, the court held that the Government's disclosure was
adequate to safeguard Bissell's rights 242 and that the district court ac-
ted within its discretion "in refusing to order additional disclosure and
adversary hearings pursuant to appellant's overbroad motion."
12 43
In Furlow v. United States, '244 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to permit the
deposition of a key witness and the introduction at trial of testimony so
obtained where the witness was ill and his testimony was taken to pre-
serve it for trial.'245 Defendant Furlow was convicted on two counts of
possessing and uttering a United States treasury check with intent to
defraud. 2  He claimed that the district court erred in permitting a
deposition of the payee of the check, Wilfred Peatross, to be taken and
used pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(a). 1247 The
court found Furlow's claim without merit. 1248 It noted that the district
court has discretion to grant' 249 or deny 25 0 a motion to depose a pro-
posed witness in a criminal trial, and held that under the circumstances
the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Rule 15.1211
The Furlow court also dismissed the defendant's claim that the dis-
1241. 634 F.2d at 1233-34.
1242. Id The Ninth Circuit explained:
The fact that one of the transcripts refers to an undisclosed conversation and that
the appellant claimed she made at least twenty-five telephone calls to the SDS
National Headquarters does not mean that any additional search is required.
These contentions do not rise above a mere suspicion that there might be some-
where in the government's files a recording of appellant's voice which might in
some manner have tainted the evidence introduced at trial. Certainly they do not
warrant remand on the facts of this case.
Id
1243. Id at 1234. The Bissell court noted that, unlike Alderman, further inquiries into
wiretap matters would have served no purpose since the Government disclosed all of the
tapes its search had uncovered. 634 F.2d at 1234.
1244. 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 454 U.S. 871 (1981).
1245. Id at 766-67.
1246. Id at 765-66.
1247. Id at 766. FED. R. Caim. P. 15(a) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the interest ofjustice
that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and preserved for
use at trial, the court may upon motion of such party and notice to the parties order
that testimony of such witnesses be taken by deposition ....
1248. 644 F.2d at 767.
1249. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1978) (Rule
15(a) authorizes trial court to permit depositions when interests of justice served), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979).
1250. See, e.g., United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir.) (depositions in crimi-
nal cases not permitted for the purpose of discovery alone), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978).
1251. 644 F.2d at 767.
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trict court made a series of technical errors regarding the taking of the
deposition, 12 2 holding that he was not deprived of the safeguards of
the criminal rules. 253 The court emphasized that a series of precau-
tions were taken to afford the defendant due process: he was provided
a right to confrontation, effective representation, sufficient notice, and
the opportunity to test Peatross' credibility. 254
Furlow also contended that the introduction at trial of a police
report prejudiced his case.' 255 The circuit court initially found that be-
cause the report was not part of the prosecutor's file, its disclosure was
not required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 161256 nor by
Brady v. Maryland 1257 When the police report was discovered, the
prosecution made it available to Furlow's counsel for overnight study
and for use on cross-examination.1258 The court concluded that, under
these circumstances, Furlow was not prejudiced by its use.
1259
In United States v. Mills, 1260 the Government appealed an order
requiring production of statements made by inmates whom the Gov-
ernment had interviewed but did not intend to call as witnesses. The
Ninth Circuit granted the Government's petition for a writ of
mandamus. 1
2 6
The Jencks Act,1262 which governs the production of witness state-
ments, 1263 provides that no statement of a Government witness is dis-
coverable until the witness has testified on direct examination. 264 In
1252. Id.
1253. Id The Furlow court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's application
of FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(b) which provides:
A defendant not in custody shall have the right to be present at the examination
upon request subject to such terms as may be fixed by the court, but his failure,
absent good cause shown, to appear after notice and tender of expenses in accord-
ance with subdivision (c) of this rule shall constitute a waiver of that right and of
any objection to the taking and use of the deposition based upon that right.
1254. 644 F.2d at 767. The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus, releasing defend-
ant from state custody, to permit his presence during the deposition. Because his appointed
counsel was on active military duty, the district court appointed substitute counsel to repre-
sent him at that proceeding. This attorney and a United States Marshal met with defendant,
and he was tendered expenses to attend the deposition, but chose not to do so. Id. at 766.
1255. Id at 767.
1256. Id FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) provides for the disclosure of evidence by the
Government.
1257. Id See supra text accompanying notes 1206-07.
1258. 644 F.2d at 767.
1259. Id
1260. 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 871 (1981).
1261. Id at 789-90.
1262. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976).
1263. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 351 (1959).
1264. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1976) provides:
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Mills, the Ninth Circuit stated that "Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 16(a)(2) excludes. . . 'statements made by government witnesses
or prospective government witnesses'" from the category of evidence
the defense is entitled to discover before trial, except as provided in the
Jencks Act. 265 The court observed that "[flor the purposes of Rule 16,
statements made by persons who were prospective witnesses when in-
terviewed do not lose that character by a subsequent decision not to
call them at trial.'
' 266
The Mills court rejected the defendants' argument that the state-
ments were documents discoverable under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16(a)(1)(C) 12 67 and held that the trial court exceeded its au-
thority in ordering the production of these statements over the Govern-
ment's objection. 1268  The court stated that protection of statements
made by prospective witnesses is necessary to protect the witnesses
from threats, bribery, or perjury. 269 The Mills court noted that in the
instant case the need to protect the Government witnesses was espe-
cially great, as they were prison inmates and lived in constant fear of
retaliation for providing evidence against fellow inmates.1270 The court
also noted that cooperation by prison inmates would be extremely un-
likely if they were not protected in their capacity as Government
witnesses. 1
271
In United States v. Valencia, 1272 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the defendant was prejudiced by a procedural irregularity re-
garding the admission into evidence of a cocaine bindle, seized during
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in
the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or
prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of
a subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct exami-
nation in the trial of the case.
Accord United States v. Jones, 612 F.2d 453, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S.
966 (1980).
1265. 641 F.2d at 790 (quoting FED. R. CiuM. P. 16(a)(2)).
1266. 641 F.2d at 790.
1267. Id FED. R. CIuM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) provides in pertinent part:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to in-
spect and copy or photograph... documents. . . which are within the possession,
custody or control of the government, and which are material to the preparation of
his defense, or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the
trial, or were obtained from or belong to the government.
1268. 641 F.2d at 790.
1269. Id (citing United States v. Walk, 533 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1975)). Accord United
States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 1974).
1270. 641 F.2d at 790.
1271. Id
1272. 656 F.2d 412 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981).
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his lawful arrest. 1273
Defendants Valencia and Duarte were convicted of conspiring to
distribute heroin and cocaine.1274 Valencia was also convicted of un-
lawfully carrying a firearm in the commission of a felony.' 275 They
were arrested after conducting a narcotics transaction with a paid Gov-
ernment informant and a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA). After placing them under arrest, the DEA agent
seized a bag containing approximately fifteen ounces of heroin from
the floor of Valencia's automobile. A search incident to Valencia's ar-
rest revealed a loaded and cocked .45 caliber pistol concealed in the
back of his pants and a small bindle of cocaine in a jacket pocket.
1276
As a prerequisite to suppression of the evidence under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3), 1277 Valencia moved under Rule
12(d) 278 to request notice of the Government's intention to use any
evidence which he may have been entitled to discover under Rule
16.1279 The Government provided Valencia with a list of certain evi-
dence to be introduced at trial, and during trial, the Government stipu-
lated that it had made "an intentional, deliberate and conscious
decision" not to include the bindle of cocaine in its list of evidence.1
2 0
The Government, however, did offer the cocaine into evidence,
and the court admitted it over Valencia's objection.128' The court also
1273. Id at 416.
1274. Id at 413-14.
1275. Id
1276. Id at 414.
1277. FED. R. CruM. P. 12(b)(3) provides: "Any defense, objection, or request which is
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by
motion. Motions may be written or oral at the discretion of the judge. The following must
be raised prior to trial: ... (3) Motions to suppress evidence .
1278. FED. R. CRiM. P. 12(d) provides:
At the arraignment or as soon thereafter as is practicable, the government may
give notice to the defendant of its intention to use specified evidence at trial in
order to afford the defendant an opportunity to raise objections to such evidence
prior to trial under subdivision (b)(3) of this rule.
At the arraignment or as soon thereafter as is practicable the defendant may,
in order to afford an opportunity to move to suppress evidence under subdivision
(b)(3) of this rule, request notice of the government's intention to use (in its evi-
dence in chief at trial) any evidence which the defendant may be entitled to dis-
cover under Rule 16 subject to any relevant limitations prescribed in Rule 16.
1279. FED. R. CGluM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) provides in pertinent part:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to in-
spect and copy or photograph ... tangible objects.., which are within the pos-
session, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the
preparation of the defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence
in chief at trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
1280. 656 F.2d at 415.
1281. Id.
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allowed a supplemental motion to suppress the evidence.1 2 2 On ap-
peal, Valencia claimed that the district court should not have allowed
the Government to introduce the cocaine into evidence because such
admission violated the spirit and letter of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(d), as well as his right to a fair trial and due process of
law.
1283
The Ninth Circuit relied on United States v. Baxter'28 for the
proposition that the district court has discretion to determine the ap-
propriate sanction for a failure to comply with a discovery rule.
128
The court then addressed the question of whether "the district court
abused this discretion 128 6 and analogized the case at bar to United
States v. Pheaster. 1287 The Valencia court observed that, as in Pheaster,
1282. Id
1283. Id The Ninth Circuit considered the purpose of Rule 12(d) as stated in the Notes of
the Advisory Committee on Rules: "to avoid the necessity of moving to suppress evidence
which the government does not intend to use." Id (quoting Rule 12, Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules). According to the Advisory Committee, the rule did not provide for
sanctions because the Committee believed that attorneys for the Government would comply
and that judges have at their disposal the means to insure compliance. The automatic exclu-
sion of evidence, the committee stated, would create too heavy a burden on the exclusionary
rule, especially when the defendant has the opportunity for broad discovery under Rule 16.
The Advisory Committee noted that the suppression of evidence could result from a failure
to comply with the duty of giving notice but because the ABA Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice makes it clear that the rule is intended as a matter of procedure, otherwise
admissible evidence need not be suppressed. 656 F.2d at 415 (citing PROJECT ON STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 116
(Approved Draft 1971)).
1284. 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).
1285. 656 F.2d at 415 (citing United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d at 174). In Baxter, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed defendants' drug convictions, although the Government failed to
comply with a pretrial order to provide them with a transcript of the grand jury testimony of
a Government witness at least 24 hours prior to trial. Following Hansen v. United States,
393 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1968), the Ninth Circuit stated that "the sanctions to be imposed, if
any, because of a failure to comply with a pretrial discovery order rest with the sound discre-
tion of the trial court." 492 F.2d at 174 (citing Hansen, 393 F.2d at 769-70). The Baxter
Court found no abuse of discretion in permitting the Government witness to testify because
the defendant was not prejudiced by the Government's delay. 492 F.2d at 174.
1286. 656 F.2d at 415.
1287. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977). In Pheaster, the
defendant challenged the district court's refusal to suppress certain evidence found during a
search of his residence on the ground that it was originally contemplated that nothing seized
from the residence would be introduced at trial. Id at 382. In the exercise of its discretion,
the district court had allowed the evidence to be introduced, subject to any motions to sup-
press by the defendant Inciso. After Inciso filed suppression motions, the district court con-
ducted a hearing and determined that the evidence was admissible. The Government later
attempted to introduce additional evidence seized during the search, and the col'rt also ad-
mitted this evidence over Inciso's objections. Id at 382. The Pheaster court held that even
though this procedure was not ideal,
[l]t was, for the most part, dictated by the Government's vacillation concerning the
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the defendant was given sufficient opportunity to present his objections
to the district court.1 288 He was not, therefore, prejudiced by the proce-
dural irregularity, and lack of such prejudice prevented a finding that
the district court had abused its discretion in admitting the cocaine
bindle.1
2 8 9
E. Government's Civil Discovery of Grand Jury Materials
In In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 78-184, 1290 the Ninth Circuit.
held that Government attorneys do not have an absolute right to dis-
closure of grand jury materials for use in civil proceedings. Instead,
such disclosure is to be obtained through a court order.' 29 1 Central to
the court's determination was its interpretation of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e) governing the secrecy of grand jury proceed-
ings. Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) and (ii) permits disclosure of grand jury mater-
ials to:
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance
of such attorney's duty; and (ii) such government personnel as
are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to
assist an attorney for the government in the performance of
such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.1
292
In In re Grand Jury Investigation, the Government moved for dis-
closure of grand jury materials used in a prior criminal prosecution for
use in a possible civil suit against the same defendants. The district
court ruled that under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) the Civil Division of the De-
evidence that it would present. The district court exercised its discretion to allow
the evidence to be introduced. In doing so, it gave Inciso sufficient opportunity to
present his objections and to preserve his position on appeal.
Id
1288. 656 F.2d at 416. The court noted that Valencia had been afforded two suppression
hearings, each involving evidence seized during the search: the pistol and the cocaine bindle.
The court further observed that Valencia also was permitted pretrial discovery of the labora-
tory analysis of the cocaine bindle. Id
1289. Id
1290. 642 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1981).
1291. I at 1190.
1292. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i), (ii). Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) and (ii) further provides:
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury may also be made -
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judi-
cial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing
that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of mat-
ters occurring before the grand jury.
FED. R. CRAiM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i), (ii).
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partment of Justice was entitled to the materials as a matter of right.1293
The defendants appealed, asserting that the pertinent provision applied
only to disclosure in aid of criminal, rather than civil law
enforcement.
294
The court's construction of Rule 6(e) derived from legislative his-
tory which the court examined in light of "the traditional and funda-
mental policy of grand jury secrecy."' 1295 The court compared the broad
investigatory powers of the grand jury in criminal matters to the dis-
covery limitations imposed on civil litigants and concluded that "[tlo
grant the government an absolute right of access to grand jury materials
for civil use might irresistibly encourage use of the grand jury as a tool
of civil discovery."' 296 Furthermore, the court held that judicial review
of such abuse would be crippled by allowing civil attorneys to have
access to grand jury materials as a matter of right.1297 These considera-
tions, in conjunction with the court's determination that the Rule 6(e)
"exception... was motivated primarily... by the grand jury's need
for legal and technical assistance,"'' 291 led the court to hold that "Con-
gress intended a court order under [Rule 6(e)(3)(C)] to be the avenue to
access to grand jury materials by the government for civil use."'
1299
The court remanded with instructions to determine the propriety
of a court order mandating disclosure to the Civil Division of the De-
partment of Justice. To assist the district court in its determination, the
court of appeals set forth a balancing test whereby "the district court
must examine each distinguishable type of protected material and de-
1293. 642 F.2d at 1186-87.
1294. Id at 1189. The Ninth Circuit first rejected the Government's argument that the
appeal was moot because disclosure to civil attorneys and their assistants had already been
made. "Each day this order remains effective the veil of secrecy is lifted higher by disclosure
to additional personnel and by the continued access of those to whom the materials have
already been disclosed." Id at 1187-88.
1295. Id at 1190. The policies underlying grand jury secrecy were enunciated by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958) (quoting
United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)):
(1) [teo prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have informa-
tion with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [the] innocent accused
who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation,
and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
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termine for each whether the need for disclosure outweighs the tradi-
tional and fundamental presumption of secrecy."' 1300 By requiring a
court order to disclose grand jury materials to government civil attor-
neys, the Ninth Circuit established a more stringent procedure than
other circuits which have considered the issue. 13
0
1
F. Defendant's Presence at Pretrial Conference
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) requires that a defend-
ant be present "at the arraignment, at the time of plea, at every stage of
the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the ver-
dict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by
this rule."130 2 Rule 43(c)(3) provides, however, that a defendant's pres-
ence is not required "[alt a conference or argument upon a question of
law."'13
0 3
The Ninth Circuit recently interpreted Rule 43 in United States v.
Veatch. 1304 Veatch was not present in chambers during a pretrial con-
ference concerning several matters, including his request for an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine his competency to stand trial, a motion
regarding his insanity defense, and his motion for continuance. 130S
Veatch claimed that he was denied access to the pretrial conference
despite his request to be present. No record of such a request was
found. 1306
The court held that, regardless of whether Veatch had requested
permission to attend the conference, his absence did not violate his due
process rights.130 7 The court relied on Snyder v. Massachusetts130 8 and
1300. Id at 1192.
1301. The Fifth Circuit has held, for example, that:
Rule 6(e), as amended in 1977, permits the disclosure of grand jury materials with-
out a court order only when made to attorneys for the government in performance
of their duties or government personnel deemed necessary to assist an attorney for
the government in the performance of his duties to enforce federal criminal law.
This disclosure limitation, restricting use to criminal law enforcement, does not ap-
ply to government attorneys.
In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (emphasis added in last
sentence).
1302. FED. R. CRM. P.43(a). Rule 43(b)(1) & (2) further provide that a defendant shall be
considered to have waived his right to be present if he voluntarily absents himself during
trial or if he is ejected from the courtroom for disruptive conduct after being warned by the
court of such possibility. FED. R. CiaM. P. 43(b)(1), (2).
1303. FED. R. CiAM. P. 43(c)(3).
1304. 647 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1981).
1305. Id at 1003.
1306. Id.
1307. Id
1308. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). The Snyder Court held that although the defendant was not
1982]
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Faretta v. California, 1309 as well as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
43(c)(3), in reaching its conclusion. According to the court, "Veatch's
presence would have contributed nothing substantial to his opportunity
to defend since the matters discussed predominantly involved questions
of law.'
1310
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present when the jury viewed the scene of the crime, his due process rights were not violated;
the defendant's presence is required only when it "has a relation, reasonably substantial, to
the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Id at 105-06.
1309. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Faretta Court noted that defendant's presence is constitu-
tionally required only at "stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of
the proceedings." Id at 819 n.15 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)).
1310. 647 F.2d at 1004. The court emphasized that because the defendant "was completely
and effectively represented by counsel at the conference," his absence did not detrimentally
affect the fairness of his trial. 1d
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